Churchill, Kitchener and the Dardanelles

Introduction

   Although Admiral Lord Nelson apparently did not say or write “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort*”, he would have been correct generally in the days of muzzle-loading cannon if he had.  The fort, usually protected with masonry, often on a hill and with bigger guns so combining to give a range beyond that of the cannon aboard ship and often with a furnace to heat the solid shot red-hot (with suitable wet wadding), could defeat a wooden sailing battleship (with limited manoeuvrability) quite easily.

*It seems that this was an invention of Admiral Fisher in a 1904 review of the Dardanelles problem (Ref. 1).

   However Special Circumstances can often invalidate any maxim.  Probably these were un-trained gunners on 19^th February 1807 when Admiral Duckworth with 7 ships sailed through the Dardanelles with little loss to carry out his government’s policy of threatening the Turkish government at Constantinople.  Lacking a landing force he was unable to get a satisfactory settlement and re-passed the Dardanelles with somewhat higher losses on 3rd March.  The total casualties to his crews were 277 men killed and wounded (Ref. 2).  Duckworth gave his opinion later that forcing the Dardanelles needed the co-operation of troops (Ref. 3).

   After sail had given place to steam and with armoured ships now having shell-firing guns (as, of course, so did the forts which also could have locomotive torpedoes and mine defences), Ref.3 lists no less than 8 times between 1877 and 1911 that the “Dardanelles Problem” was considered by the military and naval authorities.  Each time even a combined ship-plus-soldiers combination was considered too hazardous.  That was professional opinion in 1914.  An 1895 example had the then-Prime Minister, the sagacious Lord Salisbury, exclaiming in disgust “…if British warships were made of porcelain he would, of course, pursue a different policy!”.

A time-line of events concerning the Dardanelles operation in 1915

 Firstly, it will be helpful to state the positions of three of the major figures:-

• Winston Churchill [WSC] (age 39 at start of WW1) had been First Lord of the Admiralty since October 1911.

This was a political appointment with a Cabinet seat in the Liberal Government under the Prime Minister Herbert Asquith.  Before WSC the post had been principally concerned with getting Parliamentary approval of the Royal Navy’s annual Budget.  WSC took a much more active role but specific orders were the domain of the professional head of the RN, the First Sea Lord;

• Admiral “Jackie” Fisher [F] (age 73), re-appointed First Sea lord by WSC in November 1914.

He had been 1st SL previously in 1904-1910, during which period he had been the driving force in the construction of the world’s first “Multi-Big Gun” battleship, the Dreadnought.  This had sparked off the complete reconstruction of the world’s battle fleets, including of course the British.

• Field Marshal Herbert Kitchener [K] (age 64), was appointed Secretary of State for War with a seat in the Cabinet by Asquith on 5th August 1914.  Asked about the possible duration of the war with Germany declared the previous day he replied “Three years – it may be more but that will do to start with” and he planned initially a New Army of 200,000 volunteers to that end (which was very soon far exceeded).  K, while S of S, was also the professional head of the Army, a stronger position than WSC’s at the Admiralty.

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The war situation in November 1914

Russia asks for help from Great Britain

   Via the Foreign Secretary K received a telegram from the British ambassador to Russia with a message from the Russian Commander-in Chief (Grand Duke Nicholas) which, as passed on, read:-

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“…asked if it would be possible for Lord Kitchener to arrange for a demonstration of some kind against Turks elsewhere, either naval or military…which would cause the Turks ….to withdraw some of the forces now acting against Russians in the Caucasus…” (actually in Trans Caucasia) (Ref. 4).

   K immediately and personally passed this telegram on to WSC, asking “Could we not…make a demonstration at the Dardanelles?”  WSC (by now fully aware of the many professional opinions on action at the Dardanelles, listed above), pressed K for troops to aid a naval operation.  After reviewing this with his staff, K replied in writing:- “We have no troops to land anywhere” (Ref. 4).

   This was a half-truth.  Certainly, all the regular divisions were in France and it would be impossible to withdraw any because of French resistance, but the 29^th Division was forming in England from various recalled regular overseas garrisons.  The reply was a first sign of the obsession of the professional military about the Western front, although K was not so blinkered*.

*This is a convenient place to note that, excepting the 29^th division, all the troops which fought ultimately in the Gallipoli campaign were “amateur soldiers” and were completely “green” when they entered combat.  This applied especially to the Australian and New Zealand volunteers who arrived at Suez on 1^st December 1914.  The 29^th itself were quite unused to acting as a whole unit.

   Despite his discouraging reply to WSC, K replied on the 2^nd to the ambassador:- “Please assure the Grand Duke that steps will be taken to make a demonstration against the Turks” (Ref. 4).  This therefore committed the Admiralty to a purely naval operation.

  This Russian call for help was because, after sending half of their Caucasian army to fill gaps in the front against the Germans following their defeats at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, their initial invasion of Turkey in Trans Caucasia through the central pass leading to Erzurum had been pushed right back to its starting point by 21^st November 1914.  Then, on 22^nd December, the Turks had advanced to the Russian railhead of Sarikamish, 15 miles inside their border.  The provincial governor had ordered a retreat.

3^rd January 1915 (Day 2)

   Having consulted his senior colleagues in the Admiralty WSC this day telegraphed Vice-Admiral Carden commanding the ships blockading the Dardanelles, asking:-

“Do you consider the forcing of the Dardanelles by ships alone a practicable operation?”

