[In the following only the information available at the time to the British, French and Czechoslovakian governments is considered when describing their actions. It is necessary to reprise much chronology before items novel to most accounts of the Munich Agreement can be introduced]
. “Mein Kampf”: Hitler’s Action Plan
If a foreign diplomat had taken the trouble to summarise Adolf Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” when it was first published (Vol. 1 1925; Vol. 2 1927)*1 he could have produced:-
Hitler’s Action Plan (author’s sub-headings)
(A): Obtain Dictatorial power in Germany;
(B): Proclaim the German Aryans as the “Master Race” (which meant necessarily classifying others as “Untermenschen”, especially Jews and Slavs);
(C): Break the “Never-Again” clauses of the Versailles Treaty;
(D): Consolidate all German-speaking people in Europe into Greater Germany;
(E): Smash France;
(F): Take “Living-Space” from European Russia*2 and colonise it with the German “Master Race”, enslaving or eliminating the peoples already in occupation.
*1 The diplomat would have needed to read the original German. Shirer (Ref. 1) states that the English and French translations were watered-down from that edition.
*2 Which meant taking Poland en route.
Breaking the “Never Again” Clauses of the Versailles Treaty
Hitler’s actions to break the “Never Again” Clauses in 1935 and 1936 have been described in Contribution No. 2 at PP.8-11. This also describes the inaction of the British government, effectively led by Stanley Baldwin (as Lord President of the Council in 1935 until becoming Prime Minister on 7th June 1935). Neville Chamberlain was Baldwin’s “right-hand-man” as Chancellor of the Exchequer during 1935 and up to 28th May 1937 when he succeeded Baldwin as PM.
British Re-Armament
The Baldwin-Chamberlain duo eventually saw the need for Re-Armament and their comprehensive programme is described in Contribution No. 2 at PP.11-13. Unfortunately, Chamberlain did not see the urgent need to match German spending on air armaments. In particular the re-equipping of the RAF with modern fighters was not pressed forward as fast as it should have been.
Therefore, Chamberlain had no-one to blame but himself and Baldwin for the British aerial defensive weakness which crippled his responses to Hitler in 1938. It is true that the major British resolve in 1918 for “Never Again” had deteriorated into “Never Ever” by 1933 plus “Never Mind” when Hitler began breaking the Versailles Treaty. The duty of the nation’s leaders was to convince the public that this would lead to “Again”. This they did not do.
The start of the Czechoslovakian crisis.
By April 1938 items (A) to(C) had been achieved by Hitler and, by the Anschluss (“Connection”) of 12th March joining Austria to Germany, the first step had been taken towards achieving (D). Hitler’s action was therefore aimed next at bringing-in the German-speakers in the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia. These were the descendants of centuries of “seepage” over the mountains between Germany proper to the Austrian side. Although the word “Reunited” was used in negotiations, in fact these Sudetenlanders had never been part of “political Germany”. It could even be said that their ancestors had shown that they did not want to belong in Germany.
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Nazi agitation in the Sudetenland
A Nazi party had been formed in the Sudetenland in 1933. Activity demanding less control by the Czech Government began immediately after the Anschluss. Then Neville Chamberlain, in a long speech on Foreign Affairs to Parliament on 24th March 1938 said:-
“…should we at once declare our readiness to take military action in resistance to any forcible interference with the independence and integrity of Czechoslovakia…[?]
…His Majesty’s Government feel themselves unable to give the prior guarantee suggested” (Ref. 2).
Another parallel policy line was followed on 7th May 1938 when the British and French Ambassadors to Czechoslovakia presented it with a note urging it to go to the limit to meet the Sudetenlander’s concerns (Refs. 3 & 4). These two statements set the tone for all subsequent British negotiations with the German and Czech governments.
The May alarm
On 20th May the Czech government was suddenly alarmed that Germany was going to invade and partial mobilisation of their armed forces was ordered. The British Ambassador in Berlin, Neville Henderson, sent the Military attachés on a reconnaissance of the border regions but they found no undue activity (Ref. 4). Much diplomatic activity occurred, however, and on 23rd May Hitler had his Foreign Office tell the Czechs that the rumours were without foundation. The “crisis” was over – but led to the unfortunate conclusion outside Germany that a show of force had warned Hitler off.
Self-Determination
Over the next 3 months all that happened was that it was clear from “off-the-record” remarks by Chamberlain that he favoured “self-determination” for the Sudetenland, which found their way into the Times (whose Editor was wholly sympathetic to Germany and used to suppress unfavourable dispatches from his own correspondent in Berlin (Refs. 1 & 3)).
Up to this point Hitler himself had made no open demands – he was using Henlein, the Nazi Sudeten leader as his proxy. Nevertheless, Chamberlain sent Runciman to Prague on 3rd August to “mediate” between the Czech government and the Sudetenlanders. This got nowhere. On 28th August Henderson was told by Chamberlain to try for a meeting between himself and Hitler. Before this was answered, Hitler made his main speech at the Nazi Party annual rally at Nuremberg on the 12th September. This contained a demand that the German Sudetenlanders should be given “justice” or, if not Germany would secure it for them. This immediately provoked an armed revolt by the German Czechs. The government put it down by military force in two days with casualties on each side of tens of dead and Henlein sought refuge in Germany.
The French appeal to Chamberlain
While the fighting was ongoing, the French cabinet on 13th September agonised over whether to honour their Treaty of Military Assistance if Hitler attacked Czechoslovakia (Ref.3). PM Daladier telephoned Chamberlain at 9PM but the line was bad. Fearing that he had not been understood he then asked the British Ambassador to telephone the message, which was basically to contact Hitler directly to restrain him from an invasion, because this would mean automatically that France must march. This was done at 10.10PM (Ref.9)*3.
