President Roosevelt’s Decisions

   Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) was the longest-serving President of the United States of America, from 20 March 1933 to his death in office on 12 April 1945.  Re-elected 3 times, he served 3  4-year terms and 83 days.  This length of time in office, nearly 147 months, will never be exceeded because in 1951 the 22^nd Amendment to the Constitution limited it to 2 terms.    As US President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Services FDR is of course entitled to a large general share of credit for the success of the nation in WW2, but this note tries to highlight the major personal decisions which he made which contributed to that success.  It is not intended to be a biography and does not pretend to be exhaustive.

   FDR’s Presidency can be divided into three broad periods:-

1.  The 7-year period, 1933-1939, of the ‘New Deal’ aiming to get back to work the 12.1 M people unemployed at the date of his 1^st inauguration;
2. The 2-year period, 1940-1941, when Europe was at war and the USA was not but FDR gave much aid short of war to the United Kingdom and its associated nations;
3. The 3-year 3 months period, 1942-April 1945, when the USA was fully engaged in WW2.

   It must be emphasised that, the United States being very much a democracy, while “decisions” of FDR are reported in this article, action in many cases required that Congress – House of Representatives and the Senate upper chamber – should then vote in favour.  Particularly in Periods 1 and 2 majorities could be thin.  In the early years the Supreme Court could, and sometimes did, rule his action un-Constitutional.

Period 1

The ‘New Deal’

   FDR may well have secured his election to the US Presidency by promising in his campaign to abolish Prohibition, which had then lasted 13 years of unpopularity and associated crime.  He honoured that promise and launched his ‘New Deal’ for the citizens of the USA.

   This note is not concerned with the many, often controversial, details of this ‘New Deal’, except to illustrate the essential results with Fig.1 and Fig. 2 (see both below).

Figure 1

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   From 23.6% of the civilian labor force (12.1 M) in the year before FDR took office, his actions reduced it to 17.2% (9.5 M) in 1939, before the vast expansion of US rearmament took effect.

   This came at the price of doubling the National Debt, from $19.5 Bn (34% of GDP [Ref. 1]) to $40.4 Bn (43% GDP) (see Fig.2).

Figure 2

   By getting US industry and farming into better shape by 1939, FDR serendipitously made the nation in the 2^nd and 3^rd periods the “Arsenal of Democracy”.  That was his first and nearly the biggest of his decisions – actually a set of decisions relating to the numerous alphabetical agencies of the ‘New Deal’ – which contributed to winning WW2.

Expansion of the US Navy (USN)

   Within 3 months of taking office, FDR had signed a National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).  In this “Make-work” programme he made the very significant decision to expand the USN – there was scope for this within the existing tonnage limits of the Washington (1922) and London (1930) Naval Treaties.  By Executive Order in January 1933 he allocated funds from NIRA to build (Ref. 2):-

2  20.000 tons 72 airplane aircraft Carriers;  a Heavy cruiser;  4 Light cruisers  plus destroyers and submarines.

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Expansion of the Air Corps

Figure 3

   Although West Point provided the officers needed for this huge army, GCM was actually a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI).  He rose to become the 1^st 5-star General of the US Army.  He evaluated Dwight D. Eisenhower (DDE), when only a Colonel in March 1941, as fit for the highest command.

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Period 2

   World War 2 began on 1 September 1939 when Hitler’s Germany invaded Poland.  Guarantees given by the United Kingdom and France then came into effect and they both declared war on Germany on the 3^rd September.

“Cash and Carry”

   In 1935 the prevailing sentiment in the USA had led Congress to pass a Neutrality Act which forbade any sales of arms to belligerents abroad.  It was strengthened in a 1936 amending Act.  However, after Germany invaded and conquered Poland and the allied nations Britain and France declared war, sentiment changed.  FDR took advantage of this in asking Congress on 21 September 1939 to approve a change to the rules to allow foreign governments to buy arms from the USA provided they paid cash (credit was still forbidden) and ship them in their own vessels.  This was actually to favour the Allies, since it was believed that the British naval blockade would ensure that Germany could never take advantage of the rule change.  This passed Congress and FDR signed it into law on 4 November 1939 (Ref.4).

Background to the decisions of 1940

   After German invasions and conquering of Denmark and Norway in April 1940, Germany then attacked Holland, Luxembourg, Belgium and France on 10 May 1940.  By the 13^th Panzer forces had broken through the French line on the River Meuse.  The Luftwaffe was a major cause of this success.  Early on the 15^th the French PM Paul Reynaud rang Winston Churchill (just 5 days into his Premiership) to declare “We are beaten; we have lost the battle!” (Ref. 5).

   This was because there was no reserve to stop the Panzers (Ref. 5).  On the 16^th May they were 39 miles beyond the Meuse and advancing rapidly towards the Channel.

The immense new target for US aviation

  It is not certain how much of this disaster was known to FDR on the 16^th May 1940 when he addressed Congress on the defence of the United States but he included these words in his speech (Ref. 6):-

“During the past year American production capacity for war planes, including engines, has risen from approximately 6,000 planes a year to more than double that number, due in greater part to the placing of foreign orders.  [These were from France and the UK.]

Our immediate problem is to superimpose on this production capacity a greatly increased additional production capacity.  I should like to see this nation geared up to the ability to turn out at least 50,000 planes a year”.

   He then asked Congress for large increases in money to secure the defence of the USA.  These were granted.

   When he spoke FDR had no idea how his aim could be met.  Surely he was trusting in “Good old American know-how!”.  As one of his most significant decisions this is worth some detail in digression, which will now be provided.  [1940 chronology is resumed on P. 7].

   FDR’s target was met in 20 months!  His annual target rate was then vastly exceeded in 1943, 1944 (the peak) and the 8 months of 1945.

   Achieving this astounding result required:-

• A huge expansion of size and number of plants and the workforce to man – and woman – them!;
• The “magic” of the “Learning Curve”;
• Addition facilities as Modification Centres to permit smooth mass production in factories, while adding the vital combat-demanded changes later.