   This message referred to the use of old (“Pre-Dreadnought”) battleships, of no value in the North Sea, which were the Special Circumstances which could overcome the “Ships can’t fight forts” maxim which had ruled previous reviews of the Dardanelles because no-one was then prepared to risk the main battle fleet.  There were available immediately 10 such ships whose main armament was mostly 4 x 12’’ guns (Ref. 5, plus another 2, total 12).

   F participated enthusiastically in the thinking on an “old battleship” Dardanelles operation, although he wanted also to see the Greeks and Bulgarians, then neutral, joining in with attacks on Gallipoli and Constantinople respectively.  This was a wish of everyone, particularly WSC.  The Prime Minister of Greece, Venizelos, as early as 19^th August 1914 had actually offered 250,000 men to Britain.  This had been turned down on the advice of the Foreign Secretary in case it provoked Turkey into war immediately.  Had the secret agreement with Germany of 2 August been known from some spy, history might have been different.  WSC did get the Director of Military Operations to estimate how many Greek troops might be needed to capture the Gallipoli Peninsula and the answer on 3^rd September had been 60,000.

5th January 1915 (Day 3)

   Admiral Carden replied:-  “…I do not consider Dardanelles can be rushed.  They might be forced by extended operations with large number of ships”.

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HMS Irresistible, a typical pre-Dreadnought British battleship

HMS Queen Elizabeth, the world’s 1st 15″-gun battleship

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He followed this up on the 11^th January with a detailed plan of attack.  On 12^th January F suggested that Queen Elizabeth, the first finished of the Fast Battleships with 15’’ guns, should be added to the attack force since she was going to the Mediterranean anyway to do firing trials.  With the capability of firing indirectly even at the furthest forts, if successful aircraft spotting could be organised, this was an immense addition to the proposed offensive. On its own, it was a Special Circumstance.  Regrettably, it turned out to be the high-water mark of F’s enthusiasm for the Dardanelles project.

13^th January 1915 (Day 11)

   The Cabinet War Council met on the 13^th January and, after a long meeting which examined several different plans, approved the further detailing of the Dardanelles proposal with possible action in February (WSC put it at the 15^th in a message to Carden).

   Around this date WSC told the French Minister of Marine of the Dardanelles plan, because the Mediterranean had been agreed at the start of the war to be their area of responsibility, and also because he wanted their co-operation.  This was agreed on the 26th, the French to also send old battleships (and later an infantry division).

17^th January 1915 (Day15)

   The historical accounts, egs. Refs. 4 and 6, do not record that the initial aim of the Dardanelles project had actually been made un-necessary by a victory by this date of the Russian army at Sarikamish over an exhausted and over-extended Turkish invasion.   Presumably the War Council knew this but, by then, the project had gained its own momentum.

28^th January (Day 26)

 The War Council met again.  F had by then become dissatisfied with the Dardanelles as using up resources which should all go to the “decisive theatre” in the North Sea.  He told WSC he wanted to resign.  They met Asquith before the meeting and F agreed to attend the meeting after the Prime Minister stated that he was in favour of it.  He then had to be persuaded by K to return after leaving the council table   During the meeting the official record states that:-

“MR BALFOUR* pointed out that a successful attack on the Dardanelles would achieve the following results:

              It would cut the Turkish army in two;

It would put Constantinople under our control;

It would give us the advantage of having the Russian wheat, and enable Russia to resume exports;

This would restore the Russian exchanges, which were falling owing to her inability to export, and causing great embarrassment;

It would also open a passage to the Danube.

[He could have added, as WSC contended, that it would encourage Greece and Bulgaria to join against Austro-Hungary and save Serbia.]

*Balfour had been the last Conservative PM in 1905.  Asquith had invited him to attend the Liberal War Councils.

   F’s despondency was bought off by support for a Baltic project he cherished for which two new light battle-cruisers would be built.  He then agreed to the Dardanelles operation

   Effectively the meeting gave the “Go-ahead” to the bombardment, without troops, and all present believing that it could be broken-off without ill effect if un-successful (Ref. 6).

16^th February 1915 (Day 45)

   Several of those involved in the Dardanelles planning had become uneasy about “No troops” and at an emergency meeting of the War Council K now changed his mind and agreed to the 29th division and the two Australian/New Zealand divisions training in Egypt to be sent to Mudros on the island of Lemnos, made available by Greece.  The Admiralty were to collect ships for this.  They were not expected to be used until the naval attack had succeeded.

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Fortifications of the Dardanelles

Figure 3

Marked-up from Refs. 6 & 7

   Details and illustrations of the Dardanelles fort guns are given in Ref. 7.

The largest calibre was 355 mm (13.98’’)/L35 made by Krupps in 1889 in the two forts at Chanak (with a clear range down the straits) and in No. 16 fort on the tip of Kilid Bahr.  The 3 forts totalled 5 guns (Ref. 4). Their range was 17 Km (10.6 miles; 18,600 yards) with a 725 kg (1,598b) armour-piercing shell.

   The longer-range guns in the other forts were 240 mm (9.45’’)/L35 Krupps 1888 with a range of 15 Km (9.3 miles; 16,400 yards) with a 215 kg (474 lb) shell.  There was a total of 14 x 240 mm guns (Ref. 4).

