Column versus Line: Trafalgar and Waterloo compared

   In the Palace of Westminster there is a corridor between the Chambers of Lords and Commons which has two huge murals on opposite sides.  One is of the Battle of Trafalgar, the other of the Battle of Waterloo. 

   As the two major events, one naval the other land, which established the ascendancy of Great Britain in the 19^th Century, they were clearly thought appropriate to be commemorated by those who built the new Parliament in 1876.  The commanders of those battles were, of course, Vice Admiral Horatio Lord Nelson and General Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington.  Both had been granted the honour of being interred in St Paul’s Cathedral, Nelson in 1806, Wellington in 1852.  The interesting thing about these two battles is that they were won using the opposite formations known as “Line” and “Column”.

Line or Column?

   Ever since Man invented ways of killing an animal at a distance with a projectile – as opposed to using a hand-held weapon only effective at a few feet – and then turned this distance-killing method on his own kind, a Line of missile-projectors has usually prevailed over a Column of attackers.  Obviously, many men in a Line so-armed can engage simultaneously the few at the head of a Column.

  But, special circumstances convinced Nelson at Trafalgar and Wellington’s great opponent at Waterloo, Napoleon, that the reverse could be successful.  Nelson was right;  Napoleon was wrong.

Nelson before Trafalgar

   The special circumstance well-known to Nelson before he made his plan to attack the Combined Fleet of French and Spanish battle ships as soon as they gave him the chance was that their gunnery was very poor.  Without constant practice in a sea-way because they spent so much time blockaded in their own ports by the Royal Navy they could neither fire rapidly or accurately.  This would limit the damage which they could inflict during the time a Column was within cannon range of their Line.  An approach in Column was nothing like the probably-fatal risk it would have been if it had been against a British fleet in Line, which could fire at 3 times the rate of the French or Spanish*.

*Nelson’s 2^nd -in-command, Cuthbert Collingwood in a previous commission, had trained his men to fire 3 broadsides in 3 ½ minutes.  Two other technical features in favour of the British were:-  their cannon were triggered by flintlocks, which fired the propellant with little delay, whereas the enemy still used linstocks i.e. a slow-burning match with a delay during which the gun could alter its elevation in a seaway;  the French had the practice of aiming initially at the British masts, a small target but a good one if their aim was true -which it was not.

   Given that he was sure he could approach the enemy at right angles without undue loss, Nelson then added his “touch” which could make a battle decisive.  He would use three Columns at right angles to the enemy fleet and cut their line at three places, starting about 2/3rds of their ships from the rear so that far superior numbers would engage the cut-off portion (when he planned initially he expected to have 34 battleships against an expected enemy 33).  With the ability to rake the enemy as his ships passed their sterns** and the superior gunnery described, a quick victory was assured before their leading portion could “wear ship” and return to help – if it did.  That part would then itself be faced with annihilation.

** “Raking” – sailing battleships at that time had no protection at the stern from an opponent which passed across behind it from firing into it as each double-shotted gun of its broadside bore.  This produced the most appalling carnage unless the captain ordered his men to lie down in time, plus dismounted guns.  On the other hand, the forecastles were quite solid, which was to the advantage of the column against raking and as a plus in the “Victory” leading the weather column the hawse holes were barricaded.  One wonders why shipwrights did not build solid sterns.  No doubt captains and admirals prized their stern galleries for private exercise, but they could have been added externally.

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Before the Battle of Trafalgar

   In October 1805 the Combined Fleet of French and Spanish battleships under the command of Vice-Admiral Pierre-Charles Villeneuve lay at anchor in Cadiz harbour.  In accordance with a grand scheme of Napoleon’s to establish naval superiority in the English Channel, so as to permit his “Armée d’Angleterre” to cross it, he had just led a fleet commanded by Nelson away to the West Indies and back as a diversion while a blockaded French fleet in Brest was intended to sortie to join him on his return as the invasion cover force.  That sortie had been abortive.  Villeneuve had been intercepted by another British fleet commanded by Vice-Admiral Calder off Cape Finisterre in 22^nd July on his return, while attempting to sail up to the Channel.  After an indecisive battle in fog and some to-ing and fro-ing around Northern Spanish ports he had then sailed South.