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Taking these in turn:  Plants and People

   From Ref. 7 Fig. 4 shows how plant capacity was increased. This was nearly all funded by the US Government at a total of $3.4 Bn (Ref. 7).  The largest single factory was Willow Run, near Detroit, 2/3rds mile long and ¼ mile wide, managed by Ford. It built 8,645 B-24  4-engine Liberator bombers.

   At the 1944 peak 2.1 M were employed in the aircraft industry, 36% being women (Ref. 7).

The “Learning Curve”

   As long ago as 1925 staff at the Wright-Patterson AFB discovered that in making a series of one aircraft type the cost per unit was reduced steadily as numbers accumulated.  This “Practice makes Perfect” was named the “Learning Curve” and could be expressed mathematically.  Commonly it was stated as “When production doubles the unit cost falls to ‘x’ of its initial figure”, ‘x’ often around 80%, the effect being continuous so long as specification changes did not upset the learning process.

   With huge orders placed for each type of aircraft and with a corresponding huge number of new workers the Learning Curve was very significant in US production.  Ref. 8 gives statistical examples of this.  Although a late introduction to production a B-29 curve from this source is given below as Fig. 5 (the mathematical presentation by Log-Log numbers reduces the curve to nearly a straight line) :-

Log Direct Man-Hours per Lb of Airframe Figure 5

With the accuracy possible from the chart, once the Learning Curve settled down at No.12, from then on the value was about 77%.  This meant that the 460^th airframe* required only about ¼^th the Man-Hours per Lb. of the 12^th.

*Airframe excludes Engine and Propeller, wheels & brakes,  armament, and sundry other Government-Furnished Equipment.

Learning for the whole Aircraft Industry

   In Ref. 9 the author calculated that in airframe production from mid-1941 to the end of WW2 the Learning Curve was 81% in terms of Man-Hours per Lb. versus Cumulative Lb.

   Ref. 7 presents learning for the whole Aircraft Industry in another way, as shown on Fig. 6:-

Figure 6

Ref. 7 gives the total weight of airframe production between 1940 and the end of the war, including the all-important spares, as 2.7 billion Lb.

   The numbers of aircraft built included, of course, a very wide range of sizes, from the Stearman PT-17 trainer weighing 2,000 Lb empty to the Boeing B-29 weighing 70,000 Lb.

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       Eg.  In building 44 Escort Carriers of the Casablanca class (7,800 tons standard displacement) in one Kaiser yard, from the 15^th to the 44^th there was a Learning curve of 77% (Ref. 9).

        Eg.  In building 236 Liberty cargo ships (3,400 tons standard displacement), assuming Learning began at the 15^th, a new E. Coast shipyard showed an 85% Curve (Ref. 9).  Other Liberty yards also showed the Learning Curve effect, which would have been a great labour saving over the whole 2710 ship programme.

        Eg.  GM Frigidaire Division, in manufacturing over 280,000  0.5’’ aircraft machine guns, was able to reduce the price charged to the government from $690 to$169, on a Learning Curve of 79% (Ref. 10).

Modification Centres

   To enable the new plants to operate most effectively, with only major specification changes introduced in discrete blocks, and yet ensure the aircraft provided to the fighting fronts were as potent as possible, Modification Centres were added to the production process.  This was acknowledging the “Natural Rule of Thumb” that:-

In this case the Mod. Centres were the Complexity addition necessary to provide the Flexibility of the latest battle-worthy specification without harming the Effectivity of mass-producing the basic aircraft. [More can be read on this general subject in a section of the website “grandprixengines.co.uk”.]

Meeting and beating the FDR target

   The result of all this effort is shown on Fig.7 below.

Figure 7

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   This output was achieved while introducing into production 15 new types of aircraft:-  10 Fighters and 5 Bombers, culminating in the enormous B-29 programme which alone cost $3 Bn.    All production aircraft were piston-engined.  Fortunately, the Germans did not put their much-faster and more heavily armed Messerschmitt Me262 jet fighters into operations until mid-1944.  Weight of numbers against it, fuel shortage, vulnerability to airfield attacks and engine unreliability then limited its effectiveness.

FDR’s decision against war  [Reverting to 1940 chronology]

   On the 21^st May 1940 German forces reached the Channel and so cut off the best troops of the French and also the British Expeditionary Force.  The former resisted at Lille until the 31^st May.  The latter, with many French, were evacuated by sea from Dunkirk by the night of 4/5 June 1940.    The Germans by 5^th June were ready in strength to attack South against a very weak line cobbled together from Abbeville to the Maginot fortifications at Montmedy with the remaining French troops and some British.  They quickly broke through.  After 5 days the French position was near total collapse.  Encouraged by this Mussolini’s Italy declared war on France (and Great Britain) on 10^th   June.

   On that day Paul Reynaud sent a telegram to FDR which included the following appeal:- “I beseech you to declare publicly that the United States will give the Allies aid and material support by all means ‘short of an expeditionary force’ “ (Ref. 6).

   FDR replied on the 13^th that his government was doing everything in its power to make available urgently required material and efforts to do still more “ are being redoubled”.    After what turned out to be the last meeting of Churchill with Reynaud on the 13^th at Tours, with Paris abandoned and about to be captured, Reynaud sent another desperate telegram to FDR that night:-

“The only chance of saving the French nation…and through her save England…is to throw into the balance this very day the weight of American power….I know that the declaration of war does not depend on you alone.   But I must tell you…if you cannot give to France in the hours to come the certainty that the United States will come into the war within a very short time the fate of the world will change” (Ref. 6).

   FDR had to reply to that on the 15^th  , after further assurance about supplies, that there could be:- “…no implication of military commitments.  Only the Congress can make such commitments” (Ref. 6).    Discouraging as this reply was, FDR had no choice, with very strong isolationist feeling in Congress, to say nothing of the nation, and with the US armed services in absolutely no shape for war.  He had gone as far as he could go in the assurances of supplies.