   As the forts had been re-armed 27 years before the attack, it should have been possible to collect good intelligence on their capabilities, especially as there had been a British naval mission to Turkey from 1912 to 1914 helping to train their navy.  This had actually advised the installation of 3 x 18’’ torpedo tubes at Kilid Bahr (Ref. 6) (!!), which was done in January 1915.

   It is not known whether the masses of field artillery – 32 x 150 mm (5.9’’) howitzers (Ref. 4) – which the Turks brought to the shores of the Straits was anticipated by the Admiralty.  They were a considerable deterrence to minesweeping by adapted trawlers with civilian crews.

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19^th February 1915 (Day 48)

   Bombardment of the Outer Forts began.  It was inconclusive.

  The War Council met.  K performed a volte-face saying that, because the Russians had suffered another set-back in East Prussia and it might release German reinforcements to the West, the 29^th could be needed In France and could not go to the East.  Although this was challenged K’s prestige meant that he had his way.  WSC was only authorised to collect the necessary transports against a possible later move.  This entailed space for 20,000 men from England, 40,000 from Egypt and appropriate horse-boats.

   However, K told the Admiralty Transport Department directly that the 29^th was not going and, thinking that this was WSC’s wish, the assembly of those transports was countermanded on the 20^th.

2^nd March 1915 (Day 59)

   With some delay from bad weather the Outer Forts were firstly silenced by gunfire and then wrecked by Marine landing parties who were not seriously opposed by the Turks.  This was the result of 12’’ guns outranging 240 mm (9.45’’).  Perhaps the Turks should have mounted their 355 mm (13.98’’) guns in the Outer forts.

   In Ref. 4, written originally in 1923, WSC commented wryly:-

“If the Dardanelles Commissioners* could only have taken the expert evidence on the feasibility of ships attacking forts in the first week of March 1915, instead of in the spring of 1917, they would have been impressed by the robust character of naval opinion on these questions”.  [!}.

*The members of an enquiry into the failure set up in July 1916.

   The poor resistance of the Turkish troops at the Outer Forts, adding to the same at their attempt on the Suez Canal on the 3^rd February and the weak showing during a cruiser raid on Alexandretta in December 1914 plus the Sarikamish defeat, enhanced a feeling that a landing on Gallipoli, if necessary, would not be difficult.  [This might have been true if not for a certain Mustapha Kemal.]

[While the Outer Fort operations were proceeding favourably, two events of great importance actually cancelled each other out.  Venizelos revived on 1^st March the offer of Greek troops to attack Gallipoli.  Learning of this, the Russian government informed the British ambassador on 3^rd March that it:- “…could not consent to Greece participating in operations in the Dardanelles, as it would be sure to lead to complications” (Ref. 4).  Meaning, who would be the ruler in a conquered Constantinople, the Tsar, fulfilling a long-held Russian dream, or King Constantine?  The latter then refused to agree to Venizelos’ proposal and he resigned.  In a very confused situation over the next two years, where French and British troops were fighting on Greek soil, it was not until 30^th June 1917 that Greece actually declared war on the Central Powers.  WSC wrote in Ref. 4 that the Russian attitude brought to his mind at the time the Latin saying:-

“Whom the Gods wish to destroy they first make mad”]

5^th March 1915 (Day 62)

   Indirect bombardment of the forts at the Dardanelles narrows by Queen Elizabeth firing over thepeninsula at Kilid Bahr commenced. The Turks brought up field guns to force the ship out to 20,000 yards on the 6^th, at which range the fall angle of shells would have been 22^0. (Ref. 8).  This attack method had been an important reason for including this 15’’- gun ship in the task force.  It depended, however, on good aerial observation for gun-laying and this turned out to be inadequate.  After this further day’s trial the method was given up and never resumed although better air support was organised.  Surprisingly, the aim had not been at No. 16 fort with the 355 mm guns on that side of the Straits but at Nos. 13 and 17 which had 240 mm.

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8^th March 1915 (Day 66)

   Unseen by the destroyer patrols a new line of 20 x 80kg (176 lb) mines was laid early on 8^th March parallel with the coast in Eren Kevi Bay, where the Turks had spotted the ships returning after bombarding (Ref. 4).

   Being well outside the known minefields no sweeping was planned there.

10^th March 1915 (Day 68)

  K performed another about-face and told the War Council that the 29^th could be added to the force for possible military action at the Dardanelles, but exactly what it would be used for was not stated

11^th March 1915 (Day 69)

Ref. 6 records that on this day the Admiralty had intercepted and deciphered several German wireless messages*, which revealed that the forts at the Dardanelles were seriously short of ammunition for their big guns and that fresh supplies could not reach them for several weeks.  This so excited F that, in a final burst of enthusiasm for the operation, he offered to take command of it himself!

*In Ref. 4, published originally in 1923, WSC referred to the knowledge of ammunition shortage as from “secret sources, the credit of which was unquestionable”.  Presumably even in 1923 the government did not wish the activities of “Room 40” at the Admiralty to be public knowledge because it was still providing useful information from other nations.  A similar post-WW2 case was keeping Ultra a secret for 28 years.

12^th March 1915 (Day 70)

    K selected General Ian Hamilton [IH] to command the troops now being sent.  The first and major point of his written instructions to IH was:-

“(1).  The Fleet have undertaken to force the passage of the Dardanelles.  The employment of military forces on any large scale for land operations at this juncture is only contemplated in the event of the Fleet failing to get through after every effort has been exhausted” (Ref. 4).

