Air-brushing History

   The meaning of “To air-brush” in colloquial use is “To represent something as being different from how it really is”.  Any student of written history becomes familiar with the use of “The air-brush” (if they are not hopelessly naïve) in matters where an author does not wish to use plain facts which vary from some position already taken.  The defence against this is to consult as many sources as available on a contentious subject*¹.

*1.  The author, who has read a vast number of war memoirs, believes that the only examples free of the “air-brush” are those of Field Marshal Slim and Air Chief Marshal Embry.

   This Contribution No.26 gives two examples of “Air-brushing” on widely different topics where it was applied some years after the events.  The reasons were that it was politically expedient not to draw attention to things of which people in powerful positions did not wish the public to be reminded as it might damage their current influence.

   The examples are:-

A,  The December 1944.decision to withdraw US troops posted around St Vith.

B.  The 1918 decision to mass-produce for 1919 the ABC “Dragonfly” aero engine.

A 1  The St Vith decision

   After the surprise attack by the Germans on the US front in the Ardennes (see Contribution No. 9 at C1) beginning on 16^th December 1944 it soon became clear that the enemy wanted to capture the small Belgian town of St Vith to gain control of its road network from which to advance to the R. Meuse on the way to Antwerp.  They hoped to seize it on the 1^st day (Ref.1).  By using whatever troops were left in the area after the great disruption caused by the unexpected onslaught and rushing there the 7th Armored Division from 60 miles North*² the US succeeded in delaying the loss of the place until the 6^th day, 21^st December.  Fig. 1 on P.3 shows in green the disposition of the American forces on the 20^th December 1944 (the black lines show German attacks on the 23^rd December).

*2.  During that move a unit of the Division was captured by SS troops near Malmedy and 84 men were murdered.  When reported by survivors this incentivised US resistance.

   Events following the German capture of St Vith – which became a traffic jam for their troops – were as follows:-

• The US troops were pulled back South of the town by late 21^st;
• As contact had just been made with the 82^nd Airborne Division on the opposite side of the River Salm, part of the XVIII Corps commanded by Major General Ridgway, the 7^th Armored commanded by Brigadier General Hasbrouck and the other St Vith salient defenders now came under Ridgway’s command (Ref.1);
• Soon after Midnight Ridgway ordered the troops East of the Salm to form a defensive perimeter based on Vielsalm (Ref.1);
• Hasbrouck sent a message to XVIII corps listing his objections to the plan and concluded with a P.S. “In my opinion if we don’t get out of here and up North of the 82^nd before night, we will not have a 7^th Armored Division left ”(Ref.1);
• Ridgway promptly relieved Hasbrouck of his command (Ref. 2, message timed 0625)*^{3 & 4};

*3.  Ridgway was a type of US general described by themselves as “Full of piss and vinegar”!  He habitually wore on shoulder straps a grenade pinned to one side and a field wound dressing on the other – his version of Patton’s two ivory-handled pistols! (see Fig. 4 on P.4).

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*4.  Chester Wilmot (Ref. 2) is the only writer who reports this sacking (and later reinstatement, see below).  His precise timings must prove them to be true and not mentioning them is “air-brushing”.  How he came by the information is unknown.

• Field Marshal Montgomery (BLM), who had been given control of all US forces North of the German breakthrough early on 20^th December, had immediately sent his Liaison Officers each day to all parts of the US lines to find out what the 1^st US Army commander did not know.  On the 22^nd one of these LOs reached Hasbrouck just after he was sacked and was given the facts of the position behind St Vith.  This LO must have returned to report this to BLM as soon as he could, probably at noon (Ref.2);
• Writing after the war, BLM stated:_

“I, personally, did not visit the Seventh Armored Division; the situation in which the division was placed was reported to me by one of my liaison officers who had been there and had talked to Gen. Hasbrouck. As soon as I heard about the division, and about Ridgway’s order, I went at once to the headquarters of the First Army, discussed the matter with Hodges, and ordered the division to be withdrawn. I instructed Hodges to inform Ridgway that I had cancelled his order and to tell him that I was not prepared to lose a very good American division because of the sentimental value of a few square miles of ground; men’s lives being of more value to me than ground which is of no value. Ridgway never forgave me for cancelling his order, I was informed. His philosophy was that American troops never withdraw”*⁵ (Ref. 4);