   Powerless to prevent it, FDR saw France as an independent nation collapse in a further 10 days.  Reynaud resigned on the 17^th, the President of France appointed Marshal Pétain in his place and he asked the Germans for an armistice.  The terms of this were accepted on the 22^nd and France ceased to fight on the 25^th.

   FDR received advice at this time from the US ambassador to the United Kingdom (UK) (Kennedy) that, isolated as they were, the country would be beaten so that supplies sent to them would only aid the Germans.  However, a decision by Churchill and his cabinet on 3^rd July 1940 helped FDR to decide his action.  The French fleet had not been surrendered but the danger of the Germans seizing it later could not be ignored. Consequently, steps were taken by the UK to prevent this.  They varied and generally the ships were neutralised with scarcely any blood shed but, at Mers-el-Kebir, they had to be bombarded and there was great loss.  Seeing this determined action, FDR understood that the British and their Commonwealth and Empire would fight.  Aid was therefore continued.    Further assurance came after a peace offered by Hitler in a speech to the Reichstag on 19^th July was rejected in a broadcast by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, on the 22^nd. As an appeaser pre-Munich (and someone who had thought even post-Dunkirk that a negotiation with Hitler should be contemplated) Churchill’s choice of him to make public the refusal was significant.

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   When William Donovan, who had just spent several weeks in the UK, reported to FDR in August confirming that the British, given supplies and help to see that they were delivered, would stay in the war, Kennedy was sacked on his advice.

Organisation of War production

    On the 28^th May 1940 FDR telephoned William S. Knudsen, President of General Motors (GM) to invite him to Washington.  Two days later, when they met, FDR asked him to take on an advisory role on War production.  Despite FDR’s years of criticising and penalising “capitalist” companies like GM in his New Deal, Knudsen accepted the job – giving up a very large salary to do so.  Later he was appointed as Director General of the Office of Production Management (OPM).

   At about the same date FDR invited Donald M. Nelson, a high executive of Sears, Roebuck, the large-scale pioneer mail-order firm, to join with Knudsen in the organisation of the huge war production programmes, and he also accepted.    With various changes this partnership lasted until just after the USA entered the war.  Seeking clearer lines of action, FDR on 13^th January 1942 abolished the earlier arrangements and appointed Nelson to be Chairman of a new War Production Board (WPB).  Knudsen accepted a post in the War Department concerned with expediting their specific needs, being appointed as Lieutenant General to ensure he had the rank to see his instructions were obeyed (Ref. 4).

   Nelson ran the WPB until his resignation in August 1944, by which time all programmes were running smoothly except that for the new Boeing B-29 Superfortress, but Knudsen was coordinating that.

Formation of the National Defense Research Committee

   One of FDR’s most important decisions was made in 10 minutes while he was in the middle of the worry caused by the French agony, described above.  Vannevar Bush, in the top rank of academic engineering, with the support of men of similar position, prepared a proposal for a National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) to co-ordinate scientific and engineering work on new weapons, tapping into academic talent outside the usual military departments.  With the aid of Harry Hopkins, whose role vis-à-vis FDR will be amplified below, he gained a meeting with FDR on 12 June 1940.  Expecting to be cross-examined by the President he had written a short brief. Two important points were that it should report directly to the President and that it should have its own funds.  Bush got his “OK-FDR” scribbled on the brief in the aforesaid 10 minutes!  A formal letter was approved by FDR on 15 June 1940 and it included passing to Bush the oversight of people who were looking into the fission of uranium – again, see later.

The immense enlargement of the US Navy

   During the 19^th Century, apart from the war of 1812 between the new United States and Britain over the right to free passage for American merchant ships through the Royal Navy’s blockade of Napoleon’s empire, the USA had rested easy in the knowledge that the British fleet in the Atlantic protected them from any European interference.  President Monroe could state his doctrine in December 1823 that, in effect, further foreign colonisation in the Western hemisphere would not be tolerated sure that the RN would prevent it anyway.  Democratic President Wilson, over 1916 to 1921, based on the large increased economic strength of the States, did get the Congress to approve what was going to be a “Two Ocean Navy” (although not called that) but this was scuppered when the Republicans came to power in 1921.  They got all the naval powers to agree to fleet limits in the Washington Naval Conference of 1922                 (see Contribution No.2).  US attention was then concentrated on the Japanese threat in the Pacific.

   In mid-1940, with the Germans rampaging unstoppably across France and the frightening possibility that they could defeat France and then Britain and capture their fleets and shipyards, the subject of a “Two Ocean Navy” for the USA to also guard the Atlantic came very much to FDR’s attention.  The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark, had a programme for such a fleet drawn up and it was approved by FDR on 14 June 1940 (the day on which FDR received a desperate cry for help from the French Prime Minister and the day the Germans entered Paris).  Put before Congress as the Vinson-Walsh bill it was passed virtually without dissent and signed into law by FDR on 19 July 1940.

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   The Act covered (Ref. 11):-

18 Essex class aircraft carriers (CV); 7 Battleships (BB) (2 Iowa class + 5 Montana class); 6 Alaska class Large Cruisers (CB); 27 mixed Heavy (CA) and Light (CL) cruisers; 115 Destroyers (DD); and 43 Submarines (SS).

15,000 aircraft were included for the carriers and for catapult launching, plus reserves.

Money for various other ship classes, equipment, ordnance, ammunition and facilities was also included.

Later war programmes

   It is convenient to digress here to describe the further expansion of the US naval programmes.