*3 The English view of this message is reported in Ref. 10 by the American journalist Virginia Cowles. “I dined with a Foreign Office official…and learned from him that it was the French who had first caved in. On the evening of September 13th, M. Daladier, alarmed by the situation, communicated with Chamberlain and announced that France was in no position to fight, imploring the British Prime Minister to leave no stone unturned to find a way out”. In October she had the opportunity to talk directly to Chamberlain who confirmed that the French had communicated with him at the last moment and flatly renounced their pledges, having assured him, both privately and publicly, that they were determined to honour their treaty obligations – until the eleventh hour. Of course, it suited Chamberlain very well to be able to blame the French for having to give concessions to the Germans.
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Chamberlain’s action on the 13th September
At 11PM on the 13th Chamberlain sent Hitler a message, without Cabinet approval (given retrospectively, Ref.7) :-
“…I propose to come over at once to see you with a view to trying to find a peaceable solution. I propose to come across by air…am ready to start tomorrow…” (Ref. 3). Shirer wrote that Hitler’s reaction to this was “Ich bin von Himmel gefallen!”(Literally “I am fallen from Heaven”). He agreed.
Chamberlain’s meeting with Hitler on 15th September 1938 at Berchtesgaden
The Prime Minister’s journey on the 15th lasted from 8.30AM to 5PM by Lockheed 2-engined Electra to Munich (4 hours), car transfer to the station for a 3-hour train ride with lunch to Berchtesgaden then another car transfer to Hitler’s new villa, the Burghof, where the Dictator stood on the top of steps as the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the most powerful man in the British Empire and Commonwealth mounted them (Fig.1).
Fig.1
Prime Minister Chamberlain arrives at the Burghof, 15th September 1938
After tea, the 69-year-old PM, who had never flown before, then had a 3 hour conversation with the 49-year -old German, only the regular German translator Dr. Schmidt being present (and the latter’s notes, by discourtesy, were not copied afterwards to Chamberlain) (Ref. 4). The PM had to rely on his memory about what was said. Altogether, the long, tiring journey and the discussion on the same evening was a poor way to conduct World-important negotiations.
The outcome of the 15th September meeting
The essential point agreed on the 15th was that Chamberlain personally accepted “self determination” for the Sudetenland leading to secession from Czechoslovakia (with no further question of simple autonomy within Czechoslovakia), would put it to his Cabinet, to the French and also the Czechs and try to get their consent. The pair agreed to meet again after this process.
Chamberlain’s evaluation of Hitler
Chamberlain returned to London on the 16th. He wrote to his sister Ida, as he did frequently, on the 19th September :-
“Horace Wilson*4 heard from various people who were with Hitler after my interview that he had been very favourably impressed. I have had a conversation with a man, he said, and one with whom I can do business and he liked the rapidity with which I had grasped the essentials. In short I had established a certain confidence, which was my aim, and in spite of the hardness and ruthlessness I thought I saw in his face I got the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word” (Ref. 5 linked).
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Apparently, it did it not cross Chamberlain’s mind as he wrote those words that Hitler, four years earlier, had ordered the shooting without trial – murder – of scores of the Sturm Abteilung who had been the means of his rise to power.
*4 Horace Wilson was Head of the Civil Service but was much used by PM Chamberlain for diplomatic advice. He accompanied the PM on the Berchtesgaden visit but was not at his discussion with Hitler.
Five days of British, French and Czech negotiations
Between 17th September and 21st the three governments involved in the Sudeten negotiations with Germany – really with Adolf Hitler – did reach agreement on secession of the areas which contained over 50% of German speakers (see Fig. 2)
Fig. 2 (Ref. 8)
Note that this document was written as though the secession was the idea of the allies, whereas it was actually just putting Hitler’s 15th September demand into other words.
This being so another meeting of Chamberlain with Hitler was arranged (ref. 4).
The 22nd September 1938 meeting of Chamberlain and Hitler at Bad Godesberg
This time, using a larger Electra type aircraft, Chamberlain flew with Wilson to Cologne and thence by car to Bad Godesberg (see Fig.3).
Fig.3 Hitler greets Chamberlain at Bad Godesberg, again standing on a higher step!
The first meetings with Hitler took place at 5PM on the same day, 22nd September. The PM described the agreement of the British, French and Czech governments to accept secession
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(as described above) and went into the administrative details necessary to achieve it in a smooth fashion, which would require time. Hitler then replied (Ref. 4):-
“ Es tut mir furchtbar leid, aber das geht nicht mehr”
(“I am awfully sorry, but that won’t do any more”).
[Perhaps the PM realised then the truth of his half-brother’s remark about negotiating with Germans! (see Contribution No. 12).]
After Chamberlain expressed his indignant surprise Hitler indicated that the PM’s proposal involved too much delay and he demanded that the German-speaking areas should not only be ceded forthwith but must be occupied by German troops (Ref. 4).
On the following day (23rd), after some written exchanges and lower-level contacts, a Memorandum (with map) specifying just what Hitler required was produced (see Fig. 4).
Fig. 4 (Ref.8)
Evacuation of the area to be seceded was to begin on the 26th and completed by the 28th. The principals therefore met again at 10.30PM of the 23rd to discuss it.
