[These notes are not an attempt to describe the battle, which has been done many times over the century since but are meant to offer a contribution in ways not seen previously.]
At 4.40 AM on 21 March 1918 Ludendorff launched the German offensive codenamed Michael on the British front between Arras and the boundary with the French at Barisis, about 54 miles.
This attack lasted 16 days and penetrated 36 miles, see Fig. 1 below:-
Because of the way the British C-in-C, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, amended later his daily diary and influenced the GHQ report, the French aid given to the British during the attack on the orders of their C-in-C, General Philippe Pétain, was reported inaccurately and unfairly. This version of the history lasted until after WW2*, when scholars examined more carefully the Haig diary amendments compared to his original MSS diary and until some information closed for 50 years by the post-WW1 official historian was released. The facts of the aid given by the French to the British in quantity, time and space have been charted here from Refs. 1 and 2 on Figs. 2 and 3 on P.2.
The Doullens Conference on 26 March 1918, the 6th day of the attack, highlighted on the figures, was the initiation of the appointment of General Ferdinand Foch as overall commander of the allied French, British, American and Italian armies.
*It even took in such sharp minds as Winston Churchill (Ref. 4) and Basil Liddell Hart (Ref. 5) (see PART 2 for refs.)
References
- MYTH AND MEMORY: SIR DOUGLAS HAIG AND THE IMPOSITION OF ALLIED UNIFIED COMMAND IN MARCH 1918.
Elizabeth Greenhalgh THE JOURNAL OF MILITARY HISTORY 68 (July 2004)
This source gives complete details of which French divisions were used, when alerted and when arrived.
2. SIR DOUGLAS HAIG’S DESPATCHES ed J. Boraston J. M. Dent & Sons 1919.
This was a compendium of the 8 despatches issued previously plus large scale maps.
Page 2 of 3
Haig and Pétain had thwarted a Supreme War Council intention to form a General Reserve of 30 divisions against the expected German attack in the West when they had reinforced with men and guns from the victorious East. The two C-in-Cs refused to provide the troops. They then agreed a private plan for mutual support, depending on which was attacked. Haig, based on his own very slow rates of advance on the Somme and by Ypres*, completely misjudged the likely rate of advance of a German attack. He was quite satisfied with a scheme to produce 6 French divisions by the 4th day.
When the Germans penetrated over 13 miles to reach the R. Somme on the 3rd day, Haig finally realised that he was in desperate need of much more French aid. Pétain was already providing more than he had promised in February. As Fig.2 shows, he continued at the much higher rate of reinforcement. In addition to the aid there charted from the main French zone, the 36th French Corps of 2 divisions, which had been guarding the coastal approaches to Dunkirk, was moved into action East of Amiens on the 30th March (10th day) (Ref. 1).
*Somme: 9.8 miles gain in 140 days; 3rd Ypres: 5.2 miles gain in 130 days.
Page 3 of 3
A wishful thinker which led to optimistic reports. In his offensives he had claimed the inherent improbability that defenders under cover lost more than attackers in the open. In defence he thought a promise of 6 divisions from Pétain would be sufficient.
A realist tending to severe pessimism. He sent over 3 times more aid to Haig than had been asked for – and was not thanked for it, but instead maligned.
D.S. Taulbut. 15th August 2021