   Large changes were made to ship classes in later war programmes.  2 Iowa BB were added (9 x 16’’ guns) and the 5 Montana BB (12 x 16’’ guns) were cancelled, as were 4 of the CB (“Battle-cruisers”, 9 x 12’’ guns).  The numbers of CA and CL were increased, including CL especially armed for

Anti-Aircraft protection;  DD and SS numbers were vastly expanded.  9 ships laid down as CL were converted to carriers (CVL).  New classes were constructed:-  Escort Carriers (CVE) and Escort Destroyers (DE) in large numbers for convoy protection.  Naval aircraft (which probably included Marine) totalled over 80.000 (Ref. 12).

   Representative Carl Vinson, head of the House Naval Affairs Committee said “…The carrier, with destroyers, cruisers and submarines grouped round it, is the spearhead of all modern task forces”.  In the Pacific sea-fighting he was quite right, except that the submarines on their own were so successful in eliminating the Japanese merchant fleet that they virtually crippled the country by themselves.  The 4 Iowa BBs, although a necessary insurance policy and providers of strong AA protection for the carriers, never fired their main guns at an enemy warship (a case of their mis-use is recorded in Contribution No. 4 in this website).

   The growth of the USN Fleet Carrier force – the “spearhead” – is shown on Fig.8 below.

Fig. 8  

   The Tokyo raid, with B-25 bombers launched from Hornet on 18 April 1942, was approved personally by FDR.  Its significant consequences are described in Contribution No. 3.    The unusual events of the battle of Leyte Gulf are described in Contribution No. 4.

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US 1939 – End 1945 Naval Ship Construction

   For warships down to submarines, the figures are as follows (Ref.13) summed-up):-

Category	Number	Number Totals	Cost $M	Cost $M Totals
Battleships (BB)	10		862
“Battlecruisers”	2		148
		12		1010	7.4%
Large Fleet Carriers (CVB)*	2		180
Fleet Carriers (CV)	21		1,390
Light Fleet Carriers (CVL)	9		270
		32		1,840	13.5%
Escort Carriers (CVE)		82		772	5.7%
Heavy Cruisers (CA)	14		560
Light Cruisers (CL)	39		1,238
		53		1,798	13.2%
Fleet Destroyers (DD)		432		5,036	36.9%
Escort Destroyers (DE)		344		1,879	13.8%
Submarines (SS)		213		1,288	9.5%
Totals		1,168		13,623	100%

   Additional to the fighting ships listed there were:-

Small fighting craft; Minesweepers & Layers; Service and Support ships; Transports; and about 82,000 Landing Craft & Ships (Ref. 12).

Admiral Yamamoto’s foreboding and its fulfilment

   Although in his wildest dreams the Japanese Admiral Yamamoto could never have anticipated the enormous naval construction described above, he nevertheless had warned against the latent industrial power of the USA, knowledge gained during his time in the States as Naval Attaché (1926-1928).

   It was Yamamoto who conceived the idea of a surprise attack on the US battle fleet* at Pearl Harbor after it was re-based there in April 1940   Previously, it had been based in San Pedro Bay, near Long Beach, California.  The 3,000 n.miles forward move was supposed to deter the Japanese at a time of rising tension between that nation and the USA over Japanese aggression in China.  In contemplating war with the USA Yamamoto has been quoted as saying :-“I can run wild for six months…after that, I have no expectation of success”.  This was exactly right – the battle of Midway won by the USN was just 6 months after Pearl Harbor and 6 months after that the vast expansion of the US carrier force began, as shown on Fig. 8.

   Yamamoto did not live to see the full destruction of his fleet.  Knowledge of his air movements was obtained by American code-cracking in 1943 and his itinerary was just within combat range of the P-38s on Guadalcanal.  To attack him might give away the secret of the code penetration, so permission had to be obtained at a high level (possibly, and even probably, up to FDR).  It was given.  As a result he died on the 18^th April 1943.

*Japan had form in surprise attacks without a declaration of war.  That was how hostilities began with Russia at Port Arthur in February 1904.  Note that the forward move of the US fleet in 1940 was not a deterrent but just stimulated a plan for its destruction.  The same thing happened when the Prince of Wales and Repulse were sent to Singapore in December 1941 (see Contribution No.2).  Neither the Americans nor the British had understood the Japanese mind.

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Destroyers to the UK

   Churchill had first raised with FDR the possibility of obtaining 40 or 50 old destroyers from the USA on loan on 15 May 1940.  He returned to the subject on 31 July, telling FDR of the serious losses of our own destroyers to air attack and the time gap until British new construction could be available.  Soon it was proposed that the loan might be traded for US 99-year leases of bases in British territory in the West Indies, which would strengthen defence of the North American continent.  FDR was much involved in the negotiations, which extended the sites considered to Bermuda and Newfoundland.  A formula was finally agreed and FDR signed an Executive Order (bypassing Congress) approving the transfer on 30 August 1940. 

“Lend-Lease”

   Franklin Roosevelt was re-elected as President on 5 November 1940.  He had felt it necessary in one of his campaign speeches to say:-

“Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars”.

He justified this in a private comment:-“Of course, we’ll fight if we’re attacked.  If somebody attacks us, then it isn’t a foreign war, is it?” (Ref.4). When he was re-elected he could turn his mind to how best to help the United Kingdom.

  As noted above, apart from the “Destroyers for Bases” agreement, in 1939-1940 UK had paid cash to carry away arms from the USA.  By late 1940 nearly all available dollars had been spent.  Returning on the 23rd November after a visit to England, the Ambassador to the United States told journalists at the dockside, bluntly:-  “Well, boys, Britain’s broke.  It’s your money we want!!

   This was followed by a 4,000 word letter to FDR from Churchill dated 8 November 1940.  He surveyed the whole war situation then turned to the question of finance, writing:- “The moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash….” (Ref. 5).

   From this sprang, what Churchill called afterwards: “ …a wonderful decision”.  From a homely analogy on 17 December about lending a neighbour a hose to put out a fire at his house, FDR put before Congress a bill which would enable the USA to lend or lease to the UK anything they required, on the basis that British resistance to Nazi Germany was also contributing to the defence of the Republic.  The bill was bitterly opposed in Congress by some.  During the two months debate, in a radio broadcast to the nation on 29 December, FDR said:-  “We must be the great arsenal of democracy”.  The Act was passed and FDR signed it into law on the 15^th March 1941.