   Simultaneously disgusted with his navy and having just received news that Austria had joined an alliance with England and Russia against him, Napoleon on 28^th August had broken up his camps along the North French coast to march the troops inland to attack his old enemy***.  He sent peremptory orders to Villeneuve to sail from Cadiz, re-enter the Mediterranean and mount an attack on Naples, fighting a battle with Nelson if necessary.

***Napoleon forced the Austrian army covering Vienna to surrender on 20^th October 1805.  He entered Vienna on the 14^th November.

The Battle of Trafalgar

   Along with Napoleon’s order, Villeneuve learnt shortly afterwards the bad news that his replacement was on his way to Cadiz and the good news that Nelson had had to detach 6 battleships to Gibraltar for resupply (unknown to Villeneuve was that Nelson had also weakened himself by letting Calder, ordered home in a frigate to explain his poor performance off Finisterre, sail in his former flagship, a 3-decker of 98-guns****).  These three facts, with a favourable wind, caused the French commander to sail South and his ships began to leave Cadiz on 19^th October.  He sailed in no hope of victory, knowing the poor quality and under-manned state of his crews, and with an insight into what Nelson’s tactics would be.  He had written (translated) “He will try to double our rear, cut through the line, and bring against the ships thus isolated groups of his own, to surround and capture them”.  This was an amazingly correct appreciation; but he did nothing to counter it, e.g. by having two lines in parallel at the rear, echeloned so as not to mask broadsides.

****Calder received a severe reprimand from a court martial for not renewing the battle and never received another command.  Later commentators have suggested that his action had nevertheless broken Villeneuve’s confidence in his fleet.

   The two battleship forces which fought were as follows:-

		Guns per ship
British	100-130	98-102	80	74	64	TOTAL
No. of ships		7	1	16	3	27
French & Spanish
No. of ships	4		6	22	1	33 (18 French 15 Spanish)

   It has been calculated that, taking into account the weight of solid shot fired by each type of gun, the relative Total Broadsides were:-

British 19.5 tons; Combined Fleet 28.3 tons.

Of course, this was decisively modified by:-

(a) the British rate of fire being 3 x the enemy

(b) the Nelsonic concentration against the centre/rear of the enemy

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   The wind was very light West-North-Westerly on the 21 October 1805, but with a heavy and increasing swell which Nelson already noted as heralding a gale later on.  He signalled the fleet to prepare to anchor at the end of the day.  In the battle, the ships’ rolling embarrassed most the un-skilled gunners of the enemy.

   Nelson had carefully kept his fleet well over the horizon from the shore, in order to avoid frightening Villeneuve, keeping contact by a line of frigates.  When he knew that the Combined fleet had all emerged from harbour, after some manoeuvres to gain time, and when it was about 27 nautical miles (nm) South of Cadiz and in his lee he ordered his ships to sail East to intercept, grouped in two rough columns (as he was now down to 27 battleships). The Northern to be led by his 102 gun flagship Victory, the Southern by Collingwood inthe100 gun Royal Sovereign.  The two fleets sighted each other at about 6.00 am, roughly 11 nm apart, about 10 nm West of Spain.

   Around 8.00 am Villeneuve ordered his fleet to wear, i.e., to reverse course by 180⁰ .  With poor seamanship this took 2 hours and left the fleet in some confusion with the line doubled and in echelon by chance rather than intention.  Whether the Commander-in Chief intended to get back to Cadiz if he could is not known.  Certainly, Nelson thought so.

   At low speed in the light breeze it took until just after 12.00 for Collingwood to cut into the enemy line ahead of their 15^th ship (the French 74 gun Fougueux, which had, rather late, opened fire on his flagship a few minutes earlier, losing the opportunity to do damage).  He raked the 112 gun flagship of the Spanish Rear Admiral Alava (Santa Ana) which was ahead as he passed.

   The Victory was under fire from 12.20 for 40 minutes before Nelson cut the enemy line at the 21^st ship from the rear as he aimed deliberately to rake the ship ahead, the flagship of Villeneuve, the 80 gun Bucentaure.  The Spanish 130 gun Santisima Trinidad was just ahead and joined in the battle, but 10 ships ahead were cut off as Nelson planned and would have to wear again to return to the fight.  The Victory had suffered smashed steering, rigging damage and casualties in the approach, little enough due to the poor shooting of the enemy and their aiming policy.

                                         

An 18^th, the French Achille blew up at about 17.45***** and this was the dramatic end of the battle.

*****A fire had been started in a foretop by weapons there.  When British shot brought the mast down it set the hull aflame.  Nelson forbade weapons in foretops because of this fire danger.