Actually, having been apprised of the German attitude, the Czechs began to mobilise at the same time (Ref. 3). This became known during the meeting. Eventually, about 1 am of the next day (24th) Hitler offered a concession – he altered by his own hand the date for completion of the departure of the Czech army to 1st October (Ref. 3), to be agreed by 2PM on the 28th. As they separated, Chamberlain apparently happy that he had got something out of the Fuhrer, Hitler said to him (In the interpreter’s notes:-
“…the Czech problem was the last territorial demand which he had to make in Europe” (Ref. 3).
The PM for his part had only promised to transmit the revised memo to the other parties.
The close approach to war
Between the 24th and 27th of September
- Czechoslovakia rejected the Godesberg Memorandum and completed mobilisation of her armed forces, including 35 Divisions, and the garrison of her mountain fortifications;
- France also rejected the Memorandum and began mobilisation;
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- On the 26th Chamberlain sent Wilson on a special flight to Hitler with a letter proposing direct talks on details of evacuation between Germany and Czechoslovakia with the British sitting -in. Hitler would only agree to do that if the Memorandum was accepted beforehand. He set 2PM on the 28th for an affirmative answer. After a violent anti-Czechoslovakian speech that evening, he received Wilson again on the 27th and was told that Britain would see that the Czechs carried out any promises. Hitler was not interested. Wilson then made a démarche he had been authorised to give, that if France carried out its Treaty obligation to Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom would support her.
- The Royal Navy was mobilised on the 27th, decided at 8PM and announced 11.38PM.
- Chamberlain put more pressure on the Czechs to yield.
- Chamberlain broadcast to the nation on the 27th at 8.30PM, including the emotional sentence:- “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing!” [If ever translated this, with its self-pitying tone, is not likely to have gone down well with the Czechs.]
- He did include the following:- “…if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of force, I should feel that it must be resisted.” [Contribution No. 12 records how Chamberlain in late 1937 had obstinately refused to be convinced of exactly that.]
- At 10.30PM on the 27th a letter from Hitler reached Chamberlain asking him to spoil the Czech’s hope of starting a war with the help of England and France.
- Chamberlain’s reply to Hitler was a proposal for discussions which would include for the first time Italy as well as Germany, France and Czechoslovakia – but no mention of Soviet Russia, although that nation had a conditional treaty of mutual assistance with the Czechs.
- On the 28th at 10.00AM Chamberlain, via the British Ambassador in Italy, asked the Duce Benito Mussolini to urge Hitler to delay action against Czechoslovakia (Ref.16 linked)
Mussolini’s intervention on the 28th September 1938 – and the invitations to Munich
At noon on the 28th September, two hours before the ultimatum to Czechoslovakia expired, Hitler received the British Ambassador, Henderson, and told him that Mussolini had asked him to refrain from mobilisation and he had agreed to postpone it for 24 hours. He then had invitations sent to London, Paris and Rome for a meeting at Munich the following day. This reached Chamberlain at 4.15PM actually as he spoke to the House of Commons on the situation. He shared the message with the Hon. Members – who cheered wildly. The message said nothing about allowing the Czechs to attend.
The Munich conference on 29th September 1938
Chamberlain boarded the same Electra on the 29th Septemberand flew to Munich, accompanied as before by Wilson, and being joined by Henderson at Munich.. He arrivedin time for the talks to begin at 12.45PM. He did not see Daladier beforehand, unlike Hitler who met Mussolini at the frontier and concerted their action in the train on the way back to Munich.
Continued on P.7.
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Fig. 5
Left to Right:- Chamberlain; Daladier; Hitler; Mussolini.
The “Mussolini plan” then tabled offered the concession that, while the German Army would march in on 1 October, its occupation of predominately-German areas would be phased over 7 days. An International Commission would oversee further areas to be conceded to Germany, according to the %age make-up of populations in some areas and according to plebiscites to be held elsewhere. A map of the various zones was produced (see Fig. 6)
Fig.6
The map published in Ref.7B.
Colour added to clarify the zones in the Agreement:-
Black = areas to be occupied within a week.
Vertical striped Blue =
Predominately-German, to be defined by International Commission and occupied by 10th October.
Horizontal-striped blue =
areas in which plebiscites are to be held by International Commission and occupied by “International bodies” until then, to be completed by end November (Brno included in this category). NB. Teschen demanded by Poland.
As in the Godesberg Memorandum all installations were to be handed over intact.
The plan was agreed and signed, actually early in Saturday 1st October although dated 29th September. The full text is given in an Appendix. The English and French added an Annex stating that they would guarantee the new frontiers of Czechoslovakia against “un-provoked aggression”.
British activity relating to the International Commission
In consequence of the Commission, and its requirement for “International bodies” to keep order in the areas to be subject to plebiscites, much had to be organised in Britain. The terms of the agreement were settled by 10PM (Ref.3) (when they were advised to two unfortunate Czechs who had been kept on the premises for 8 hours without being allowed into the conference) (Ref. 3). The rest of the time to signature must have been taken up in preparing the prime documents and numerous copies. That gave about 6 hours to settle between Munich and London and issue to the British morning papers some details of two major Initiatives concerning the “International bodies”:-
(1). A police force of volunteers from ex-Servicemen of the British Legion;
(2). A 6-battalion brigade of the army to provide the necessary armed force.
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How these things were published to the British public on Saturday 1st October is shown on the newspaper facsimiles given below on PP. 12-13.
The News Chronicle described on its P.2 (Ref. 7B) that Lord Halifax (Foreign Secretary but left behind by Chamberlain) and Sir John Simon (Chancellor of the Exchequer) had a meeting with officials of the British Legion on the previous day to discuss details of the volunteer police force.