   A significant FDR decision at this time was that he designated Harry L. Hopkins to “advise and assist” him on Lend-Lease, without giving him a formal title.  Hopkins, from 1931 until FDR’s death, despite being in fragile health most of the time, was very close to him and an essential part of his team of advisors. He had already, over 7th January 1941 to the 10^th February visited England as FDR’s personal representative to meet Churchill and size up the situation in the country. It was during this visit, when Churchill took great care to show him everything, that the possibility of a meeting between the two top men was raised.  It was also then, on the 17^th January, that he quoted from the Book of Ruth:- “Whither thou goest, I will go….and added “even to the end” (Ref.4).  Hopkins was admired by Churchill in particular for always concentrating minds on “The Root of the Matter”.  Later, Stalin also spoke to him in July 1941 more freely than to most emissaries from the Western allies, after FDR’s letter of introduction said:-  “I ask you to treat Mr Hopkins with the identical confidence you would feel if you were talking directly to me” (Ref. 4).  FDR’s reliance on Hopkins was one of his best decisions, equal to his reliance on Marshall.

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   The value of Lend Lease supplies to the end of the war was (Ref. 14):-

                                                                                      $Bn

                                                                        UK         31.4

                                                                        USSR     11.3

                                                                        France    3.2

                                                                        China      1.6

                                                                        Others    2.6

                                           Total                                  50.1     17% of US war expenses.

By reverse Lend Lease, principally the cost of providing air bases (British spark plugs for the 8th USAF was a particular item, better than the American plugs) the UK offset the receipts by $6.8 Bn.    Although the USSR after the war officially down-played the Lend-Lease aid, Stalin did actually acknowledge its true value in a toast at the Allied Conference in Teheran in November 1943, saying:-

“Without the machines we received through Lend-Lease, we would have lost the war” (Ref.15).

   As well as “machines” (Tanks, Aircraft, Trucks & Jeeps [see below], Motorcycles, Locomotives), Stalin could also have mentioned Aviation Fuel, Canned Food, and Raw Materials.

   The USSR’s “Reverse Lend-Lease” was not in money but in lives lost in the vicious struggle on the Eastern Front – nearly 9 million officially reported in 1993 but some historians believe that this is an understatement.

Neutrality Patrols and the Garrisoning of Iceland

   On the orders of FDR the USN had established Neutrality Patrols at the start of the war.    On the 10^th May 1940 the UK had responded to the occupation of Denmark by the Germans by garrisoning Iceland – actually “invading”, because that island had declared its neutrality. 

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   On 24^th April 1941 by Presidential directive FDR had ordered the USN to report any German activity in an Atlantic zone west of the 25⁰ Longitude.  Passed on to the British this would help to get convoys through.    When the British needed the Iceland garrison elsewhere, the US was asked if they would take over the duty and FDR approved this.  The US forces landed in Iceland on 8^th July 1941 with the agreement of the Government. Three days later FDR personally drew for Hopkins the limits for USN patrols on a small map of the Atlantic torn from a National Geographic magazine (see Fig. 10 below) [Ref.4].

   Hopkins suggested to FDR while in England that he should go on to visit Stalin and this was approved. On the 28^th July he travelled by Catalina flying boat to Archangel – a hard 24 hours journey for a man in very poor health, and then on by Russian plane to Moscow.  As noted above, he was able to determine from Stalin what the USSR wanted (Ref.4).

 The joint embargo on strategic supplies to Japan

   In Contribution No. 2 the surrender of France in 1940 was shown to be a 7-point disaster for Britain, the 7^th being the occupation of bases in French Indo-China by Japan, Vichy being powerless to resist.  This had been carried out by late August 1941.  This forward move of 1,400 miles from Formosa threatened Singapore, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies.

   On the 24^th August FDR asked the Japanese government to withdraw the troops and to put pressure on them then made an Executive Order to freeze their assets in the USA, from whom they had been buying strategic raw materials (Ref. 5).  This was followed on 1^st August by an American embargo on fuel sales to Japan, which had been substantial.  These actions were immediately followed by Britain and the Dutch.

   Regrettably, the joint governments did not read correctly the effect their moves would have on the Japanese.  Would they themselves have yielded to such pressure?  It helped to promote General Tojo, an aggressive militarist, from War Minister to Prime Minister on 18^th October 1941.  After that, it was simply a question of whether to attack Russia, heavily engaged with Germany and in accord with the German/ Italian/Japanese Tri-Partite Pact of 1940 or drive South to secure the oil.

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   There were 3 days of discussions in various groupings of the two principals and their senior staffs.  The outcome was an un-signed “Joint Statement” which became known as the “Atlantic Charter”.  This could be said to be the origin of the post-War United Nations organisation but, at the time, was only “pious words”.

   The real value of the meeting was that, in Churchill’s words on 12^th August:- “I am sure I have established warm and deep personal relations with our great friend” (Ref. 5)

Extension of Selective Service

   The Selective Service Act of 16 September 1940 had provided 800,000 young men by lottery to serve for one year.  Against isolationist sentiment, FDR was persuaded to risk a defeat in Congress to extend the period of service.  It passed the House of Representatives by 1 vote on the 12^th August 1941, the same day that the Atlantic conference closed!  After the Senate approved by a wider margin, FDR signed the legislation on the 18^th..  So, despite everything done by FDR to bolster the defensive equipment of the USA, the nation by that one vote “had decided to have an army”!    A surprising fact in the eventual enlargement of the services was that 39% were volunteers (Ref.18).  Another interesting statistic was that 39% were in non-combat jobs (Ref. 18)..