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   The author of all this, Nelson, had been shot down 25 minutes after the Victory broke into the enemy line by a marksman in a foretop of the Redoutable alongside.  He was carried below, his wound was mortal but he lived until 16.30, long enough to be told of 14 ships captured.  His last order was to anchor, as he had earlier intended against the forthcoming storm, but no ship, British or prizes, had its gear in condition to do that.  This caused the loss of several of the latter and a fearful night and day for the British.

Casualties
		Killed	Wounded	Prisoners
	British	402	1139
	French & Spanish	About 4,500	About 2,500	About 7,000

   The rival commanders did not long survive Nelson.  Villeneuve, captured but freed on parole, was found dead in France in April 1806 with multiple stab wounds, officially self-inflicted but which suggested assassination. The Spaniard, Gravina, escaped in his flagship with a wound which caused his death in May 1806.

Lost Prize Money

   Given the harsh discipline and poor pay, quite often after having been forcibly pressed into service for years, the lower ranks of the Royal Navy hoped for some reward from Prize Money after captured ships were sold or taken into British service.  This was denied to them because some captured ships were sunk in the gale after the battle and then, when he could not bring the others into port, Collingwood ordered the rest to be burned.  However, in 1806 Parliament made some compensation for this by voting £300,000 to be distributed to those who took part.  This gave Captains £3,362 and sailors £6.10s – about 1/3^rd and 1/5^th of what they might otherwise have received.

Sources

• Nelson and his Times.  Rear Admiral C. Beresford with H. Wilson.  Eyre & Spottiswoode.  About 1897.
• A Portrait of Lord Nelson.  O. Warner.  Reprint Society.  1958.
• Nelson’s War.  P. Padfield.  Book Club Associates.  1976.
• Trafalgar.  J. Terraine.  Sidgwick & Jackson.  1976.
• Bonaparte.  C. Barnett.  Book Club Associates.  1978.
• Why did the British defeat the Combined Fleet, despite the Combined Fleets superior numbers – Wikiversity
• Head-Hunting: The legal aftermath of the Battle of Trafalgar and the case of El Rayo [1811] 165 ER 1226 (linkedin.com)

1805 – 1815

   In July 1805 Napoleon realised the truth of a statement made by Earl St Vincent, First Sea Lord, in 1803:-  “I do not say that they cannot come;  I only say that they cannot come by sea”.  Giving up his plan to invade Great Britain and with Austria once again hostile, he had turned his back on the English Channel and, in late August, had set his army in march to the Danube.

   From that date onwards until April 1814 he was engaged continually in wars with various coalitions of Austria, Russia, Prussia, Portugal and Spain – while always at war with Great Britain.  English diplomacy and subsidies created those coalitions.  Napoleon, on the other hand, had imposed on any nation he controlled his “Continental System”, i.e. a ban against any import from or export to Britain.  This was a continual source of friction and ultimately of his un-doing.

   From 1808 British troops fought French directly in the Spanish Peninsula and, with various setbacks, eventually invaded France itself in 1813.

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   After his catastrophic attempt to coerce Russia into supporting his blockade of Britain by his march on Moscow in 1812 all the opposing powers came together to defeat him through 1813 and 1814 and forced him to abdicate as Emperor of France.  Exile to Elba did not curb his ambition.  His return to France on 1^st March 1815 opened 100 days of suspense and furious activity which culminated effectively in the Battle of Waterloo on 18^th June 1815.  Defeat and a final abdication and permanent exile to St Helena then followed.

Actions of 15^th to 17^th June 1815

   The nations which had defeated Napoleon in 1814, after his return, declared him an outlaw and set in motion very large forces to repeat the performance in 1815.

   However, by June only the British, the United Netherlands * and the Prussians had troops in a position in Belgium from which they could invade France.  Napoleon naturally mustered an army to repel such a move, which would have been in concert with Austrian and Russian troops from the North.  While awaiting those forces Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, in command of the British, Dutch and various associated German troops and Field Marshal Blucher commanding the Prussians took up defensive positions South-West and South of Brussels.  Wellington’s HQ was in the city and Blucher’s at Namur, about 35 miles from it (as the crow flies, which will be the way distances are reported subsequently).

