In Contribution No. 13 (Churchill, Kitchener and the Dardanelles) the author has referred to the “Curse of Amphibious Assaults”, defined (P.15) as
“The fear of exploiting too far from a beach-head too soon”.
This “curse” was a major factor in the failures of the initial and later (Suvla Bay) landings on Gallipoli in 1915, leading to an unsuccessful operation.
Twenty-nine years later this “curse” affected the Allied assault on 22 January 1944 on Anzio (Operation Shingle”). The assault was made by the US VI Corps (3rd US and 1st British infantry divisions plus attached sea-borne paratroops, Rangers and Commandos), commanded by US Malor General Lucas. In Ref.1 (linked), which gives a detailed account of the operation in its first month, extensive quotes are given from Lucas’ diary. From these it is clear that he was totally unenthusiastic about his mission from the start. A significant remark on 9 January 1944, knowing that UK PM Winston Churchill (WSC) was a leading advocate of Shingle as a way of threatening the communications of the German forces grimly defending Cassino, 60 miles further South (see Fig. 1), was “ the whole affair has a strong odor of Gallipoli and apparently the same amateur was still on the coach’s bench.” If Lucas had not repeated this canard about WSC (who had nothing to do with the land operations) but studied the details of the Gallipoli campaign, he might have fared better.
Fig.1 (Ref.2 marked-up)
Having made an unopposed landing, because 2 German divisions which had been posted nearby had been sent to oppose an attack on the Cassino front which was intended to achieve that movement, Lucas made no change to his pre-determined plan to consolidate a beach-head before considering an advance inland, although that ground had no defenders on the day of the assault.
The Army Group commander, Alexander, informed of the easy landing, had signalled to WSC
“We appear to have got almost complete surprise. I have stressed the importance of strong-hitting patrols being boldly pushed out to gain contact with the enemy, but so far have not received reports of their activities.” WSC replied “Am very glad you are pegging out claims rather than digging in beachheads” (Ref. 3).
However, when Alexander and Clark (Army commander) visited Lucas that day by fast motor-boat and observed what the VI Corps CO was actually doing, they made no effort to stimulate him to do what Alexander had intended. The last thing Clark said to Lucas before re-embarking, was “Don’t stick your neck out” (Ref. 1). Alexander was an equable man but not a forceful commander, especially with his US subordinate Clark, who had his own decided views
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Perhaps 2 infantry divisions were not enough to push ahead boldly to the Alban Hills astride the German L of C to Cassino – it was the most strength which could be carried by the available Landing Ships and that only after agonised timetabling of these precious vessels against their intended return to mount the Cross-Channel assault (Overlord) in May. This was an early example of how the USN hogging of Landing Ships for the Pacific hampered the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed decision of “Germany First”.
Against this hesitation the Germans reacted with the professional speed which they displayed so many times in WW2. The beachhead was soon roped off, although their attempt to drive the invaders back into the sea was beaten off. WSC was very dis-satisfied with the situation which developed after the easy landing and gave vent to one of his pithy, but not always accurate, remarks “I had hoped that we were hurling a wild cat on to the shore, but all we had got was a stranded whale” (Ref. 3). Perhaps the Army Group and Army commanders’ concurrence in Lucas’ decision was overlooked. Whether a VI Corps commander of Patton-like aggression could have done better cannot be known.
At least, because of Hitler’s desire to eliminate the beach-head, it drew troops into Italy which would otherwise have been in France to oppose Overlord.
It took 4 months before a simultaneous breakthrough at Cassino and a reinforced breakout from Anzio could be accomplished. Then, instead of advancing North East to “cop” the Germans retreating from the South, which was Alexander’s stated requirement, Clark sent most of the Anzio troops North-West to try to capture Rome*1 . The whole intention of Shingle and the bitter fighting which followed was therefore thrown away.
*1. Actually troops from the Cassino front entered Rome first!.
Montgomery’s plan to prevent the “Curse” from affecting Overlord
General Montgomery (BLM), who was to be the Ground forces commander for Overlord, had no involvement in Shingle but he considered carefully what had been learnt from that operation. He issued a tactical instruction to his Army commanders (Dempsey (MCD), 2nd British; Bradley (ONB), 1st US) on the 14th April 1944 as follows (Ref.4):-
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[ Of course, no armour was landed on the first day of Shingle.]