“Shoot on sight” in the Atlantic

   On 4^th September 1941 the destroyer USS Greer picked up by sonar a German submarine, stalked it for some time in accordance with current orders, then was fired on by torpedo and returned fire with depth charges.  Neither side suffered damage or casualties.     FDR decided to use this incident to raise the stakes.  In a broadcast he said:-“From now on if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril” (Ref.6).  The area covered was that shown on Fig. 10.    This was popularised as a “Shoot on sight” order to the USN.  In anti-submarine warfare this meant “Depth-charge a sonar contact”.

   Hitler, who had not reacted to FDR’s actions over 1940 – 1941 which were aimed clearly at Germany, did not openly respond to this démarche either.  He was busy with the campaign in Russia, where his troops were about to close another huge kessel around Kiev, 360 miles from their start line.  His basic attitude towards the USA he had already expressed to the Japanese Foreign Minister on the 27th March 1941, when the latter was in Berlin for discussions about the Tri-Partite Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan:-“Germany had made her preparations so that no American could land in Europe.  Germany would wage a vigorous war against America with U-boats and the Luftwaffe, and with her greater experience….would be more than a match for America, entirely apart from the fact that German soldiers were, obviously, superior to the Americans”.  He had then added [author’s colouring]:- “Germany….would promptly take part in case of a conflict between Japan and America” (Ref. 19).  This, of course, was not known to FDR.

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   US destroyers were now routinely escorting British convoys to and from the FDR mid-Atlantic boundary and, as it was soon seen, putting themselves in harm’s way.  On the 17^th October the USS Kearny , while dropping a depth-charge ‘barrage’ in defence of a convoy, was torpedoed.  The damage was controlled and the ship reached port, having lost 11 men.  FDR said on the 27^th:-  “…history has recorded who fired the first shot.  In the long run, however, all that will matter is who fired the last shot” (Ref.4).  On 31^st October the USS Reuben James, while depth-charging a sonar contact was torpedoed by another submarine.  The ship sank quickly and 100 men were lost.

   These events did not move the American public to demand action against Germany, and FDR did not allow himself to be deflected from a policy of ‘all aid short of war’.

Period 3

THE JAPANESE SURPRISE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

   Sunday 7^th December 1941, which FDR described as “A date which will live in infamy” in addressing Congress on the following day to ask them to declare war on Japan (which, of course, they did – there were no “isolationists” on the 8^th – just one pacifist voted against war).

   Hitler declared war on the United States 3 days later, 11^th December 1941, as he had promised on the 27^th March (see above).  Was that the only promise he ever kept?!

   There were 8 battleships in the harbour when the Japanese carrier aircraft attacked.  All received some damage:-  2 were total losses;  2 were sunk in fairly shallow water and were salvaged, modernised and returned to service 3 years later;  2 were quickly returned to service;  1 was beached, salvaged and back in service quite soon;  1 was still fit for service.

   The total casualties were 2,403 killed, including 68 civilians.

   Fortunately, none of the 7 available carriers was in the harbour on the 7^th.    All old battleships in the US fleet later provided shore bombardments for amphibious landings, in the Pacific and 3 on D-Day;  5 of the 6 battleships returned to service after Pearl Harbor obtained their revenge in the 1944 Surigao Strait defeat of a Japanese force South of Leyte.  This was the last battleship action in history.

Washington Conference  (coded “ARCADIA”)

   In the evening of the 7^th December, after hearing on the BBC that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, Churchill immediately telephoned FDR.  He was told that Congress would be asked the following day to declare war on Japan and he promised that Great Britain would do the same.  FDR agreed on the 11^th December that Churchill should come to Washington with his Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible to settle joint action.  Arriving by the new battleship Duke of York on the 12^th, Churchill stayed until the 14^th January 1942, with an intermediate visit to Canada.

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      This Conference marked a change in FDR’s personal decision-making.  A Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee was set up, meeting in Washington, and this through the next 3 ½ years would propose the main moves in the War, for the concurrence of the Political Chiefs.  There were occasions when FDR made major decisions, however, and these will be noted in their place.  He did, for instance, appoint Admiral William D. Leahy as Chairman of the US Joint Chief of Staff’s Committee (as well as being Chief of Staff to FDR as Commander in Chief), the first time such a body had been formed in the United States.  Previously, the USN and the US army had tended to act as rivals rather than partners!  The USN, of course, under the Chief of Naval Operations, Ernest J. King (EJK) had their own aviation and soldiers – the Marine Corps;  and the Army, under the Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall (GCM) had the Army Air Corps.

   Despite the blow to the pride of the United States from Japan, Arcadia agreed with a conclusion of American and British staffs in secret meetings over January to March 1941 that, if it came to allied war, then it must be action against “Germany First”.  This was because that nation had been judged by far the more powerful industrially and technically.

To some extent this was because the technical capability of Japan was unknown in early 1941 because of the deep security it had imposed in the preceding years.  The sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse on 10^th December1941by long-range torpedo bombers had administered one shock.  The superior performance of the Mitsubishi A6M (“Zero”) fighter and the destructive capability of their 24’’ oxygen-burning torpedo were still to be suffered.

   The “Germany First” decision really made itself in January 1942.  At that date, when the US military build-up had only just begun, the UK was the major partner.  There could not be any question of leaving it in limbo for 2 or 3 years a few miles off the coast of a hostile Europe.

   As events turned out, the US build-up for war was so enormous that it was able to conduct large operations in the Pacific without fatal prejudice to those officially of higher priority in the Atlantic, North Africa and Europe.  Admiral Chester Nimitz in the Central Pacific and General Douglas MacArthur in the South had large resources provided to them.

The Atomic Bomb Programme

   On 11^th October 1939 a letter written by Albert Einstein, then resident in the USA, was read to FDR in which, after advising of new discoveries in nuclear physics, he wrote:-

“…it is conceivable – though much less certain – that extremely powerful bombs of a new type may thus be constructed…A single bomb…exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port…” (Ref. 21).  Describing the action then initiated by FDR, which became very much committee-oriented, the ref. author (who became later the historian of the bomb project) wrote:-  “   the Einstein letter produced hardly any action worth mentioning; it played no part whatever in the later decision to go all out on the building of an atom bomb”.