*It is convenient from here to call countries by their current names.  Holland and Belgium had been under French rule since 1795 and 1797 respectively.  After Napoleon’s abdication the assembly of the victors at the Congress of Vienna in late 1814 had created the “United Netherlands” as an amalgam of Holland and Belgium.  In the Southern half of Belgium, called Wallonia, which was French-speaking, this was a very unpopular move.  Conscripts from that area were looked on with some doubt when it came to the 1815 campaign.

   Napoleon, while professing his peaceful intentions, had re-assembled an army of his old soldiers who had perforce been taken into the service of the returned Bourbon King Louis XVIII in 1814 but who had never lost their basic loyalty to the Elban exile.  Some of these veterans were men returned from being prisoners of war from the previous campaigns.  These troops had camped around Valenciennes and Maubeuge, near the Belgium frontier (see the sketch map below).

   The Emperor decided on a different strategy.  With the coalition forces spread apart, he planned to split them and defeat them separately. He concentrated before Charleroi and attacked there on the 15^th June, driving in the Prussian outposts in the town and along the river Sambre and driving them back on their main forces before him in a North-Easterly direction, away from the British and Dutch (which will be called the “Allied” forces subsequently).

   Not until late on the 15^th did Wellington learn that the French had gone from before Mons and accept that activity reported from the Prussian front was not a feint.  “Napoleon has humbugged me…he has gained twenty-four hours’ march on me!” he exclaimed (ref. Longford, see sources).

   Allied troops were set in motion to rendezvous at Quatre Bras on the 16th.  Wellington rode there that day and on to consult with Blucher, who was preparing to resist the French at Ligny.

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Having spread his troops as far as Liege on the river Meuse, where Bulow stood with his corps (about 31,000 men), he could only concentrate 3 corps (about 84,000 men).  Seeing the Prussians assembled in full view of their approaching enemies (who totalled about 80,000 men), Wellington suggested that Blucher should conceal his formations from cannon fire as much as possible.  This advice was not taken.  “My men like to see their enemy” was the reply.  This is mentioned specially because it had long been Wellington’s practice to place his men on reverse slopes – it might be called the “Wellington touch”.

   By a misunderstanding, Gneisenau, Blucher’s Chief of Staff, thought that Wellington promised to bring his men over to support the Prussians, although this was with the qualification “If I am not attacked myself”.  He was so attacked in an “encounter battle” at the cross-roads and spent the day gradually building up defences, as troops arrived piecemeal from the West, against an attack by a French corps led by Ney.  Fortunately, the intended reinforcing corps of D’Erlon (about 21,000 men), in a classic example of the old military saying “Order, counter-order, disorder!” spent the entire day marching and counter-marching between Ney and Napoleon at Ligny, without firing a shot at either battle.  Quatre Bras was held, Blucher’s, 3 corps were defeated and he himself was dismounted in a cavalry charge and for some hours was out of contact with his army.  A decision to retire was made by Gneisenau and, despite his grievance against the Englishman, he directed “der ruckmarsch” 14 miles Northward to Wavre and not North-East and their main depot at Liege.

   Wellington only discovered the Prussian movement early in the morning of the 17^th, which necessitated his own retreat.  Finding Wavre on the map and seeing its relation, about 9 miles East of the back-stop position at Mont-St-Jean (MStJ), 12 miles South of Brussels, which he had considered earlier in the year (but had decided not to have entrenched so as not to give it away to the many Napoleon-supporters/spies in Brussels), he ordered that to be the assembly point.  On the day of battle his Command Post (CP) was by a large elm tree near the cross-roads of a sunken lane along the crest of MStJ and the Charleroi-Brussels paved road (the chaussée), although he was constantly on horseback along the ridge to observe and re-post his forces.

   Four critical decisions were taken on the 17th:-  the Prussians to retain reasonable touch with the Allied army;  Wellington to stand at MStJ with his main army;  his decision to detach (or possibly confirm the previous detachment of) 17,000 men with 22 guns to Hal, about 9 miles West of his CP, under command of Prince Ferdinand of the Netherlands;  and Napoleon’s to detach Grouchy with 30,000 men and 96 guns to “see off” the Prussians with an assumption that they were retreating on Liege, away from the Allies, while he followed Wellington with his main army.

   From 14.00 on the 17^th until early next morning there was a violent thunderstorm.  Most of the soldiers on both sides endured this with little or no shelter.  The ground to be fought over on the 18^th, covered with a growing long-stalked grain crop, was saturated – which became significant.