  IH, without a proper staff, was transported as fast as possible (including a 30-knot cruiser provided by WSC) to join Admiral Carden in the QE at the Dardanelles, arriving on the 17^th.

   IH’s last combat experience, like that of all the army’s senior officers, was with great numerical superiority against Afrikaans amateurs 12 years earlier.  Of course, he had no experience of assaulting a defended enemy shore.

15^th March 1915 (Day 73)

   Being concerned that the naval operations were proceeding too slowly and not being pressed, WSC and his senior officers had agreed to send an Admiralty telegram to Admiral Carden on the 11^th March which included the words:-

“…you will have to press hard for a decision….even if regrettable losses are entailed.” (Ref. 4).

Carden replied that he concurred with the Admiralty and a further telegram from the Admiralty on the 15^th read back their understanding of what he intended to do about the minefields and the Narrows forts. 

16^th March 1915 (Day 74)

  Vice Admiral Carden informed the Admiralty that, under doctor’s orders, he had to go on the sick list.  He had collapsed under the strain (Ref. 6).  Very quickly it was agreed that his 2-i-C Vice-Admiral de Robeck [dR] would move up to the command, he assuring WSC personally that he agreed with the earlier Admiralty telegrams about pressing for a decision (Ref. 4).

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18^th March 1915 (Day 76)

On this day dR made his maximum effort inside the straits. His fleet comprised:-

BRITISH
		Main guns
Queen Elizabeth	Modern Fast Battleship	8 x 15″
Inflexible	Battlecruiser	8 x 12″
8 x	Pre-Dreadnought Battleships	4 x 12″ each
2 x	Pre-Dreadnought Battleships	4 x 10″ each
FRENCH
3 x	Pre-Dreadnought Battleships	4 x 305mm (12.01″) each
1 x	Pre-Dreadnought Battleship	2 x 305mm

dR’s intentions were:-	1st Dominate the 2 forts covering the minefields and the 6 at the Narrows, then retire:
	2nd Sweep a 900 yard channel through the mines, continuing at night if necessary, covered by 2 more pre-D battleships;
	on the 19th The fleet to use the swept channel to advance through the Narrows, destroying the forts.

   Fire was opened at 10.45 am by a leading row of British ships, then the French ships bombarded the Narrows forts at close range.  By 1.25 pm the forts had ceased fire.  The French ships then retired.  While doing this, at 1.54 pm the Bouvet suddenly blew up and most of her crew were lost.

It was not known what caused this*.  The operation continued and by 4 pm the forts were again practically silent.  At 4.09 the Irresistible hit a mine.  At 4.14 the Inflexible hit another mine.  The first was abandoned and later sank, the second was able to leave the Straits (her damage was repaired in 6 weeks).  As dR thought that mines floating down on the current had caused the damage he ordered a retirement at 5 pm.  At 6.05 the Ocean hit a mine, was abandoned and later sank.  One other French ship was badly damaged by gunfire.

   The allied casualties were 643 men of the Bouvet but only 61 men killed or wounded on British ships, protected as they were by thick armour (all above from Ref 4 and quoting from dR’s report).

*A wreck examination (Ref. 9) accepted that it was one of the 20 fresh mines which caused the loss.

   Regarding this historic minefield, Ref, 4 reports that 3 of the new batch of 20 mines had been found and destroyed on the 16^th March.  Furthermore, it states that as the sweepers were advancing in Phase 2 of the 18^th March operation they exploded 3 and retrieved 3 more of this mine line, leaving only 11 unknown.  Considering that all 20 had been laid well to the South and in advance of the first line of the existing mine field, it might be thought that suspicion of a newly laid group would have been aroused and a complete sweep ordered.  Alas, it was not and the course of history was changed (as it soon appeared).  The Turkish officer who had noticed the weak spot in the enemy’s operations deserved well of his country.

   Admiral dR reported the result of the 18^th March operation immediately, advising that, with the exception of the sunk and damaged ships “…squadron is ready for immediate action, but the plan of attack must be reconsidered and means found to deal with floating mines” (Ref. 4)..  WSC and F agreed the fleet must fight it out.  Two more pre-D battleships were ordered to go, to add to an extra 2 already on their way and the French were sending a replacement pre-D.  The War Council on the 19^th accepted the situation but authorised WSC to inform dR “…that he could continue the naval

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 operations against the Dardanelles if he thought fit” (Ref.4.  Author’s bold).  This was a weak instruction which WSC and F did not pass on in a message on the 20^th but also did not clearly state that he must go on.  There was rather too much attention paid to the opinion of “The man on the spot” in a matter of national importance.  The reply to that from dR on the 20^th described the improvement in minesweeping being arranged, with faster ships to counter the outflowing current and volunteer naval crews drawn from the lost ships to overcome the understandable reluctance of the civilians to face the howitzer fire.  This would take 4 days to organise and train.  So far, so good, remembering the Admiralty knowledge of the big gun ammunition shortage.

23^rd March 1915( Day 81)

   The greatly-improved minesweeping force was destined never to be used.

   Admiral dR telegraphed:- “At a meeting today with Generals Hamilton and Bird wood” [Commanding the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps – ANZAC] “the former told me Army will not be in a position to undertake any military operations before 14^th April        it is necessary to destroy all guns of position guarding the Straits     only a small percentage can be rendered useless by gunfire    I do not think it is a practicable operation to land a force adequate to undertake this service inside Dardanelles.  General Hamilton concurs in this opinion.    better to prepare a decisive effort about the middle of April    ” (Ref. 4).