*5.  The reluctance of Hodges, 1^st US Army commander (who actually abandoned his own HQ in Spa in a hurry on 18^th December) and his subordinates to accept BLM’s advice (and finally orders) to pull back his troops to more defensible positions was because of their unthinking adherence to the line of the Battle Hymn of the Republic which runs “He has sounded forth the trumpet that shall never call Retreat”.  This was written at the start of the US Civil War by Julia Ward Howe. Americans afterwards learnt that in childhood.

• By early afternoon on the 22^nd Ridgway, having received BLM’s countermand and his order to withdraw the troops east of the Salm, went to Hasbrouck’s HQ in Vielsalm (Ref.1) (with the obvious intention of disobeying that order if he could).  When he had consulted with Hasbrouck and the other involved commanders, he found he could not.  The withdrawal was to begin that night.  Hasbrouck was formally re-instated as 7^th Division commander by a message timed 1853 (Ref.2) and given control over all other troops.
• BLM reported to Field Marshal Brooke at the War office that night (Ref. 3, 22^nd December):-

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• After snow had fallen the condition of the poor roads and the ground generally was so soft that the movement of the masses of wheeled and even tracked vehicles was made almost impossible by thick mud (see Fig. 5 on P.4).  By what must be described as a miracle overnight 22^nd /.23^rd December the weather changed, froze the mud and the withdrawal proceeded.  The German advances and attacks during 23^rd are shown in black on Fig. 1 below.  Note particularly the attacks to Salmchateau. Nevertheless, 20,000 men and their equipment were able to cross the Salm and join the 82^nd  (Ref.1).

• Just East of St Vith 2 regiments of the green 106^th US Infantry Division (about 7,000 men with their attached units. Ref. 1), surrounded on top of the Schnee Eifel, had surrendered by the early hours of 21^st December.  If BLM had not given his order the forces behind St Vith would probably have been trapped in an even bigger disaster on the 23^rd.

   Montgomery soothed American amour propre with the words:- “They can come back with all honour…they put up a wonderful show” (Ref.5).  West Point simply did not train the US commanders in the principle of reculer pour mieux sauter for a properly-organised counter-attack when the Germans had been brought to a standstill by defensive attrition, lack of petrol and by air attacks, which is what BLM applied as a professional unaffected by emotion.

   When BLM returned the 1^st US Army to the 12^th US Army Group Commander, Bradley, on 16^th January 1945 Ridgway wrote a quite fulsome letter of thanks to him for his “gifted professional guidance”, concluding with the words “…the hope of again serving with you in the pursuit of a common goal” (Ref. 3). 

   The opportunity for Ridgway to serve again under BLM occurred in April 1945 when the XVIII Corps was lent to him to make a quick drive to the German/Danish border so as to seal it off from our Russian allies.  Actually, it was two British Divisions under attachment to Ridgway’s Corps which then accomplished that mission (see Contribution No.19 at P.20).   Seven years later when the two worked together in NATO and the relative positions were reversed, Ridgway’s warm words had cooled considerably, as will be told below!

Fig.1  (marked-up from Ref. 1)

A.2  Air-brushing the St Vith record

   In December 1950 Ridgway was appointed to command the US 8^th Army in Korea, the previous commander having been killed in a jeep accident.  At the time the troops were in retreat from a large Communist Chinese force of “volunteers” which had come to the aid of the defeated North Korean Communists.  Ridgway first halted this rearward movement then counter-attacked to restore the South Korean boundary near enough to the line it had been before the North Korean invasion – where it remains to this day.

   When General MacArthur was dismissed in April 1951 for defying the orders of his President/Commander-in-Chief, Ridgway moved up to take over his wider responsibilities.

   In Europe the threat of the Communist Soviet Union had resulted in April 1949 in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).  The troops of the 12 members were placed under the command of 5-star General Eisenhower (DDE) in December 1950 as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), with HQ as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).   His WW2 subordinate. BLM, became his Deputy.  DDE and BLM got along well in these roles and the latter had a free hand to organise command training exercises (Ref. 3).