   The MStJ ridge is today about 443 feet AMSL at the Wellington CP, but this has been affected by scraping up the area to raise the huge mound on which now stands the memorial to the Dutch-Belgium forces.  At a guess it would have been 450 feet in 1815.  Going South along the chaussée, just past the large farm of La Haye Sainte some ¼ mile from the CP, the lowest point is about 380 feet.  An attack on the ridge therefore had to climb about 70 feet.  A mile further on is the ridge on which stands La Belle Alliance which is about 440 feet AMSL.  This is where the main French army deployed late on the 18^th.  The Imperial Guard were a short distance further back.  SouthWest from the CP at about 1 1/4 miles stood the chateau of Hougoumont.

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The Battle of Waterloo

   After the detachments given above, the strengths on the battlefield were as follows (using Wikipedia figures -other accounts vary, so numbers must be considered approximate):-

		Total	including Cavalry	Guns
	Allied	67,000	11,000	150
	French	69,000	14,000	250
The Allied army was very heterogeneous, comprising:
British 25,000 + 6,000 King’s German Legion			(expatriates	from Hanover)	31,000
				United Netherlands	17,000
				Hanover	11,000
				Brunswick	6,000
				Nassau	3,000

Many of these soldiers had never fought before and, as mentioned, some were of doubtful loyalty or had fought on the French side previously and were inclined to believe that Napoleon was invincible.

   The French army, all of one nation, also believed that Napoleon would win again after his defeat of the Prussians.  The Emperor himself, refusing to listen to those who had fought Wellington in the Peninsula, was entirely confident that he would soon beat him.

   Believing that Grouchy had pursued the Prussians out of touch, he did not know that they were encamped at Wavre.  After their Ligny losses and the subsequent desertion of many thousand Saxon conscripts from a region only recently annexed by Prussia, but now joined by Bulow’s corps, they comprised:-

                             Prussian             91,000**

**Fought at Ligny 84,000 less 16,000 Killed & Wounded less 8,000 deserted plus Bulow’s corps 31,000 = 91,000.~~~~~~~~     Various accounts give 48,000 to 50,000 but these figures are not consistent with the separate elements also quoted elsewhere.

   The special circumstances which convinced Napoleon that he could defeat a Line with a Column also involved gunnery, as it had Nelson at Trafalgar, only the other way round.  Trained as a gunner, he had conceived the use of a large concentration of field artillery to blast a hole in an enemy Line so that the shaken remnants were frightened into running as a Column of infantry attacked, or at least only putting up a poor fight.  He first used this tactic at Friedland in June 1807 against the Russians, having assembled a 36 gun battery and was victorious.  Only two days earlier he had used 60 guns at Ligny, followed by an attacking Column of the Imperial Guard, to shatter the Prussian centre.

   After deployment, the map below shows the forces before the Battle

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Approximate timetable of the battle

   4.00.  Bulow’s Prussian corps of about 31,000 men commences its march from East of Wavre to fulfil a promise made by Blucher to come to join Wellington.  It was undoubtedly chosen to lead because it did no fighting on 16^th although much marching on that day and 17^th.  Gneisenau (it was surely his decision), knowing that Wellington was at MStJ, directed it to use the Southern of two narrow roads, from which it could debouch on Napoleon’s flank, although it was in poor condition after the rain and would mean crossing a single bridge over the small river Lasne (described in accounts as a “defile”).  Distance to march, 13 miles to Plancenoit village, about 1 mile from the chausée.

   6.00.  Wellington receives a message from Blucher, written late on the 17^th, that two Prussian corps definitely will be coming to his aid.

   8.00.  Napoleon holds a breakfast conference with his generals, refuses to listen to the cautions of those who had lost to Wellington before (did they mention reverse slopes?), dismisses the hearsay that the Prussians will join him, and is sure he will enter Brussels that day.

  9.00   As the ground is too soggy to permit cannon balls to bounce and ricochet to cause maximum damage, Napoleon delays the start of his grand bombardment, for which he has assembled 80 guns, 24  12 pounders and the rest the standard 6  pounder***.

***British designation; it is not known how the French described them.  The 12 pdr was about 4 ½” bore, the 6 pdr about 3 ½”, both firing solid shot.  There were a few howitzers of 5 ½” bore which could fire explosive shells over the ridge, but it is not known if they were in the grand battery.