The Daily Herald gave details of the 6 Battalions of soldiers on its front page but there was no indication of who organised them at such short notice (and the author has not discovered it since).
Chamberlain’s further talk to Hitler
Before separating early on 30th September Chamberlain suggested to Hitler that they meet in the morning for a further talk. Hitler agreed. This took place after 10AM (Ref.7B). The Prime Minister, according to the account he gave to the Cabinet that evening (Ref. 12), spoke about the limitation of armaments, about Spain and about S.E.Europe and had then produced his draft single sheet of paper headed” Joint Declaration” on the subject of Anglo-German relations and signed by himself.
Allowing, after the Agreement signature, meeting the Czech representatives (to give them the bad news, noted by them as yawning continuously), for travelling back to his hotel and some sleep this was extremely quick drafting and then getting Munich Consular staff to type it. The only advisors present with Chamberlain were Wilson and Henderson.
Dr Schmidt (the regular translator for Hitler) had read this paper to Hitler who then signed it. The interpreter’s notes say Chamberlain “underlined the great psychological effect which he expected from this document” (Ref.3). More details of this meeting can be found in Ref. 13 (linked).
Certainly, the Prime minster made the most of it, at Heston aerodrome and from a window in Downing Street on his return.
The way it was presented to the British people is shown below, from the News Chronicle (Ref.7B), amplified with Chamberlain’s statement
“I believe it is peace in our time”.
[ Whether Chamberlain believed sincerely in what he wrote and said the author will leave to a discussion in a later part of this contribution.]
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On the word of his Parliamentary Private secretary, Lord Dunglass, his chief said to him on the aeroplane on the way home that, if Hitler did not keep his agreement, the whole world would then see that he had broken his word and thus be more willing to act in unison against him. The author has been unable to find the primary source of this statemen, only a roundabout version in Ref. 14.
The Cabinet meeting on 29th September 1938
After waving his piece of paper to an enthusiastic crowd at Heston, after motoring to Buckingham Palace to be thanked by a grateful King George VI, after appearing at a window of No. 10 Downing Street to show the paper once again to a large and thankful crowd, Mr Chamberlain’s busy day was not finished. He held a cabinet meeting at 7.30PM. The record is given in Ref. 12 (linked).
He there listed 9 items for which he claimed that the Munich Agreement was better than the Godesberg Memorandum which had brought the nations very near to war.
In fact, only Items 2 and 8 were factual improvements:- No. 2 because the German army would stage its initial occupation over 6 days; and No. 8 which covered the method of possible population transfers, not previously touched. The other 7 items referred to subjects which would be decided by the International Commission which was to start work next day and whose conclusions could not be predicted. No-one pointed that out.
However, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Duff Cooper, although thinking at the time that all 9 items were better, still offered his resignation. This was “because we should not have gone so far to meet Germany’s demands if our defences had been stronger, but now, with the PM having written that we would never go to war with her, how could we re-arm?” (Ref. 6). A little later, after his leaving office, he realised that Chamberlain’s claim to have accomplished a great deal at Munich was specious – “…even The Times*5 …admitted a few days later that the Germans had already got more than Godesberg would have given them”. (Ref.6).
*5 The Times editor was known to be pro-German.
So ended 5 days of intense emotional, intellectual and physical activity as the culmination of 7 months of concentration on foreign affairs by the 69-years-old Prime Minister who previously had no experience whatsoever of such matters.
[The author here indulges in a little personal reminiscence which can give some colour to the last week of September 1938. Arriving at primary school one day we were given the day off because “the teachers were working for the King”. They were issuing gas masks. These were to be carried in brown cardboard boxes about 6 inches cubed with a cord over the shoulder. On the way home the author (then 6 years old) found men filling sand-bags from a heap where a new road was being laid down, so “helped” with that. Floating above the houses was something never seen before – a barrage balloon. It was tethered to a mobile winch in a nearby park. In the evening there was a demonstration of how the Air Raid Precautions people would tackle a poison gas bomb. Wooden rattles would give the signal to put on the mask. Men in protective overalls would neutralise spills of liquid gas. The “All Clear” would be by ringing handbells. This really was frightening.]
The International Commission
The International Commission was to comprise the German State Secretary, von Weizsacker, and the British, French and Italian Ambassadors, plus an emissary from Czechoslovakia. It would start work on the 30th when these gentlemen had returned to Berlin.
The British Ambassador, Nevile Henderson, had made his mind up on the Sudeten situation right at the start of the crisis in March. His un-trained military appreciation he recorded in his memoirs
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(Ref. 4):- “The Czech Maginot line was strong, but it would have been turned from the south through Austria, and in any case the campaign would have been settled by the vast superiority of the German air force”. [He gave no credit to the Czech military for deploying their field army to the Austrian border; the point about the air was typical of the fear engendered everywhere by the bombing of Guernica in April 1937, with its exaggerated casualties]. Regarding his role on the International Commission “I had made up my mind before the first meeting” (30th September at 5.30PM) “that plebiscites, which could only lead to trouble, should be avoided at all cost”(Ref. 4).
Shirer records (Ref. 3) “Every dispute over additional territory for the Germans was settled in their favour, more than once under the threat from Hitler and OKW” (military staff) “to resort to armed force”. Hitler demanded occupation up to the language line drawn in the Austro-Hungarian map of 1910, refusing to accept a Czech census of 1923 “by which time the pre-war position had been considerably modified” (Ref. 4).