[In other words, dR, reading between the lines, was now saying the whole basis of the naval attack was wrong and troops would have to be landed after all to secure the Gallipoli peninsula to take the forts in the rear and that could not begin until after 14^th April !!].

   WSC wrote in Ref. 4 “I read this telegram with consternation.”  He would have been even more upset if he had known then what IH had written in his diary about this meeting:-

“The moment we sat down de Robeck told us he was now quite clear he could not get through without the help of all my troops.”

“…there was no discussion.  At once we turned our faces to the land scheme”.

(Ref.4, quoting from Hamilton’s Gallipoli Diary published in 1920).

[The reason for the delay in land operations was that soon after his arrival at the Dardanelles IH had decided that he must shift his base to Alexandria so that the troop transports could be “Assault loaded” there, the soldiers and their equipment having been put aboard “higgledy-piggledy” previously.  All part of the ignorance of staff about amphibious operations]

  DeR’s telegram had been less than frank, not admitting to the Admiralty that in effect he had made the decision about the use of troops.

   WSC immediately gathered F and his senior naval officers and put before them a draft telegram to dR which included the words-:_

              “…you should make all preparations to renew the attack begun on 18^th…

The war group majority would not agree to this.  They considered themselves bound to accept the decision of the “Man on the Spot”.  WSC took his draft to the Prime Minister who did agree it – but he would not overrule the Admiralty.  If there was one moment when the Dardanelles operation was doomed to fail, it was this, when the person with the most power in Great Britain did not make use of it and order the attack to be renewed*.  Therefore, WSC sent dR a telegram questioning why he had changed his mind and pointing out all that could follow from success.  It included for the first time in the correspondence the significant statement:-

              “We know the forts are short of ammunition” (Ref. 4).

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*F would probably have resigned.  WSC could have reconstituted the Board of Admiralty.  Admiral Wemyss, acting as dR’s 2-i-C, although senior to him, would have made the attack, as he offered later, if dR still refused.

   De Robeck replied in a long telegram on the 27^th without changing his decision, simply rehashing negative things which were known on the 20th when he proposed to recommence operations but not mentioning the important new fact of the shortage of ammunition advised to him.  The real reason for his change of mind he had perhaps disclosed inadvertently to IH on the 19^th March:-               “…I was sad to lose ships and my heart aches when one thinks about it…” (Ref. 4).

   WSC in Ref. 4 muses on how ship loss affected a sailor, to whom a ship is his home, and particularly to an Admiral who in this case would have begun his career on the old ships sunk, however expendable they were to a civilian at home provided that they contributed to a worthwhile result*.

*The author has referred to this naval attitude, considering how it may have affected even Japanese Admirals, in Contribution No. 4 at P. 7.

WSC’s report to the Cabinet, 23^rd March 1915 (Day 81)

   Before receiving dR’s 27^th cable, in face of F’s refusal to back a firm instruction to him to carry on the naval operation and Asquith’s refusal to order it, WSC “with grief” announced to the Cabinet that it must be abandoned.

   K agreed to carry the operations through by military force.  WSC wrote in Ref. 4 that:-

“No formal decision to make a land attack was even noted in the records of the Cabinet or the War Council”.

   Effectively, WSC had no further influence on the Dardanelles/Gallipoli campaign. 

The fleet at the Dardanelles

   The fleet helped the army ashore on 25 April 1915 (Day 114) by preliminary bombardment of the beaches, helped again for the second assault at Suvla Bay on 6 August and finally evacuated it in two stages on 20 December 1915 and 9 January 1916 (Day 373).  For the rest of the 9 months they were, in effect, spectators.

 Winston Churchill, May to December 1915

   On 15^th May 1915 F’s mind-changing and inconsistency came to a peak with his (final) resignation as 1st Sea Lord.  While WSC found that he could re-constitute an Admiralty Board, the event coincided with a government crisis over the shortage of shells.  Asquith (whose balance was suffering from a break with his close friend Venetia Stanley) decided that he had to bring the Conservative opposition aboard and they would not have the Conservative renegade of 1904 in any major office.  He remained in the coalition government as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster without departmental authority and was still invited to the Committee formed to give policy on the Gallipoli campaign.  While he still gave his opinions, they were seldom heeded.  He resigned from the government on 25^th November 1915, re-joined the army and served in the trenches on the Western Front while the Gallipoli campaign came to its end.

The Gallipoli campaign on land

   It is not intended to write more than a few highlights of the land campaign.  Ref. 10 can provide the details.  The post-war Turkish Staff history reported:-“Up to 25^th February it would have been possible to effect a landing successfully at any point on the peninsula and the capture of the Straits by land troops would have been comparatively easy” (Ref. 11).

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   IH was finally ready for the assault on the Gallipoli peninsula on the 21^st April but bad weather then imposed a delay to D-Day on 25^th(Day114).

   During the 114 days which had elapsed from the Russian call for help, the Turks had increased the troops on the peninsula from 1 division (nominally 10,000 men at war establishment) to 6 on the 25^th April.  A German general (von Sanders {vS]) had been appointed on the 25^th March and he had revised the defence dispositions from a “coastguard” force to concentrate the divisions with new roads replacing mule tracks to enable men and guns to be redeployed rapidly.  The forthcoming assault was clearly signalled by reports from Alexandria.  It was a question of precisely where and when.