  What did really spark off the programme was the visit to the USA of Dr M. Oliphant in August 1941 when he reinforced details of work done in the UK which had already been sent to the people working to FDR’s 1939 memo but which had been filed and forgotten.  This British “MAUD” report made it “…nearly certain that an atomic bomb could … be built and that it could be made in time to be of use in the war against Germany” (Ref. 21).  This was then studied and validated and a report sent by Bush to FDR on 27 November 1941.  After the Japanese attack FDR got round to reading it and on the 19th January 1942 (Ref. 22) in effect he gave a go-ahead to action which would lead to the Uranium U235 atomic bomb which obliterated the centre of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945.

   The really heavy expense of the atomic bomb programme was approved by FDR on 28^th December 1942.  It was placed under the US army Corps of Engineers with Leslie R. Groves in command (he had just completed the Pentagon in Washington) and coded the “Manhattan” project.  These costs were concealed in other authorisations.

Sherman tanks to the 8^th Army

   On 21^st June 1942 Churchill was conferring with FDR when a telegram brought in by GCM informed them that Tobruk had surrendered to the Germans.  This was a place which had successfully withstood a 241 days siege in 1941.  FDR simply said “What can we do to help?”  Churchill asked for Sherman tanks.  He was well-informed, because the M4 Sherman, 31 tons with a short 75 mm gun and nearly as good as the German 25 tons PzKw IV with a long 75 mm gun, was just coming into production.  GCM agreed to take newly-issued tanks from American divisions and added that 100 self-propelled 105 mm howitzers could be sent in addition (they were)..  In practice 300 Shermans without engines installed were sent, i.e. directly from the makers, with the engines in a separate ship, which was sunk.  Replacement engines were dispatched by a faster ship to overtake the convoy to Egypt (Ref. 5).

Churchill wrote in his memoirs “A friend in need is a friend indeed”

Army Procurement: the Sherman tank

   Apart from his general decisions like creating the OPM and the WPB, FDR was not involved in US army procurement.  However, as just one example of a large-scale programme in that area, details are shown below for the M4 Sherman tank which became the standard for the US and its Western allies (via Lend-Lease).  The illustration (Fig. 14) shows a Sherman in a British regiment.

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The FDR’s decision for “TORCH”

   In the middle of July 1942 the war situation was as follows:-

• In Russia the Germans were about to fight their way over the R. Don on a thrust towards Stalingrad, 60 miles further on;
• In the W. Desert the 8^th Army at El Alamein was halting the German advance towards the Suez Canal, 214 miles away;
• In the Pacific, having won the battle of Midway on 4 June, an amphibious landing on Guadalcanal had been authorised on 25^th June;
• In the Atlantic in June U-boats had sunk 500,000 gross tons of ships for the loss of only 3 submarines;
• Bomber Command had just mounted 3 x “1,000-bomber” raids on Germany;  30/31^st May on Cologne; 1/2 June on Essen; 25/26 June on Bremen.  Bad weather had made the results on the 2^nd and 3^rd uncertain;

• Preliminary Plans had been made for:-

BOLERO – build-up of US forces in the European Theatre towards an eventual Cross-Channel attack;

SLEDGEHAMMER – attack in 1942 against the European Continent IF there was danger of a Russian collapse, as a diversion;

ROUNDUP – attack in 1943 against the European Continent;

GYMNAST – attack on N. Africa.

   One of the last three would be the first Anglo-American offensive.

   To expedite a decision on which plans should be implemented, FDR on 15^th July ordered the US Chiefs of Staff (GCM and EJK) and Hopkins to go to London to confer with Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff.  On the 16^th he gave them detailed instructions in writing covering many situations but with one sentence reading “It is of the highest importance that US ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942”.  He included “I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan…” (Ref. 4).  This cancelled GCM’s thoughts of recommending this reversal of “Germany first” if the British would not accept his push for SLEDGEHAMMER.  EJK was, of course, always mostly concerned with the Pacific, and was allowed by FDR to be so.

   FDR did not state his reason for 1942 action, but everyone knew it was because there were to be Congressional House of Representative elections on 3 November.  Unlike Britain, the USA retained their electoral schedule in the war.

   In London GCM continued his push for SLEDGEHAMMER, against British opposition.  His idea of strategy was that of Ulysses S. Grant in the Civil War in 1864 – “Straight at the enemy”!  He was “a stranger to subtlety”.  He probably never recognised that it was William Tecumseh Sherman’s “long way round” via Atlanta and Charleston which finally unstuck Robert E. Lee’s Confederates entrenched before Grant around Richmond.  Actually, this was “Fix” and “Outflank” on the largest scale.

   The outcome of the London meetings was a telegram from the Americans to FDR on the 22^nd July saying the British would not agree to SLEDGEHAMMER and asking for his instructions.  His immediate reply said, in effect, that an operation against Algeria and/or Morocco must go ahead.  As Commander-in-Chief his decision had to be accepted by GCM and EJK (Ref. 4).  Originally the operation, re-coded TORCH, was to start on October 30^th.  It was delayed to the 8^th November, unfortunately.  Meanwhile those important elections had been held and FDR’s Democrats lost 45 seats and were reduced to a majority of 13.

Figure 16

   TORCH was the first Anglo-American offensive.

   The disastrous result of the raid on Dieppe on 19^th August proved that the British opinion of SLEDGEHAMMER being unrealistic with the means then available was correct, although it had not stopped that operation, unfortunately.