   10.00 to 11.00.  To occupy the time until the ground was considered to be dry enough, Napoleon holds a grand review of his army, to encourage them and hopefully to frighten the enemy.  All this time Bulow, who was delayed in Wavre for 2 hours by a fire, is marching towards him.  This is unknown to Napoleon.  Perhaps if he had known he would have begun his attack on Wellington earlier.

   11.25.  The grand battery opens fire on the centre-left of the Allied position.  At the same time an infantry attack is made on Hougoumont.  If intended to cause Wellington to pull reserves to his right, although he feeds some troops in over the next few hours that the local fight rages, it does not succeed.  On the other hand, Jerome (Napoleon’s brother) in charge of the assault loses his head and throws more and more troops in and still does not succeed in capturing the place during the whole day.

On the ridge, mostly sheltered on the reverse slope except from cannon balls which bounce over the crest, Wellington also orders his men to lie down.  This is something a Continental general would not do, in case they would not stand up when ordered.

   12.00.  Pirch’s corps begins to leave Wavre, same route as Bulow.  Probably about 21 ,000 strong after Ligny losses and desertions

   ca 12.00.  Grouchy, having turned towards the actual Prussian encampment at Wavre, hears the sound of the guns.  He is urged to march towards them, but refuses, carrying out Napoleon’s previous order to follow the Prussians.  He therefore misses an opportunity to reinforce Napoleon before Bulow can attack him.

   13.30.  The corps of d’Erlon advances towards the East of the chausée.  Probably they had been placed in front because they had not fought at all on the 16^th.  They are formed in 4 columns or, rather in 3 they are in “phalanxes”, 200 files wide.  As they march up the slope they are fully exposed to the fire of the line of Allied guns.

   ca 14.00.  At the crest they are met by Dutch-Belgium and British brigades.  In the fight which follows the former is forced to retreat, the latter charges.  Suddenly, 2,000 British heavy cavalry, big men on big horses, sweep forward and force the French to retire.  Unfortunately, the charge goes too far and cannot be rallied (shades of Prince Rupert at Naseby) and they are in turn counter-charged at the bottom of the ridge by French cavalry and badly cut up.  They are unable to make another major charge in the battle.

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   14.00.  The head of Bulow’s Corps is at the bridge over the R. Lasne.  Napoleon has sent reserve cavalry to oppose him.

   14.00.  Zeithen’s corps begins to leave Wavre, taking the easier Northern road which will lead him directly to Welling ton’s left flank on MStJ.  Probably now about 21,000 strong.  This is handsomely fulfilling the promise of support to Wellington, because it leaves only Thielmann’s corps of perhaps 18,000 in Wavre to oppose the oncoming Grouchy with 30,000.

   14.30.  Wellington sees with his telescope a Prussian cavalry patrol about 3 ½ miles from Napoleon’s right flank.

   15.00.  There are no live or free Frenchmen on MStJ.  The grand battery re-opens its fire.

   15.45.  Mistaking troop movements on MStJ, as Wellington re-organises, for a retreat, Ney orders part of his cavalry to charge up MStJ “in pursuit”.  Other cavalry joins this in error.  It is un-coordinated, without horse artillery in support.  Allied guns inflict losses as the French climb the hill, then the gunners leave their weapons and take shelter in the squares which the infantry form.  The French cavalry are unable to break the squares although they try many times.  Horses will not charge home against a chevaux-de-frise of bayonets and the Allied infantry fire steadily.  The Allied cavalry make counter-charges.  Napoleon, although knowing that Ney’s attack is premature, reinforces it with more cavalry, without success.

   16.30.  Bulow’s leading brigades debouch from the wood about 1 ½ miles from Plancenoit and are in action against a reserve infantry corps sent by Napoleon.  Wellington hears the guns.

   17.00.  The French cavalry retreat from MStJ .  Wellington moves up fresh infantry from his right.

   17.00.  The Prussians capture Plancenoit.  At Wavre their last corps is now facing East, fighting Grouchy.

   17.30.  The French attack again with cavalry supported by infantry, without success against the Allies reinforced on the crest.

   ca 17.30.  Napoleon sends part of his Imperial Guard from reserve to re-capture Plancenoit.

   18.00.  Ney finally captures La Haye Sainte as the defenders run out of ammunition.  He can now send up guns to fire at close range on the Allied infantry.