   Sanders decided to await the assault with his divisions placed as follows:-

              2 on the Asiatic side of the straits, at Kum Kale and Besika Bay (3^rd & 11^th);

              2 near the Bulair isthmus, where the peninsula is only 3 ½ miles wide (5^th & 7^th);

              2 on the high ground at the tip (9^th & 19^th).

Total force 84,000 (Ref. 11).

   IH chose to assault the tip at the following places:-

              The 29^th regular division (the only fully-trained troops, although not in amphibious landing),

              with a battalion of RND Marines attached, at 5 beaches around the extreme end,

 identified as S, V W, X, Y.

              The ANZAC corps of 2 partially-trained divisions at a beach coded Z, 12 miles further North;

              The French division to attack the Asiatic tip at Kum Kale as a diversion.

The Royal Naval Division (also only partially-trained) to remain afloat and feint a landing on the North side of the Bulair isthmus.  The French also feinted at Besika Bay south of Kum Kale.

Total force 75,000 (Ref. 11).

   The ANZAC and RND soldiers were about to enter their first combat by being launched across enemy beaches.  The French had limited training as a formation.

   Mostly the men were to be finally taken to the beaches in boats rowed by sailors, except at V beach where a collier had been modified to carry them close to shore (shown on P. 17).

   IH’s major intention was to seize the hill top of Achi Baba to obtain artillery observation over the Narrows so as to be able to bombard accurately with heavy guns and destroy the forts there.

   The respective dispositions are illustrated on Fig. 4 on P. 14.

The results of the landings on the 25^th April (Day 114)

   The fate of the 7 landings is summarised below (Ref. 11):-

Beach	Landing Force	Casualties	Outcome
S	1 Bn	Few	Captured, had orders not to advance
V	3 Bns	Very heavy*	Captured next day
W	1 Bn	Heavy	Captured
X	1 Bn	None	Captured, no orders, no advance
Y	2 Bns	None	Captured, no orders, no advance. Re-embarked next day.
Z	2 Divisions	Few*	Landed too far North, against cliffs little instead of open beaches, confusion, little advance
French	1 Regiment	Light	Transferred to Helles front on 2nd day.

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   The landings at S, X, and Y suffered from the curse of amphibious assaults – the fear of exploiting too far from a beach too soon.  [This also affected the new landing at Suvla Bay on the 6^th August – and at Anzio 29 years later.]  The Y beach inertia was particularly tragic, because the force commander was able to walk inland nearly to the deserted village of Krithia, which could have been taken un-opposed that morning and which could have led to taking the V and W defenders in the rear.  In the following 9 months 3 battles were fought to try to take the entrenched village on the way to Achi Baba and all failed.

   The feint off Bulair was successful in keeping most of the 2 Turkish divisions there for 2 days.

*British public thinking about the Dardanelles/Gallipoli has been for ever afterwards coloured by the casualties at V beach.  Likewise, in Australia imaginative paintings of “diggers” fighting theIr way ashore, which only occurred on one small spot, have left an inaccurate folk belief.  As recently as the ‘80s an otherwise well-informed Daily Telegraph contributor referred mistakenly to high Australian losses in landing.

   The 30,000 troops landed on the 25^th April did not reach their objectives (shown on Fig. 4), about 4 miles inland for both the 29^th division and the ANZACs.

   The casualties on the 25^th April are believed to have been about 2,000.  This compares with about 700 in the naval battle on the 18^th March – plus, of course 3 old battleships, which were due to be scrapped anyway.

   For a comparison of East versus West, the first British attack in France in the battle of Neuve Chapelle starting on 10 March 1915 had captured a maximum 1 ¼ mile of strategically-unimportant ground at a cost of 13,000 casualties.

   Hamilton had deserved success.  He had out-Generalled von Sanders, using the RND to pin down two Turkish divisions on the Gallipoli peninsula, using the French to pin down another two divisions on the Asiatic shore and landed three divisions against two at the peninsula tip.  Then an error* had wasted 20,000 ANZAC troops at a place where the topography, their inexperience and the prompt response of the 19^th Turkish division commander (Mustapha Kemal) had pinned them down and even led the corps commander (Birdwood) to contemplate evacuation.  That was prevented by the army commander.  The error of the 29^th division commander (Hunter-Weston. [HW]) in not responding to appeals for orders had thrown away the priceless opportunity at Y beach.  Ref. 11 records that IH had seen the opportunity there and early on the 25^th had signalled to HW “Would you like to get some more men ashore at Y beach?  If so, trawlers are available”.  HW had done nothing about this.  During the night a single Turkish battalion had been beaten off.  Early next morning, when it still was not too late, IH had then available a French brigade of 6 battalions and offered them for Y beach.  HW sent them to W beach instead.  If there were actions missing which condemned the whole Gallipoli campaign to sterility, it was when the army commander twice did not enforce his intentions on the 29^th divisional commander.  Had it been necessary to dismiss HW, IH’s Chief of Staff (Braithwaite) could have been his replacement.

*An Australian Ref.17 as recently as 2015 has sources suggesting that the landing of ANZAC 1 mile North of the planned Z beach was a last-minute mind change by Birdwood because that beach was wired. However, it had only one company of Turks posted there (Ref. 11) and while the loss of getting ashore would have been higher there would have been open space inland for the effective deployment of the two divisions.