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   However, in May 1951 DDE resigned to throw his hat in the ring to become the Republican candidate for the US Presidency, the election to be held in November of that year (he was so nominated in July).  His replacement as SACEUR was 4-star General Ridgway.

   This reversal seven years later of the positions of two strong-minded men was bound to be difficult.  Despite his words to BLM of January 1945 (given above), Ridgway’s first act was to make clear to BLM that ”…there was going to be but one commander – and when my decisions were announced, that was it. There wasn’t to be any question about them” (Ref.3, quoting from Ridgway’s autobiography, Ref. 6).

   This set the tone for a poor relationship.  The major disagreement was that Ridgway, fresh from fighting Communists in Korea, thought that a “Hot Warr” was likely in the next few years in Europe and wanted to build up large forces to be ready for that, disregarding the economic burden which this would cause.  BLM disagreed because he had concluded that the “Cold War” would last for decades and NATO countries had to adjust their lives to that (of course he turned out to be right since the confrontation lasted without war in Europe until the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991.  See Contribution No. 9 at A5).

  In the meantime, a new edition of Chester Wilmot’s masterpiece “The Struggle for Europe” was being prepared.  Now that Ridgway was in the most responsible military post in Europe and BLM was his Deputy it seemed good to someone to rewrite the part containing Ridgway’s poor decisions of 22^nd December 1944 to hold position East of the R. Salm and then relieve Hasbrouck of his command when he disagreed – which BLM had countermanded.  Accordingly, the relevant part became:-

                           1954 edition                                     Compare this with the 1952 original.

   Ridgway’s order dismissing Hasbrouck disappeared.

   As shown above, Montgomery did not merely “support” a withdrawal, which Hodges and Ridgway had refused, he ordered it.

   This “Air-brushing” by “self-censorship” which saved Ridgway from embarrassment was published in early 1954 (Ref. 7).  By then Eisenhower had become dissatisfied with Ridgway’s performance as SACEUR and decided that he would be better as US Army Chief of Staff.  He changed posts in August 1953.

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   Ridgway wrote later in Ref.6 that Montgomery in 1944 “…gave me the general outline of what he wanted and left me completely free”.  This was a subtle way of saying “Montgomery may have made suggestions but actually I did it my way!” – which was not true.

   Chester Wilmot died on 10^th January 1954 in Comet 1 G-ALYP when it blew up over the Mediterranean due to fatigue failure of the pressurised cabin.

References

1. The Battle of the Bulge  C. MacDonald  Guild Publishing  1984.
2. The Struggle for Europe  C. Wilmot  Collins  1952.
3. Monty: The Field Marshal 1944-1976  N. Hamilton  Sceptre ed.  1987.
4. https://erenow.net/ww/ardennes-1944-1945-hitlers-winter-offensive/6.php

This is a very comprehensive account of the battle of the Bulge, well-illustrated with many German photos, some combat and some posed and well-known..

5. Eisenhower’s Lieutenants  R. Weigley  Sidgwick & Jackson  1981.
6. Soldier  M. Ridgway  Harper  1956.
7. The Struggle for Europe  C. Wilmot  Reprint Society  Before March 1954.

B 1  The order for the ABC Dragonfly aero engine in 1918

Background

   During the Great War, after various organisations had been tried, the growing importance of aviation had finally resulted in the creation of an Air Ministry on 29th November 1917.  This was a decision of the government led by Lloyd George as Prime Minister.

   This was nominally made equal to the Admiralty and the War Office, in charge of a Minister.  There was some difficulty over this post but Lord Rothermere (a “Press Baron”) held it until 23rd April 1918.  He was succeeded by Sir William Weir (WW), who since December 1916 had previously been Controller of Aeronautical Supplies in the Ministry of Munitions.  He had been called into that post, like many other “Captains of Industry” running the Ministry, from being Chairman of the family business making ancillary equipment for steamship propulsion.  The Minister in charge of the Munitions Ministry since 16^th July 1917 was Winston Churchill.