   18.00.  Zeithen’s advance guard reaches Wellington’s left flank.  He takes troops from there to reinforce his centre and also brings a Dutch division there from the extreme right flank.

   ca 19.30.  To hearten his troops Napoleon orders officers to announce that Grouchy has reached them on the right – “Voila Grouchy!”.  He has to decide on his next move.  The Prussians are still arriving on his flank.  Grouchy is in their rear but when or if he can assist Napoleon is doubtful.  Wellington still holds the crest of MStJ but must have used all his reserves.  Napoleon still has the never-defeated Old Guard in reserve.  He can still win if he defeats the Allied army and then uses his whole army against the Prussians.  Therefore, he orders much of the Old Guard to attack MStJ.  They attack in two columns of squares with 80 files in front.  They aim at the west of the chausée, to the drumbeat of the pas-de-charge:- “the rum-dum, the rum-dum, the rummadum, dummadum, dum, dum!”.  The boy drummers are in the squares.  The beat is to keep time and also to frighten the enemy.

   19.30.  Zeithen’s corps comes into action on the East of MStJ.

   ca 20.00.  After enduring the fire of the Allied batteries, the Guard reaches the MStJ crest.  The Eastern column cause the remnants of a British brigade to waver.  The newly-reinforcing Dutch defeat the French.  The other column is allowed to come within 30 yards of the British Guards lying down before they spring up and, 400 files wide in 4 ranks, pour their musketry into the French column.  They give way.  One British battalion on their flank is wheeled out parallel with them to fire into the side of the column.  The Imperial Guard, which attacked about 6,000 strong, is defeated.  “La Garde recule!” is heard with horror in Napoleon’s troops.

   20.30.  Wellington orders a general advance.  Bulow finally captures and holds Plancenoit.

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The cry “Nous sommes trahis!” is raised in the French army as they realise the lie they have been told about Grouchy.  A panic-stricken flight of most of the army follows.  Some units resist in squares until guns are brought up to threaten to shatter them.  Napoleon abandons his men and escapes along the chausée.

   21.00.  Wellington and Blucher meet on the chausée about 1 ½ mile past the prophetically-named inn of La Belle Alliance.  It is agreed that the Prussian cavalry will take on the pursuit.  Napoleon has a narrow escape from them.

   Early 19^th.  Grouchy forces a crossing of the R. Dyle near Wavre against Thielmann’s corps.  It is too late and he retreats towards Namur.

   24^th June.  Napoleon abdicates for the 2^nd time.

   6 July.  The Prussian army enters Paris.

   15 October.  Napoleon arrives at St Helena, where he will spend the rest of his life in exile, under British supervision.

Losses (source wiki)

              Allied                   17,000 killed, wounded, missing;

              Prussian             7,000     ‘’             ‘’               ‘’;

              French                26,000    ‘’             ‘’       prisoners + 15,000 missing, presumed deserted.

The name of the battle

   Although Blucher wished to name the battle after La Belle Alliance, and it is so named in Continental accounts, Wellington named it Waterloo after his rear HQ.

Wellington’s detachment at Hal

   The Hal detachment did not fire a shot.  Why Wellington made no use of this large body of troops -20% of his total strength- is a source of controversy.  Gleig (see sources) records a statement the Duke made on the subject about ten years after the battle:-  “Had I been forced from my position, I should have retreated to my right, towards the coast, the shipping, and my resources.  I had placed Hill [nominally in command of the Hal detachment, but actually at MStJ] where he could have lent me important assistance in many contingencies, and that might have been one”.

   Wellington was very sensitive about the possibility that Napoleon might execute his famous “Manoeuvre sur les derrières” on his right.  In fact Napoleon never contemplated it and his Westward action was limited to the attack on Hougoumont.  This being so, why did Wellington not carry out his own outflanking attack?  This author suggests it was because of the composition of the Hal force, which comprised a British division plus a Netherland corps.  As mentioned earlier, Wellington had reason to doubt the steadiness of the Dutch-Belgians.  Perhaps he thought he could expect them to resist a French attack when accompanied by the British – as they did at MStJ – but not rely on them to make an attack themselves.  This, clearly, was not something he would admit since the battle was won with the aid of the Netherlanders.

LINE versus COLUMN at Waterloo

   Wellington, in a letter of 2^nd July 1815, said about Napoleon’s tactics:-

“He just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style.”.

By the old style he meant “In Line”, as shown by a letter written on 8^th April 1811 during the Peninsula campaign  “..I do not desire better sport than to meet one of their columns en masse, with our lines.”