Development of land operations

   Figure 5 on P. 16 shows the build-up of troops on the Gallipoli peninsula after the landings.

   The initial beach-heads, separated by 13 miles, were never joined and scarcely developed.  Two Territorial divisions plus another French division had reached Gallipoli by mid-May.  The Southerly beach-head at Cape Helles was expanded slightly but, as before mentioned, never captured Krithia. 

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Figure 5

`Sources: Ref. 16 and unit histories in wikipedia

   On the 17^th May IH asked for a reinforcement of an army corps, ie. 3 divisions. The home crisis of F’s resignation, the shell-shortage scandal and the formation of a Coalition government delayed a decision on that until 9^th June, when it was agreed by the new Cabinet that the first 3 divisions of “Kitchener’s New Army” should be sent (Ref. 4).

   On the 6^th August 1915 (Day 217) a fresh landing was made with 2 of the new divisions at Suvla Bay just North of the ANZAC beach-head from which a supporting attack was made.  The assault was unopposed but the “Curse of Amphibious Warfare” struck again, particularly at the corp’s commander, and no significant advance was made until the Turks had rushed up troops to hold the high ground.  Another failure like Y beach – this time the responsible commander was sacked.

   Yet more divisions were sent but no useful results were obtained.  Sickness affected the troops badly.  The Turks built up their defenders to 20 Divisions (ref. 12).  Of course, both sides suffered a large “write-down” from theoretical establishments due to casualties and disease

   During this period the army on the French front fought the battle of Loos, beginning on the 25^th September.  To gain that village and make a maximum advance of 1 1/2 miles of strategically-worthless ground 50,000 casualties were incurred.   To emphasise the relative value of advances in the West and East fronts:- on Gallipoli, an advance of ½ mile from the position reached on 30^th April would have secured the entrenched village of Krithia on the way to capturing the strategic height of Achi Baba 2 miles further on.  With artillery observation over the Narrows this would have permitted bombardment and destruction of the forts and hence, with the improved mine-sweeping force, a passage of the fleet to dominate Constantinople, with political consequences there and in Bulgaria and Greece, to add to opening of communications with Russia.  A 15’’ howitzer had been readied to be sent to the peninsula for that bombardment.  WSC emphasised the relative gain possibilities in vain.

   Finally, evacuation was decided upon, after IH had been relieved on 16^th October.  This was the only part of the campaign which went smoothly in two steps.  All surviving troops were gone by 9^th January 1916 (Day 373).

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   Total casualties (killed + wounded) inflicted by the Turks were 181,000.  To this was added 98,000 evacuated sick. 

  The Turks lost 165,000 to enemy fire plus 90.000 evacuated sick or died of disease (Ref. 10).

[Figures do vary between sources.]

   A Turkish review of the Dardanelles/Gallipoli campaign is given in Ref. 15.

“Working up from the fingertips”

   WSC, in Ref. 12, first published in 1927, wrote that after failing in the strike at the heart of Turkey at the Dardanelles/Gallipoli, Great Britain later began new attacks by beginning at her fingertips at Gaza and Basra and working upwards.

   Ref.12 also includes the relative effort put into the various fronts of WW1, derived from Ref. 13, as follows:-                                          

Man-Days

Excluding Officers

Dardanelles, taken as the datum	1.0
Salonica	6.4
East Africa	8.2
MESOPOTAMIA PALESTINE	11.8 12.2	Together 24 x datum
France & Flanders	73.0

The future of Vice Admiral de Robeck

   The failure of dR at the Dardanelles was not held against him.  Apart from the usual “gongs”, he was appointed commander of a Grand Fleet battleship squadron in 1916.

Views of the landing beaches

Figure 6

This map shows how the planned Z beach was intended to provide space to deploy fully both ANZAC divisions and then a route across low country to the exit from the Dardanelles Straits.

[Actually, there was a meeting of the War Council on 19^th March.  See above.]

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   After David Lloyd George, newly installed as Prime Minister of Great Britain, had published the February 1917 Commission report, he was able to over-ride continuing Conservative back-bench antipathy to Winston Churchill and appoint him to be Minister of Munitions in July 1917.

   WSC wrote in Ref. 12 “Not allowed to make the plans, I was set to make the weapons”.

   The most important of those weapons was the tank, whose initiation he had paid for without Treasury authority in March 1915 while 1st Lord of the Admiralty (he authorised personally £70,000, equivalent in 2021 money to £7.7 millions)(Ref.4).  When, after the war, a Royal Commission on War Inventions was set up, in its report of 17^th November 1919 it wrote “…it was primarily due to the receptivity, courage and driving force” of Winston Churchill that the idea of the tank “was converted into a practical shape”.  WSC refused a monetary grant.

Summary and Conclusions

(1).  The original stimulus of the Dardanelles operation was the Russian call to Britain on the 2^nd January 1915 (Day 1) for a diversion of the Turks from the Trans Caucasian front, where they were being beaten.

   The necessity for this had gone by the Russian victory of Sarikamish on 17 January 1915 (Day 16) but, by then, the operation had gained its own momentum.

(2).  On Day 1 WSC and K conferred.  The Dardanelles were suggested by K as a good place for an operation, but a purely naval one was enforced by K committing something to the Russians immediately while refusing to supply troops for an amphibious attack.  This was despite numerous staff studies over many years which had concluded that was the only way to force a passage and create the required diversion of Turkish forces by threatening Constantinople.