   A Technical Committee in the Ministry of Munitions had the responsibility of vetting designs, which was under the half-brother of WW, Brigadier James Weir (Ref. 8)

  Engine production was in the hands of the Ministry of Munitions co-ordinating private firms, most of which had never made aero engines before the war but which had learnt the business in the previous 3 years.

   In early 1918 new-type engine procurement was in a mixed state – some engines ordered in large quantity for production were bad or late or both, others were good.

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Another disappointing engine was the Siddeley-Deasy Puma.  This water-cooled IL6 18.8 litres engine was a re-design of the BHP type lightened 9% by substituting cast Al-alloy structure for iron and steel.  This caused production delays from casting porosity.  A promise of 300 Rated HP given to Airco for their DH9 (Ref. 10) resulted in performance estimates which bettered the excellent DH4 with Rolls-Royce Eagle engine. 

*6.  Most data sources on the Puma omit any reference to its being de-rated 20% for service – “Air-brushing” an unfavourable fact.  They therefore leave unresolved the question of why the supply authorities delivered the unsuccessful DH9 in the 4^th year of the war, which is explained above.

   Ref. 11 reports that in the 7 months from May 1918 until the end of the war Nos. 99 and 104 Squadrons lost 54 DH9s shot down, ie well over 100% of the original strength.  What is even sadder is that they had 94 aircraft written off by accidents.  This is not to say they were DH9- specific but just brings home the total hazards suffered by aircrew in these early years of military aviation.

   A member of the Aeronautical Inspection Department (AID), George Bulman (who in 1928 would become Director of Engine Development in the Air Ministry until 1944) was sent to evaluate the Wasp (Ref.8).  The prototype developed 170 Rated HP for a weight later reported by Ref. 9 as 260 lb.  Bulman reported on its simple manufacture and thought that if it passed a 100 hour test it could be suitable for trainer aircraft.

   While at ABC Bulman was shown the drawings of a larger 9-cylinder engine of 22.8 Litres based on the Wasp principles which GB claimed would produce 340 Rated Hp for a weight of 600 lb.  That this was a large advance on anything else of that power can be seen by reference to an official Chart – actually dated October 1918 – shown here as Fig. 2 on P.8.  This was the Dragonfly.

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                                                                                                                   Fig.2

   What happened next is best described in Bulman’s own words (Ref. 8):-

“Then, from out of the blue, came news that on account of its amazing simplicity of construction no less than 10,000” [Actually,11,500] “Dragonfly engines were to be made, absorbing the whole of British production capacity in 1918 other than for the Rolls-Royce Eagle and Falcon and the Puma.  The first Dragonfly had not, at that time been built…… Its design contained a number of ‘short cuts’ from a production angle to which I had drawn special attention in my note on the Wasp  as demanding prolonged testing before they could be accepted as the basis of any production in small quantity”.

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Weight/Power ratio had worsened from 1.765 promised to 2.224 (26%) achieved.  The Fig. 2 chart of October 1918 does not give this point for the Dragonfly, which can be regarded as an “Air-brushing” decision.

   Bulman does not mention the fact that the air-cooling of the engine was also very poor, the overheating even charring propellers.  The vaunted copper-plating did not work.

   With the troubles of the Dragonfly Walter Bentley, the designer of the successful BR2 under Admiralty aegis (mentioned above), then in full production, was asked to take over post-production experimental work.  In Ref. 12 he relates the consequences:-

“The new radial engine, I discovered, caught fire easily, was unreliable and ran far short on its power test at Farnborough.  I didn’t like it, and told my new C.O.*⁷ what I thought of it.

              ‘Bentley’, he said, ‘I think you’re just tired.  And in any case it’s natural for you to feel a certain prejudice’.

   His first statement was all too true; the second made me so angry that it’s a wonder that I ever got out of his office without committing violence”.

*7.  “WO” does not name the officer concerned.  Very likely it was the James Weir mentioned above.

   So, there it was.  The decision had been made and adverse expert criticism was not accepted!