  He could have enlarged his remark by adding that the columns had the “Napoleonic touch” of the preliminary mass bombardment and that he countered this with the “Wellington touch” of placing his men on a reverse slope.

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Overall conclusion

   The overall conclusion from Trafalgar and Waterloo is that it was unsafe to assume that a Line would always defeat a Column.  “Special circumstances” could upset that maxim, as they did at Trafalgar and as they did at Ligny and as they might have done at Waterloo if other opposing “special circumstances” had not cancelled them out.

Some additional thoughts on the battles

Command and Control

   At Trafalgar, once Nelson had sent his fleet into action in two columns, he had no further need to give formation orders, except one – for the Victory to pass astern of Villeneuve’s flagship Bucentaure so as to rake it.  His famous signal “England expects…” was simply to “Amuse the fleet.”

  Incidentally, the way in which Pasco, the Signal Lieutenant, felt able to suggest “expects” instead of his Admiral’s proposed “confides” (to save flag hoists), and have it adopted, showed the good inter-rank relations which existed under Nelson’s command.

   At Waterloo, Wellington was constantly engaged in riding along the battle line to see situations for himself, giving orders to improve them and even rallying troops who wavered.  He told an enquirer the day after the battle, without any evidence of vanity, “I don’t think it would have done if I had not been there!”.

The Commander-in Chiefs’ Danger

   Admirals have always shared danger with their men^4*.  More so in Nelson’s case as he was on deck when most of the crew were below.  It cost him a painful death.  It did not affect the outcome.  His well-trained fleet was captained by officers who had been thoroughly briefed with Nelson’s intentions.  Apart from that, Nelson had already made a general point to them in a memorandum:-

“When signals cannot be made out clearly, no captain can do very wrong by placing his ship alongside that of an enemy”.

   Wellington escaped death from cannon balls by inches on at least two occasions – once when an Aide-de-Camp lost his arm while riding alongside him and the second time near the end of the battle when his cavalry commander lost a leg directly beside him.  From what has been written above his death or serious wounding in the first case would probably have lost the battle^5*.  He had had no time beforehand to train his polyglot army, and he had few of his Peninsula veterans who had experienced his methods in the British contingent.  He did not actually believe in disclosing his plans before a battle (although he had told the Duke of Richmond on the night of the 16^th where his fall-back position might be, at MStJ).  When his cavalry commander asked about those plans, he had simply said that, as Napoleon had not told him how he would attack, he couldn’t tell what he would do either.

4*In more recent times there were the deaths in action of Admiral Craddock at Coronel in 1914 and Admiral Hood at Jutland in 1916;  Admiral Blagrove in the Royal Oak in 1939, Admiral Holland in the Hood and Admiral Phillips in the Prince of Wales in 1941.

5*When battlefields grew far out of sight of the commander, as in !914-1918, the C-in-C had to be far behind the front line and in no danger at all.  More recently, with developed air warfare and the use of Tactical HQs well forward, commanders have been able to share some of the danger with their soldiers.

Sources

• Life of Wellington.  G. Gleig.  Longman, Green.  1864.
• Wellington.  E. Longford.  Weidenfeld & Nicolson.  1969.
• Waterloo Companion.  M. Adkin.  Aurum Press.  2001.
• Google earth.

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Appendix

Analogies

   Interesting, though arguable, analogies have been drawn between the Napoleonic wars and WW2.

1805 Trafalgar and 1940 Battle of Britain

              Battles which saved Great Britain from invasion.

1812 and 1941

The mistake of marching on Moscow which was the beginning of the end for Napoleon and Hitler.

1815 Waterloo and 1944 D-Day

              Battles which led to the final defeat of the Continental dictators.

A unique experience

   One man had the unique experience of fighting at both Trafalgar and Waterloo.  This was the Spaniard Don Miguel-Ricardo de Alava.  As a Captain of Marines he was aboard his uncle’s ship, the Santa Ana, which was captured (but freed later).  When Spain revolted against Napoleon in 1808 Alava was sent to the British forces on liaison duties.  He later became an Aide-de-Camp to Wellington and reached the rank of Brigadier-General.  During the Hundred Days he was able to resume A-de-C duties with Wellington and was one of the two of his personal staff officers who survived unhurt to share the Duke’s supper in his Waterloo billet after the battle.                                                         

The Commanders-in-Chief

Derek S. Taulbut January 2021