During a final tour beginning on the 23rd May 1944 of the troops for Overlord, in which BLM spoke to groups of all officers down to the rank of Lt. Col., he made a particular point under the heading “Offensive eagerness”:-
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“…After a long sea voyage and a landing followed by fighting, a reaction sets in and officers and men are often inclined to let up and relax. This is fatal; senior officers must prevent it at all costs on D-Day and on the following days…..Inaction, and a defensive mentality, are criminal in any officer – however senior) (Ref.4).
2nd Army plans for armoured columns
Second Army obeyed BLM’s instructions in the way which is illustrated on Fig. 2 below.
Despite the optimistic words about exploitation spoken by BLM on 7th April 1944 – see ONB’s quotes below (in authentic BLM language!), he accepted less in the 2nd Army planning. After the general strengthening of the German forces in Normandy from 2nd May (by Hitler’s decision) became known, Ref. 7 states that BLM insisted on retaining the plan.
Fig.2 (Ref. 5 Map 4)
The troops specified for the columns were:-
To reach Villers Bocage, about 19 miles from the beach*2–
8th Armoured Brigade,
24th Lancers leading.
To reach Evrécy, about 17 miles inland*3.-.2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade,
1st Hussars (aka Canadian 6th Armoured Regt.) leading.
*2. A cross-roads town on the main road between Caen and Avranches at the foot of the Cotentin peninsula.. The real objective would be Point 213 (metres = 700 feet) just NE.
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*3. A village on a ridge half-way between the small R. Odon and the larger R. Orne, at the same height and near-to Point 112, which gave good observation over Caen 6 miles NE. (Distance from the beach is more accurate than Fig.2).
These locations were probably chosen by MCD, who was noted for having a good eye for country.
1st US Army plans for armoured columns
In Ref. 6 ONB refers to BLM’s idea of armoured spearheads being spoken of at the first major review of Overlord plans at St Paul’s School on 7th April 1944. “Pointing towards Falaise, he talked of breaking his tanks free on D-day ‘to knock about a bit down there’…..Falaise lay 32 miles inland by road from the beach… Monty afterward” {ONB must mean the 14th April instruction} “urged me to explore the possibility of a similar tank knockabout behind Omaha beach. Although knowing there was scant chance of carrying it through, I nevertheless devised such a mission. As I anticipated, we never even tried it. In contrast to Monty, I had foreseen a hard enemy crust on the Normandy coast.”
This is ONB in 1951 re-wriiting history! He forgets this about foreseeing a hard crust when he wrote later about the bad situation on Omaha on the morning of D-Day:-
“…I was shaken to find that we had gone against Omaha with so thin a margin of safety……we had counted upon a thin enemy crust of two static”[second-rate] “divisions between Caen and Cherbourg” (Ref. 6).
Of course, the Omaha resistance of the un-forecast German 352 Infantry division made an armoured dash impossible, as did the sinking or destruction on the beach of the US tanks*4.
This did not matter because no Panzer divisions were near the US beaches and none were directed there in the first week.
*4. While the fate of the DDs of the Eastern group is well known – 27 of 32 sank, what happened to the 32 of the Western group, which were bravely landed directly onto the beach, has not been read by this author. They should have been the saviour of the Dog Green assaulting infantry but obviously were not. The answer is presumably that casemated 75 mm anti-tank guns firing in enfilade must have knocked them out. There is a gun still in its pill-box there.
How the 2nd Army plan worked out
Villers Bocage
Stiff resistance by a battalion of 352 Division behind Gold beach (Ref. 7), plus congestion on the beach, which was narrowed by the strong on-shore wind blowing the tide much further up than usual (Ref. 7), meant that few of the tanks of the 24th Lancers got ashore on D-Day and the rest did not land until late on D + 1 (Ref.8). Some time was then needed at a rendezvous area just inland to remove from the tanks the two large and tall temporary sheet-metal ducts (air inlet and exhaust, obstructing all-round fire) fitted to permit wading up to several feet of water from the landing craft (see Fig.3).