   Three fighters were committed to the Dragonfly in 1918 for the expected late 1918/early 1919 programme.  The Sopwith Dragon first flew before the 11^th November Armistice, but was not issued for service.  The others did not fly as prototypes until 1919.  The sudden collapse of the beaten German army (which yielded nearly 400,000 prisoners and 6,600 guns in the 100 days before they begged for an Armistice (Ref. 13)) saved the new RAF from fighting the 1919 campaign with a crippled fighter force.

   With peace the Dragonfly orders were redundant in any case and they were cancelled-  no doubt with a sigh of relief – after 1,000 or so had been made.

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   Weir resigned from being Air Minister at the end of the Great War and returned to industry.

   In 1935, as UK air matters began to cause unease, he was asked to join the Defence Policy and Requirements Committee and did so, unpaid at his own request.

Stanley Baldwin became Prime Minister in June 1935 and appointed Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister as Air Minister on 7^th June 1935 (he was ennobled in November 1935 as Viscount Swinton).  Weir became his adviser and the two worked closely together for 3 years (Ref. 14).  There was then a critical debate in the Commons on the question of Britain’s air strength relative to Germany and Swinton was pushed to resign on 16^th May 1938.  Weir went with him.  In those 3 years, together with Air Vice Marshal/Marshal Wilfrid Freeman, Air Council Member for Research and Development and George Bulman, Director of Engine Development, the government having at last decided on a large re-armament programme in 1936, the following major events occurred:-

• Large orders were placed for the new monoplane fighters Hurricane and Spitfire. Both depended on one engine type, as the 1919 fighter programme was intended to depend only on the Dragonfly, but this was a Rolls-Royce engine (Merlin) which had been in design and development since 1933 and was the heir to knowledge gained in successful racing engines for the 1929 and 1931 Schneider Trophy events.
• Swinton and Weir did not challenge the restriction on expenditure by Chamberlain (Chancellor of the Exchequer) which prevented fighter production being double-shifted to meet the Luftwaffe expansion rate.
• Large orders were placed for the Battle light level day bomber which the Air staff did not foresee could not live against the new German Bf109 fighter plus the new automatic 20 mm and 37 mm flak with which the Wehrmacht was equipped.  The result in 1940 was a repeat of the DH9 experience.  That the RAF could have had a Hurricane for every useless Battle is a sombre thought which, also double-shifted, could have stiffened Chamberlain to prevent the betrayal of Czechoslovakia in 1938 (as well as saving the lives of many aircrew);
• Orders were placed for 3 types of bombers which the Air Staff believed could raid Germany by daylight protected by their own defensive armament.  In 1939 the Bf109 soon proved that they could not.  The Wellington. Hampden and Whitley had to be switched to inaccurate night bombing;
• Swinton and Weir did not challenge the obsession of the Air Staff with daylight bombing.  It was not until Inskip, as Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defence, recommended and the Cabinet agreed in November 1938 that priority in production was given to “First things First – fighters”.
• On the bright side, science came to the rescue with Radio-location and a system was created which made all the difference to survival or defeat in 1940;

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• Also on the bright side, a Shadow factory system was set up to ensure a sufficiency of aero supplies when money restrictions were finally lifted and one which could not be knocked -out by German raids on crucial factories (egs, Rolls-Royce at Derby producing Merlins; Supermarine at Southampton producing Spitfires).

B2 The Official History of the Great War: The War in the Air: the Dragonfly “Air-brush”

   Volume VI of “The War in the Air” was published in 1937 (Ref. 15).  Its section discussing the aero engine programmes in 1917-1918 has the following.

    For an expanded aircraft programme at the start of 1917 it was clearly necessary to cut down the 40 different engine types then being made.

The Sunbeam Arab

  “Unhappily a grave mistake was made in the beginning – a mistake which was destined to upset the whole engine production programme for the remainder of the war”.

   In the 200 HP water-cooled class there were 4 contenders:- The IL6 BHP; two Sunbeams, one a IL6 the other a V8; and the V8 Hispano-Suiza.  In January 1917 the engine sub-committee of the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics*⁸ were asked to choose which was most suitable for mass production:-

“…they recommended the adoption of the eight-cylinder Sunbeam.  Although the engine had not

 yet developed 200 horse-power…”.