Naturally the Italian followed the German line. Francois-Poncet for France, on the orders of his government (having already swallowed the camel they did not strain at the gnat) did the same. Henderson, on his principle of avoiding plebiscites, accepted it on his own responsibility (Ref. 4).
“The acceptance of the 1910 boundary rendered plebiscites superfluous, and by October 10th meetings of the International Commission” were “discontinued sine die” (Ref.4). The Commission was terminated on the 13th.
So, the fine words of the Munich agreement, which with the government’s announcements of British volunteer police*6 and British troops*7 to see fair play in plebiscites had undoubtedly eased the nation’s conscience over the betrayal of Czechoslovakia, all became nul and void within 10 days.
[Comment on whether the announcements were ever intended to be more than Suggestio falsi is left to Conclusions below.]
*6 The British Legion Volunteer Police Force was formed and sailed for Germany but was recalled on 14th October. A full description of this is given in Ref. 15 (linked).
*7 The author has been unable to discover any “Stand down” order regarding the troops.
Fig.10 on P.14 below shows the final state of the German take-over.
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The Newspapers of Saturday 1st October 1938 Fig.7 (ref.7A)
[These facsimilies can be enlarged by the bottom RH corner scale, then a portion can be located by the vertical and horizontal sliders on the screen.]
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Fig.8 (Ref.7B)
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Fig. 9 (ref.10)
Fig. 9 is a partial facsimile of the Daily Herald (a Labour-supporting paper) for Saturday 1st October 1938. It must have been printed later than Fig.7 because it gives much fuller details of the troops which were to be sent to the Sudetenland areas to be subject to a plebiscite under an International Commission regarding union or not with Germany (Fig. 7 only mentions the troop move briefly under Late News).
The author has seen, and made notes on, a full facsimile of the front page (which is not now available in the British Newspaper Archive) and it had the following:-
“Nearly 5,000 British troops will leave during the next few days for the policing of the Sudetenland.
They will be battalions of the Coldstream Guards, Grenadier Guards, Scots Guards and Welsh Guards, together with two battalions of line regiments. One of these will be the Gordon Highlanders; the other had not been decided last night.
The men will travel by way of Brussels and Germany and last night the War Office and Foreign Office were busy completing the arrangements for their transport.
The first draft of men are [sic] expected to travel tomorrow and the remainder on Monday and Tuesday.
One of the points still to be fixed is the uniform in which the men will travel.”
This all appeared to be based on Clause 5 of the Munich Agreement (which was published in full in the Herald):-
“5. The International Commission…will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed…”.
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Fig. 10
Note that Pilsen, the base of the famous Skoda armament works, was not included. However, by necessity it would have had to fulfil German orders in order to survive. The same is true of Brno, home of the Zbrojovka Brno company whose ZB-26 machine gun was the base of the BREN standard weapon of the British army throughout WW2.
Further break-up of Czechoslovakia
Poland seized the opportunity of Czech weakness after the Munich agreement to occupy a disputed part of the North at Teschen in October 1938. The following month Hungary was permitted by Germany to seize a slice of Southern Slovakia.
Acceleration of British war production
As reported above, in the Cabinet meeting of 30th October 1938 Duff Cooper had asked:-
“…with the PM having written that we would never go to war with her, how could we re-arm?”.
To the annoyance of the Germans the British re-armament programme was not halted or slowed down but accelerated. The British ambassador in Germany was reproached when an extra £150 M was voted for 1939 in February. On being shown a telegram with this news, Henderson wrote on it ”Peace can only be ensured when Britain is in a position to defend herself” and signed it (Ref. 4). He agreed that this could be published, although this was never done. It reworded the old Roman tag:-
Si vis pacem, para bellum
“If you want peace, prepare for war!”
As a major part of the re-armament programme the chart at Fig.11 on P.15 illustrates the acceleration of the fighter production.
Continued on P.15.
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Fig.11 (Data source Ref. 17 linked)
The output of fighters in Quarter1 of 1939 was nearly treble that at the date of Munich. The author has asserted in Contribution No. 2 at P.12 that this could have been done in time to obviate the need to appease Hitler, if Chamberlain had realised the need to match German production rate.
The total destruction of Czechoslovakia – 15th March 1939
Slovakia had been granted autonomy in October 1938 but a wish for independence was fomented by Nazi Germany. This reached a point where the Prague government occupied Bratislava (the principal city of the Slovak region) with Czech troops on the 10th March 1939. Organised by Germany and offered that nation’s “protection”, Slovakia then declared its independence from rule from Prague on the 14th.
The President of the remainder of the former Czechoslovakia saw no way of survival but also to ask Hitler to take it under German “protection” and was bullied into signing away the government ostensibly to that effect the following day. German troops entered Bohemia at 6AM on the 15th
Hungary seized the chance to occupy a further slice of Eastern Slovakia.
It will be seen that, although none of this was within the spirit of the Munich agreement, the situation offered an opportunity for Britain and France to evade their Annexed promise to guarantee the rump of Czechoslovakia from “Un-provoked aggression”.
Chamberlain’s reaction in the House of Commons on 15th March 1939
Ref.18 (linked) gives Chamberlain’s statement which, after describing the events as above said:-
“ In our opinion the situation has radically altered since the Slovak Diet declared the independence of Slovakia. The effect of this declaration put an end by internal disruption to the State whose frontiers we had proposed to guarantee … His Majesty’s Government cannot accordingly hold themselves any longer bound by this obligation”.