Fig.3 (amazon.co.uk)
Model of Sherman tank with US wading kit. The British kit did not have the curl-over.
Despite en-route losses from air attack (see below) some of Panzer Lehr reached Tilly-sur-Seulles, half-way towards Villers, by D+2 and so the plan to forestall them failed. The 24th Lancers then reverted to infantry support.
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Evrécy
Despite being delayed by the sea conditions, by some defences un-damaged by preliminary bombardment, by bad congestion on the narrow beaches and traffic jams inland, the Canadians made more progress inland than any other assault force – 7 miles inland (Ref. 7). The planned dash beyond this by an armoured column, the 1st Hussars, reached Bretteville l’Orgueilleuse on the Caen-Bayeux road nearly 10 miles inland which Ref. 5 describes as their objective for the day. There is no mention of Evrécy, which was nearly 8 miles further on. Ref. 5 says the two troops which reached Bretteville “inflicted considerable casualties on the enemy before withdrawing for the night to the main Divisional line”. They were obliged to do that because they had no infantry with them (Ref. 7), so could not harbour in safety. Whether no-one had thought of having infantry ride on the tanks or it could not be organised in time is not reported.
This is BLM’s only statement on the outturn of his 14th April instruction, and it is a long way from the pushed-out “Firm Base” which he wanted (Ref. 5).
The mission achieved by Operation Fortitude and the Tactical Air Forces
The mission of what Wilmot described as BLM’s “Impudent plan” (Ref. 7) for armoured columns was to disrupt and delay the advance of German Panzer divisions against the beach-heads.
The 21st Panzer division, posted just South of Caen by Hitler’s intuitive order of 2nd May, could only be disrupted by air attack. Fortunately, while part was sent early on against the British airhead East of the R. Orne, the 88 mm anti-tank battalion was placed under command of a static coast division which re-located it away from the direct route to Caen. This was a critical mistake by the enemy. Orders came eventually to use the armour on the West of the river. Most of this was stopped by anti-tank guns, notably 17 pdr Sherman Fireflies. One element did reach the coast but did not stay there because a second huge wave of airborne troops either side of the Orne in the evening led them to think they would be cut off.
Despite BLM’s admonition pre-D-Day, there was, perhaps, a touch of the “Curse” in his old 3rd division which prevented an early advance on Caen, as well as the presence of 21 Panzer (Ref.7).
As early as 4 AM on D-Day the staff of Rundstedt (Oberbefehlhaber West) telephoned to OKW for permission to move nearer to the coast the two panzer divisions (12th SS and Lehr), held in strategic reserve by Hitler’s order about a day’s (uninterrupted) march from the landing beaches. Hitler refused the move in case the activity in Normandy was a feint. Operation Fortitude, which was laid on to reinforce the German belief that the Schwerpunkt would be in the Pas de Calais, had done its stuff again. He then went to bed (Ref.7).
Hitler did release the two reserve Panzer divisions in the afternoon but nearly half of D-Day was gone before movement orders were sent to the reserves (Ref. 7).
A strong battle group of 12th SS set out from Lisieux at 3 PM with Evrécy as its objective (Ref.7)– an interesting confirmation of MCD’s choice for the planned Canadian spoiling advance. Ref. 7 continues:-
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Panzer Lehr began to move at 5 PM and their commander Bayerlein described the march post-War (Ref. 7):-
Conclusion
So, although BLM’s plan for bold advances ahead of the main bodies did not come to pass (he did not draw attention to that in his writings, of course!), other planned major factors of Overlord (deception and air attack) achieved the same result of interfering with a prompt counter-attack by Panzers. The rest is history.
References
- https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_13.htm
- Anzio W. Vaughan-Thomas Pan ed. 1963.
- The Second World War Vol. V W. Churchill Cassell 1952.
- The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery Collins 1958.
- Normandy to the Baltic F/M Montgomery Hutchinson 1947.
- A Soldier’s Story O. Bradley Eyre & Spottiswoode 1951.
- The Struggle for Europe C. Wilmot Reprint ed. 1954.
- Notes by the late Major David Turquand MC of 24th Lancers, published in Duffield Parish Magazine, July 1996.