(3).  When the Vice Admiral commanding the Dardanelles blockading fleet produced on WSC’s request a plan to force a passage it was with the new Special Circumstances that it could be done with the many otherwise-surplus Pre-Dreadnought battleships available.  High losses of these ships would not endanger the strength of the British main Fleet, which had always been the fear in previous staff studies.

(4).  WSC was one of several Liberal ministers, and also Balfour (ex-Conservative PM, invited to be a member of PM Asquith’s War Council) who could see that, apart from helping the Russians immediately, forcing a passage of the Dardanelles could produce one or more of several situations:-

1. Produce favourable political repercussions in Constantinople, leading to an abrogation of their agreement with Germany;
2. If not 1., then persuade Greece and Bulgaria to join the Triple Entente not only to attack Turkey but save Serbia (otherwise isolated and fearing a stab in the back from Bulgaria);
3. By neutralising Constantinople by 1. or 2., open up the route for the export of Russian wheat to help refresh Russian finances and allow the supply of vitally-needed arms;
4. With 2. or 3., open a new front against Austro-Hungary, the weak partner of the Central Powers.

(5).  The PM and Cabinet effectively gave the “Go-Ahead” for a naval attack without troops on 28^th January 1915 (Day 26).

(6).  On 2^nd March (Day 59) the naval attack silenced the Outer Forts of the Dardanelles Straits.  This led to hubris.  That mood had surfaced on the 1^st March when Venizelos, PM of Greece, had offered a corps of 3 divisions to attack Gallipoli.  This offer was immediately nullified by the Russian government refusing to allow Greece to participate in the capture of Constantinople – because it was an old dream of theirs to return that city to Christian rule.  Nemesis for them came 2 years later.

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(7).  On the16th March (Day 74) the Vice Admiral l who had planned the operation and was leading it collapsed under the strain.  His place was taken by his 2-i-C who declared himself committed to the plan.  However, when he made a “Maximum Effort” against the forts further into the Straits on the 18^th March (Day 76) a clever Turkish mine-trap caused ship losses and damage, un-important of themselves, sufficient to cause him to lose his nerve and call off a renewed attack.

(8).  Knowing the forts were critically short of ammunition from intercepted and deciphered wireless signals, WSC wished to enforce continuance of the attack.  F (who blew hot and cold throughout the operation) would not give the order.  Although the PM agreed with WSC’s intention, he would not over-rule the Admiralty or the commander on the spot.  This was a test of character in a matter of national importance which he failed.

(9).  After the PM would not use his authority to back him, WSC’s responsibility for the naval operation ceased on 23^rd March 1915 (Day 81).

(10).  K, who had produced troops for a land operation by that date, assumed responsibility for it.

(11).  A delay of 33 days occurred between the Navy abandoning the operation and the army making the attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula.  This gave the German general appointed to command the defence ample time to strengthen it.

(12).  Two mistakes on D-Day, 25^th April 1915 (Day 114) led to the failure of the land campaign:-

• Failure to exploit an unopposed landing on Y beach, so that the Cape Helles area could not be developed significantly over the rest of the 9 months campaign.  The army commander did not enforce his will on a less-than-eager divisional commander;
• The chance, or perhaps last-minute corps command choice, which landed the ANZAC corps onto a rugged area (instead of the planned beach with immediate access to open country with space to deploy the two divisions effectively) where it was roped-off by energetic Turkish reaction for the rest of the campaign.

(13).  An un-opposed second landing with reinforcements on 6^th August 1915 (Day 217) at Suvla Bay (well away from the critical Narrows) was wasted by the “Curse of Amphibious Warfare” (the fear of exploiting too far from a beach too soon) and it was sealed off by the Turks.

(14).  Finally, evacuation was completed on 9^th January 1916 (Day 373) – the only part of the whole naval and land campaign carried out smoothly according to plan.

(15).  The failed attempt to strike Turkey at its heart then led to attacks at its fingertips through Palestine and Mesopotamia over the next 3 years which, in total, absorbed 24 times the effort expended at Dardanelles/Gallipoli.

(16).  The Dardanelles Commission of Enquiry effectively exonerated Winston Churchill of the populist charge of culpability for the failure which Asquith had not refuted so as to conceal his own major responsibility.

References

1.  https://twitter.com/smh_historians/status/1285061873407123456

re ships and forts

2.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dardanelles_operation

re Duckworth

3.  Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles  T. Higgins  Heinemann  1963.
4. The World Crisis 1911 – 1918 Vol. II  W. Churchill  Odhams Ed.  1949.
5. Ditto, Vol. IV Appendix F.  The 1st Sea Lord added later the last 2 pre-Dreadnoughts.
6. Winston S. Churchill Vol III  M. Gilbert..Heinemann  1971.

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7. https://www.navyingallipoli.com/

re Dardanelles guns

8.  http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_15-42_mk1.php
9. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_battleship_Bouvet
10. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gallipoli_campaign
11. History of the First World War..L. Hart..1973.
12. The World Crisis 1911 – 1918 Vol III  W. Churchill  Odhams Ed  1949.
13. Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War..War Office  1922.
14. https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/battles/p_dard_comm.htm
15. http://www.turkeyswar.com/campaigns/gallipoli/
16. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Order_of_battle_for_the_Gallipoli_campaign#Initial_landings,_25_April_1915
17. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-riddle-of-the-landing/

Derek S. Taulbut

7th March 2020.