*9.  This body had been set up by PM Asquith in 1909 – quite a far-sighted move by that un-scientific lawyer!

   Orders were therefore placed totalling 4,400 engines (which were named Arab).  There was an objection to the reliance placed on an un-tried engine from Capt. Verney of the AID (a colleague of Bulman’s).  After a review the orders were confirmed.

   “By May 1917 it was becoming apparent that the engine programme was in jeopardy”.  The author does not give details of the Arab problems, which have been described above.  “…the expanded programme for the Royal Flying Corps… had allowed for an output of 1,800 Arab engines before the end of 1917: the number delivered was eighty-one”.

   “The failure of the Sunbeam Arab engine, a failure which entailed much waste of effort and money, and limited the expansion of the air services, should not be lightly passed over.  In war, risks must be run, but there are some risks which are only rarely justifiable.  It was a gamble to choose an untried engine with many experimental features for mass production, more especially because grave misgivings had been expressed by at least one officer of practical experience”.

  Concerning the sub-committee “…their responsibility was a grave one and they cannot be absolved from some blame for an error of judgement of which the consequences were serious”.

The ABC Dragonfly

   In late October 1917 the attention of the members of the Air board was called to a new engine.

   “This was the A.B.C. Dragonfly fixed radial, and it was described as an extremely simple engine, both in design and for production purposes.  It would be cheap to make, and it was considered that production could begin within three or four months.  It was revealed in discussion that the Dragonfly, in a suitably designed aeroplane, would give 300 horsepower and a speed of 156 miles per hour at 15,000 feet, and that it was expected to reach this height in eight and a half minutes”*¹⁰ .

   There were, however, differences of opinion about the possibilities of the Dragonfly….some of them were of the opinion that the engine had been cut down too finely in the matter of weight¹ .

   “As time went on, however, faith in the Dragonfly grew apace, and large contracts for the engine were placed during 1918”.

   “Not only did the Dragonfly prove to be a failure from the production point of view, but it was also  dangerous in the air….certainly, had the war continued into 1919, the failure of the A.B.C. Dragonfly would have put an effective brake, once again, upon the expansion of the air service² .

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History footnotes:-

1. “380 lb for 300 horse-power*¹⁰.
2. Orders for some 12,000 Dragonfly engines were placed. Experiments to make the engine a success were not abandoned as useless until 1921”.

*10.  The Epilogue shows that this speed claim was grossly exaggerated.  The weight given in this official history is vastly different from the 600 lb derived from other project claims, for no known reason

Comment.

    Having named the body responsible for the Arab failure, which invalidated 4,400 orders and having said that this should not be lightly passed over, Jones pulls his punches about the Dragonfly.  He does not name the person responsible for ordering 12,000 Dragonflys before the first engine had been fully developed and which turned out to be useless.  He only writes that the failure would have put a brake on the expansion of the air service in 1919 when actually it would have crippled the fighting squadrons fatally.  He could have identified Sir William Weir but “Air-brushed” him from fault.

   Why?  Because in 1937 Weir was now back in the aero-engine scene as adviser to the Air Minister!

Conclusions

   This contribution No. 26 has given two examples of historical writers who “Self-Censored” their work to “Air-brush” unfortunate decisions made earlier by persons who later became significant in defence against potential aggressors.  In Weir’s case, against Germany;  in Ridgway’s case, against the Soviet Union.

   Another important case of “Self-Censorship” for the same reason can be cited.  On his way to meet President-elect Eisenhower in January 1952 Winston Churchill told his secretary, John Colville, that he must omit part of what he had intended to include in Volume VI of his War History.  He could no longer tell in full the story of how the United States, to please the Russians, gave away vast tracts of territory they had occupied and how suspicious they were of his pleas for caution (Ref. 19).

   These examples of “Self-Censorship” were clearly in the belief that confidence in their later decisions should not be prejudiced.

   They could be regarded as noble actions by the censors.  However, it is interfering with the truth.  If History is not written with the intention of finding the Truth, what use is it?

   Perhaps the decisions of those whose reputations were protected should have been considered in the light of their previous performance?