His remarks included:- “The attempt to preserve a State containing Czechs, Slovaks, as well as minorities of other nationalities, was liable to the same possibilities of change as was the Constitution which was drafted when the State was originally framed under the Treaty of Versailles. And it has not survived. That may or may not have been inevitable”. This was a rather cool dismissal of the Czechoslovakian nation.
He went on:- “ and I have so often heard charges of breach of faith bandied about which did not seem to me to be founded upon sufficient premises, that I do not wish to associate myself to-day with any charges of that character “. So, Adolf Hitler was not to be blamed!
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He concluded:-”-In a speech which I made at Birmingham on 30th January last I pointed out that we ought to define our aims and attitude, namely, our determination to search for peace…..
It is natural, therefore, that I should bitterly regret what has now occurred. But do not let us on that account be deflected from our course”
No change to his policy, then, after the events of 14th and 15th March 1939!
Altogether, this was not the statement of someone who had meant what he was reported to have said on the way back from Munich:-“if Hitler did not keep his agreement, the whole world would then see that he had broken his word and thus be more willing to act in unison against him”.
In the Cabinet Foreign Secretary Halifax, who had been a supporter of Chamberlain’s appeasement policy now insisted that the PM should change his course (Ref. 3). Possibly on Halifax’s initiative Henderson was recalled to London on the 16th (but did return later).
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Figure 12 (Ref.19)
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The “Damascene” conversion on 17th March 1939
On the second day after Hitler’s seizure of the rump of Czechoslovakia Chamberlain was due to give a speech in his “power base” of Birmingham on trade and social matters. On the afternoon train to that city, however, he had a conversion of his mind which, in the telling of it, was a less important version of that which befell Saul on the Damascus road. He abandoned his written speech and said something very different (Ref. 20 linked).
First, being a politician, he tried to excuse himself from what he had said on the 15th because
“the information that we had was only partial; much of it was unofficial” therefore he had made a “…..somewhat cool and objective statement…”. This was a specious excuse: in Prague he had an Ambassador, a Military Attaché and undoubtedly an MI6 officer. The German troops crossed the new border, 30 miles from Prague, at 6AM and lorried infantry could cover that distance in 1 hour. Sentries could have been posted outside the Embassy by 7.30AM. Chamberlain rose to make his speech in the House at 3.46PM (Hansard). The passing of 8 hours was ample time to get the facts from his men on the spot.
Another excuse regarding the Munich Agreement which Hitler had just torn up: “I had to deal with no new problem. This was something that had existed ever since the Treaty of Versailles-a problem that ought to have been solved long ago if only the statesmen of the last twenty years had taken broader and more enlightened views of their duty”.
Eventually the question:-“ “Is this the last attack upon a small State, or is it to be followed by others? Is this, in fact, a step in the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force?”
Finally the declaration:-“ …no greater mistake could be made than to suppose that, because it believes war to be a senseless and cruel thing, this nation has so lost its fibre that it will not take part to the utmost of its power in resisting such a challenge if it ever were made”.
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Figure 13 (Ref.22)
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Why did Hitler invade the Czech rump?
This Contribution has described only what Chamberlain knew, not what was being planned by Hitler. Those plans can be read in Ref. 3. The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) may have been able to brief the PM on some of what was being planned but Chamberlain certainly acted as though he did not know.
However, the invasion of the rump of Czechoslovakia was such a turning point in British-German relations that even Chamberlain could not “turn the other cheek” (although he tried to do that for two days). The reason ought to be queried by looking over the enemy’s shoulder. Ref. 23 (linked) includes the statement:-“ On 8 March 1939, Hitler met with Wilhelm Keppler, the NSDAP’s economic expert, where he spoke about his wish to occupy Czecho-Slovakia for economic reasons, saying that Germany needed its raw materials and industries.”. He probably also thought of seizing its gold reserves, because the 3rd Reich was desperately short of hard currency to buy raw materials. The Anschluss had provided 90 tons of gold from the Austrian central bank (Ref.26 linked) and he may have hoped for something similar from the Czech bank.
The invaded territory also provided an extra launching line for the planned invasion of Poland and presumably air fields in support.
Lastly, Hitler was intent on humiliating the Czechs because of the loss of face which he had felt in the May 1938 “crisis”.
The Polish guarantee
The first public action arising from Chamberlain’s “conversion” was his statement in the House of
Commons on 31 March 1939 – just a fortnight after his Birmingham speech. He said:-
“In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect. I may add that the French Government have authorised me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty’s Government “(Ref.21 linked).[7]
It is hard to describe this guarantee as anything but the “knee-jerk” response of injured vanity*8.
Ref. 27 states that “The British Chiefs of Staff” (CIGS Gort) “were entirely opposed to the guarantee to Poland”. The Secretary of State for War (Hore-Belisha) was not consulted (Ref. 28 linked).
*8. Readers may think that the author has been unfair in describing Chamberlain as “vain”. They should consider the following points:-
- (See Contribution No. 12). After the Foreign Secretary had endorsed the conclusion of a long study by Prof. Roberts in a book published in October 1937 that “Hitlerism cannot achieve its aims without war”, Chamberlain wrote in his diary “I know it is not true”;
- After his 15th September meeting with Hitler, Chamberlain wrote to his sister “…Wilson heard…that…[Hitler] liked the rapidity with which I had grasped the essentials”;
- Never having studied foreign affairs [Czechoslovakia “…a far-away …country … people of whom we know nothing!”] he had met Hitler 3 times without taking his Foreign Secretary with him, plus rushing out his “Piece of paper” with little or no advice.
WHAT HAPPENED NEXT?