Epilogue

   In August 1960, when he was 73 years old, Granville Bradshaw took the opportunity of an earlier refence to one of his designs in the magazine Motor Sport to write a letter about various of his engines and particularly his Dragonfly of 1917-1918 (Ref. 16).

   This was not an apology or a rebuttal of criticisms – far from it.  He boasted about the engine!

   He claimed:-

1. Built in a month “…it gave 360 b.h.p.”;
2. “It did 72 hours on the test-bed, flew immediately at nearly 100 m.p.h. faster than any of our rotary engines and was standardised for the 1919 programme”;
3. “A flight of 36 was sent out to France,” was ready on the 11^th November 1918 but the mission was cancelled by the Armistice;

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4. “Lord Weir…told me that the Germans knew they were beaten in the air and that my engine had certainly hastened the signing of the Armistice.  If only they could have taken off in that first flight and demonstrated their100 m.p.h. superiority”;
5. “Anyway, I earned an award of £40,000 and an OBE”.

   In the October 1960 issue of MS a correspondent who signed himself as “Senrab” (obviously a reversal of “Barnes”) and clearly someone who knew the Dragonfly facts confirmed the figures deduced from Bulman (Ref. 8) at an achieved 295 Rated HP and 656 lb weight.  He also confirmed the inadequate cooling and the vibration at Rated RPM (Ref.17).

   This author of Contribution No. 26 comments on GB’s points as follows:-

Re 1.  If GB did see 360 HP on the test-bed it can only have been a “Flash” reading before the engine settled down to a (too-high) steady temperature;

Re 2.  The +100 MPH claim is absurd!  The Sopwith Snipe with the Bentley BR2 engine of 238 Rated HP achieved 120 MPH (Ref. 18).  Ref. 9 has the Rated power of the Dragonfly as 320 HP – presumably after improvement from its early 295.  The maximum gain of GB’s engine over Bentley’s in the Sopwith Dragon fighter (developed from the Snipe), discounting speed lost through 6% greater weight, would have been the cube root of 320/238 which was 1.10.  The speed gain would therefore have been 12 MPH, ie. 132 MPH..

Re 3.  All sources agree that no Dragonfly – powered fighter aircraft were ever issued to squadrons;

Re 4.  Weir (who was not then a peer) may have been naïve in listening to GB’s blarney and ordering the Dragonfly but it is hard to believe he was that naïve!

Re.5.  It is incomprehensible that the post-war Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors should give GB £40.000 (£1.6 million in 2022’s degraded money) when Walter Bentley received only £8,000 for the BR1 and BR2!  Re Honours, “WO” was appointed MBE, one rank below OBE.  GB’s OBE was the same as Henry Royce’s, chief designer of the acknowledged two best engines of the Great War (Eagle and Falcon). 

   Someone high-up seems to have been favouring GB both during and after the war.

   As to the data, It must be concluded that old age had distorted his memory and allowed him to “Air-brush” unpalatable facts from his mind.

References

8. An account of Partnership-Industry, Government and the Aero Engine  G. Bulman, edited by M. Neale  Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust  Historical Series No. 31  2001.
9. Official table of engine data, undated but about September 1918, almost certainly from the Technical Department of the Ministry of Munitions.
10. https://www.baesystems.com/en-uk/heritage/airco-dh9—–
11. https://www.gracesguide.co.uk/Aircraft_Manufacturing_Co:_DH.9
12. W.O.: An Autobiography  W. Bentley (with R. Hough)  Hutchinson  1958.
13. The World Crisis 1911-1918  Vol.IV  W.Churchill  Odhams edition  1949.
14. Wilfrid Freeman  A. Furse  Spellmount  2000.
15. The War in the Air  Vol VI  H.Jones  OUP  1937.  Part of the Official History of the Great War.
16. Letter from Granville Bradshaw  Motor Sport  August 1960.
17. Letter from ”Senrab”  Motor Sport  October 1960.
18. The Fighter Aircraft Pocketbook  R.Green  Batsford  1962.
19.  The Churchillians  J. Colville  Weidenfeld  1981.