By his 31st March statement Chamberlain had bound the UK in honour to a potential action which depended on Poland’s response to German aggression. Since this Anglo-French guarantee did not deter Hitler from invading that nation, which did resist, and ultimata to stop and retire did not have any effect, the allied countries had to declare war on Germany.
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Theoretically, what should have followed was the advance of the French army into Germany while that country’s main forces were engaged with the Poles, and while the Royal Navy began a blockade.
The French had been afraid to tackle the West-Wall in September 1938 while it was still nothing but a “…large construction site…”*9 . In September 1939 it was finished. With the morale of the French army shaken by its abandonment of the guarantee to Czechoslovakia and with the 15% Communist element*10 now opposed to war because of Stalin’s August pact with Hitler, the attack made by it into Germany was feeble and soon halted. It then engaged in, what was derided as, the “Phony War”. The RN fulfilled their part and had swept the seas of all German ships, mercantile and naval, by the end of 1939. Their war and the Merchant Navy’s war was definitely not “Phony”.
Meanwhile, Poland had been shattered quickly by the German “Blitz” and half-occupied by a Russian stab in the back.
Chamberlain’s guarantee had been no help to Poland whatsoever.
Unknown at the time, though, it had given one invaluable asset to the UK – Polish knowledge of how to defeat the German standard electronic ciphering system (Enigma)*11.
*9. As described by Jodl of OKW in evidence at his Nuremburg trial in June 1946 (Ref. 3).
*10. The %age of the electorate which voted Communist in the last French election in 1936.
*11. Another invaluable asset. In 1941 an emigré Polish soldier would develop the portable electronic mine detector which became standard in the British and other armies.
The relative gains in strength between 1938 and 1940
The relative gain in strength of the UK and Germany between the Munich Agreement and 2 years later, i.e. whether Chamberlain made a wise decision or not, has been debated ad nauseam. It even re-appeared in Daily Telegraph correspondence columns in 2021. Most of the arguments have been concerned only with the air situation of the UK.
The fact that the RAF and the UK’s integrated defence system defeated the Luftwaffe over England “Just-in-time” really settles the argument in favour of the UK gaining more than Germany in air matters.
However, what actually mattered was the relative situation between Germany and the Franco-British alliance. The air Battle of Britain was only made necessary because of failure of the alliance in the relative strength race on the Continent It was defeated in a 44 day battle. France was smashed and a weak British Expeditionary Force was thrown off the Continent. The soldiers and little else were saved by, what has been called, a “miracle”.
To some extent the German victory in France was because of superior tactics (tanks combined with dive-bombers) and an innovative strategy (Sichelschnitt). But also it was helped by an extra 3 Panzer divisions equipped with Czech tanks*12 plus whatever other help was provided by 2 years of Skoda output and war material arising from the demobilisation of the Czech army*13. That boosted the crucial Panzer spearhead in the West on 10th May 1940 to 10 divisions.
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*12. After the Polish campaign another 4 Panzer divisions were formed of which the 6th,7th and 8th were equipped mainly with Czech tanks identified by the Germans as PzKpfw 35(t) and 38(t) (see Refs. 24 & 25, both linked).
Czech 38(t) with Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division in 1940
*13. Hitler could not resist boasting of the booty obtained by invading Czechoslovakia. Ref. 23 (linked) gives his list:
In a speech delivered in the Reichstag, Hitler stressed the military importance of occupation, noting that by occupying Czechoslovakia, Germany gained 2,175 field cannons, 469 tanks, 500 anti-aircraft artillery pieces, 43,000 machine guns, 1,090,000 military rifles, 114,000 pistols, about a billion rounds of ammunition and three million anti-aircraft shells. This amount of weaponry would be sufficient to arm about half of the then Wehrmacht.
The consequences of the1940 Franco-British defeat
There were 7 shocking consequences of the Franco-British collapse which had never been foreseen in any pre-war strategical review:-
1. The loss of the French armed forces
(and 1.5 million POW kept in Germany as forced labour for the duration);
2. The loss of French industrial capacity
(and then turned over to German advantage);
3. An advance of 200 miles towards England for the Luftwaffe air bases
(meaning heavier bomb loads and fighter escort);
4. The German army on the Channel, 21 miles from England
(the definite risk of invasion);
5. The German navy on the West coast of France with immediate access to the Atlantic
(the powerful enlargement of the U-boat war);
6. The French army no longer a threat to Italy in Tunisia, leaving her free to invade Egypt
(resulting in 3 year’s fighting in Africa);
7. The Japanese seizing bases in French Indo-China
(resulting in the loss of Singapore and 4 years fighting in Burma).
The only thing spared was that Germans did not discover from French Intelligence about Enigma deciphering.
Foreseeing the grief which must ensue from a French collapse, Winston Churchill, with Cabinet agreement, offered a complete union of the two nations if they would keep fighting from Africa. It was of no avail.
Remarks
The author does not wish to draw Conclusions on the conduct of Neville Chamberlain during April 1938 to March 1939 but to offer some remarks on the three big questions about that conduct and allow readers to decide for themselves.
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The three big questions are:-
- Was he duped by Hitler because of naivety?
- Did he act as a crafty politician to cover up the betrayal of Czechoslovakia?
- Was he a wise strategist delaying war until the country was ready and willing to fight?
1. A dupe
Ref.5 (linked), written to his sister Ida after his first meeting with Hitler on the 15th September 1938, includes the comment:-
“ I had established a certain confidence, which was my aim, and in spite of the hardness and ruthlessness I thought I saw in his face I got the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word.”
The role played by his vanity has already been discussed, above.
About his second meeting on 22nd September he mentioned later “Even the SS cheered me!” Did he really believe that a highly-disciplined body such as that would have cheered him without orders?
2. Crafty politician
The 30th September “Joint Declaration” signed by Hitler was a grand prop to wave to the British public on his return. It led them to forget that Britain had pressured a small, harmless democracy to give in to a ruthless dictator. Of course, the nation had no treaty with Czechoslovakia. France had and Chamberlain had told Hitler that Britain would support France if she fulfilled her treaty but, knowing that she would not, it was an empty gesture.
The details then rushed out on the 1st October of the British Legion volunteer police and the six regular army battalions specifically listed to go to oversee the promised plebiscite (for areas not immediately conceded to Germany) were another great help in public swallowing of the shame:- “The good old British Tommy and ex-Tommy would see fair play!”. A nice touch was included by someone who today would be labelled a “Spin-Doctor”:-“ One of the points still to be fixed is the uniform in which the men will travel.” To partially quote W.S.Gilbert, this gave “An air of verisimilitude to an otherwise bald narrative!”.
Letting the International Commission discussions be handled by Henderson, whose attitude towards Czechoslovakia (like that of Chamberlain himself) was that it was a mistake of the Versailles Treaty and who was determined to prevent a plebiscite, meant that the whole thing was meaningless and finished after 10 days. The story of the BL volunteers is told in Ref. 15 (linked). The army involvement disappeared without trace. Neither Churchill nor Shirer mentions it.
A detailed account of the (denied) involvement of Chamberlain’s government in the actual control of the British Press and BBC is given in Ref.29 (linked, but the visitor must register to read the whole document).
3. Wise strategist
The case for and against this has been discussed above. “For” is the victory of the Battle of Britain. “Against” is the disaster of the preceding 44-day Battle of France and the unforeseen “7-fold-Shock” which resulted, including the necessity to fight the air battle over Britain.
Chamberlain’s own belief in his actions
Chamberlain was quite satisfied with himself up to the 9th April 1940. Contribution No.12 describes his notorious remark about Hitler having missed the ‘bus.
A summary of Chamberlain’s actions
Despite having said that no conclusion would be drawn by the author, he is forced to say that Chamberlain’s actions were, like those of most of us, ruled by a mixture of motives. His misfortune was that he became Prime Minister at an exceptionally difficult time, when Germany had allowed itself to be led by a dictator devoid of humanity and with a definite Action Plan for conquest.
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A final comment on the British Government’s actions between 1935 and 1938
This is what happens when “You do not pay the fire insurance before the house burns down”!
To say nothing of the lives lost in “The Un-Necessary War”, as Winston Churchill called it.
Epilogue to Munich
After they were liberated in May 1945, the Czechs expelled all the Germans (Ref. 30 linked).
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References
1. Berlin Diary 1934-1941 W. Shirer Sphere edition 1970 (first published September 1941.
3. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich W.Shirer Book Club edition..1984.
4. Failure of a Mission N. Henderson Hodder & Stoughton 1940.
5. https://spartacus-educational.com/2WWmunich.htm
6. Old Men Forget D. Cooper Hart-Davis 1954.
7. News Chronicle Saturday October 1 1938. 7A = Page 1; 7B = Page 2. British Newspaper Archives.
8. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25642336
9. The Collapse of the Third Republic W. Shirer Literary Guild edition..1970.
10. Looking for Trouble..V. Cowles Hamish Hamilton..June 1941.
11. Daily Herald Saturday October 1 1938 Internet.
12. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, Friday 30th September1938 at 7.30 p.m. National archives.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-23-95-cc-47-38-11.pdf
13. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neville_Chamberlain#Path_to_war_(October_1938_%E2%80%93_August_1939)
14. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/arts-and-books/munich-is-great-cinema-but-unreliable-history
15. https://british-police-history.uk/f/british-legion
16. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munich_Agreement#Elsewhere
19. News Chronicle Thursday March 16 1939 British Newspaper Archives.
20. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk09.asp
21. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Polish_alliance
22. News Chronicle Saturday March 18 1939 British Newspaper Archives.
23. https://www.wikiwand.com/en/German_occupation_of_Czechoslovakia#/The_Arsenal_of_the_Reich
24. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanks_in_the_German_Army#World_War_II_2
25. https://tmg110.tripod.com/ger_pzd1.htm
26. https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-epic-gold-heist-that-financed-the-war-for-hitler/
27. Alanbrooke D. Fraser..Collins..1982.
28. https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Hore-Belisha+-+Britain%27s+Dreyfus%3F-a020074761
30. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expulsion_of_Germans_from_Czechoslovakia
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Appendix to Contribution No. 18
Agreement concluded at Munich, September 29, 1938, between Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy
GERMANY, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement, which has been already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfilment:
(1) The evacuation will begin on 1st October.
(2) The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th October, without any existing installations having been destroyed, and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations.
(3) The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.
(4) The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on 1st October. The four territories marked on the attached map will be occupied by German troops in the following order: The territory marked No. I on the 1st and 2nd of October; the territory marked No. II on the 2nd and 3rd of October; the territory marked No. III on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of October; the territory marked No. IV on the 6th and 7th of October. The remaining territory of preponderantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.
(5) The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.
(6) The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. The commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, in certain exceptional cases, minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite.
(7) There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.
(8) The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.
Munich, September 29, 1938.
ADOLF HITLER,
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
EDOUARD DALADIER,
BENITO MUSSOLINI.