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The Casablanca Conference (SYMBOL) and “Unconditional Surrender”

   The Casablanca Conference was between FDR, Churchill and their staffs over 14^th to 24^th January 1943, without Stalin because he felt unable to leave Moscow with the battle of Stalingrad not yet concluded (the Germans there surrendered on 2^nd February 1943).  The Anglo-American forces in Africa at that date were still held in Western Tunisia by the reinforcements which Hitler had poured into that region (see Fig. 16 above).  However, on the Eastern approaches the 8th Army was about to capture Tripoli – they did so on 23rd January 1943.  This was 73 days and 1100 miles from winning the battle of El Alamein.

   During the Conference, the question of demanding “unconditional surrender” from our enemies came up when they were defeated, as the allies definitely planned to achieve but were by no means near to achieving in January 1943 (Ref. 5).  The words were in the notes prepared for FDR to use in the Press conference which followed the conclusion of official business (Ref. 4).

   However, it was FDR who actually spoke the phrase to the assembled reporters and therefore to the world.  Churchill was surprised but backed him up.  To the question of whether it helped or hindered the defeat of Germany, he post-war gave the firm statement:-“Negotiation with Hitler was impossible.  He was a maniac with supreme power to play his hand out to the end, which he did; and so did we” (Ref. 4).

The Quebec Conference (QUADRANT)

   Held between 19^th and 24^th August 1943, Churchill (WSC) meeting FDR with their Staffs.  The most important outcome was setting a target date of 1^st May 1944 for “OVERLORD”, the Cross-Channel amphibious assault on occupied France.  This was coupled with the Combined Chiefs of Staff reporting to the “Big Two” “We have approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation Overlord and have authorised him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations”.  FDR and WSC accepted this, although WSC thought that at least 25% should be added to the 1^st assault (Ref.5).  Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) in March 1943 had appointed Morgan to the post of “Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate)” (COSSAC), but he did not tell the Conference that, on that occasion, because of a perceived future lack of landing craft he had told him:- “Well, there it is.  It won’t work but you must bloody well make it!” (Ref. 24).  Morgan was a surprising choice for the job, having only had a few days experience of fighting Nazi Germans in June 1940.  His outline plan had just 3 divisions and 2 paratroop Brigades in the 1^st wave plus 2 second wave divisions pre-loaded in landing-craft (Ref. 24).

   FDR (no soldier) therefore made a mistake in accepting the COSSAC outline plan, because he trusted GCM (who had never led soldiers in combat; his approval of the COSSAC plan, when he thought he would probably command the operation, showed that);  and the CIGS (who had), nevertheless, had written in his diary on 6th August, after first reading it, “A good plan…” (Ref. 27).  It is hard to know how he could have thought that – a momentary aberration!  WSC (who had been a fighting soldier), had his doubts, as mentioned. He may have borne in mind that the invasion of Sicily 40 days earlier (10^th July) had employed 7 seaborne divisions and an airborne division against a coast defended by Italians!

   Not until an experienced and successful ground force commander (Montgomery) was appointed at the end of the year was the plan beefed-up at his insistence.

   The build-up of US forces in the UK for the 1944 cross-Channel assault is shown on P.25 of Contribution No. 2 of www.strategyinhistory.com.

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The Norman coast was less-heavily fortified.  The Germans, via Enigma decrypts, were known to believe the “Schwerpunkt” would come in the Pas de Calais.  Special measures were taken to reinforce that belief by means of double agent reports, a sham army in the East “commanded by General Patton” and by an airborne electronic spoof on the day.  They thought the Normandy landings were feints for a critical period.

The Teheran Conference (EUREKA):- “Who will command OVERLORD?”

   For the first time all the “Big Three” met at Teheran over 28^th November to 1^st December 1943.  During the Conference Stalin asked bluntly “Who will command OVERLORD?”.  FDR and WSC mentioned the role of Morgan as COSSAC.  This cut no ice with Stalin.  He declared it essential that a man should be appointed at once to be responsible not only for the planning but also for the execution.  Otherwise, the Supreme Commander, when appointed, might have very different ideas and wish to alter everything (Ref. 5).  [How right he was – not everything, but the basic assault plan was changed!  His remarks on this subject show that Stalin had a better grasp of military essentials than FDR or WSC.]

  He was promised that the post would be filled within a fortnight.

The second Cairo conference (SEXTANT), 4^th – 6^th December 1943

   This second conference between FDR and WSC and their staffs was held on their way home after Teheran.  According to Ref. 4 it included the major over-ruling by the President of a unanimous recommendation of his Chiefs of Staff.  On the way to Teheran in Cairo there had been a meeting of FDR, WSC and Chiang Kai-shek (CKS), ruler of that part of China not occupied by the Japanese (or in the control of the Communists led by Mao Zedong).  A series of operations had been agreed to re-open the Burma Road connecting Burma with Chungking, CKS’ capital, in order to mount more vigorous air action against the occupiers and their homeland.  This included an amphibious assault on the Andaman Islands (in the Bay of Bengal) to provide supporting air bases, coded BUCCANEER.  This had been approved by the American Staff.  Now, having received at Teheran a promise by Stalin that he would make war on Japan as soon as possible after the defeat of Germany, which made difficult actions from China over tortuous L of C redundant, on 5^th December 1943 FDR cancelled his promise to CSK (Ref. 4).

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Choosing the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force

   WSC had agreed with FDR at the Quebec conference that an American should command OVERLORD, because the balance of forces in action would soon swing to the US shortly after the landings.  He thereby disappointed his CIGS, who had been promised the post.  It was expected in the higher circles of Washington that GCM would be appointed (Ref. 4), but, while keen to give GCM his chance to be the “Pershing of WW2 ” FDR was also very reluctant to lose him as his principal military adviser. 

On the way to the Teheran Conference, FDR took the opportunity on 21^st November 1943 to spend some time with General Dwight D. Eisenhower (DDE), who had held the Supreme Command for TORCH and its natural continuations through Sicily (HUSKY) and into Italy (BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE).  FDR was evaluating him for the OVERLORD job (Ref. 4).  He had risen from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel since July 1941, showing GCM’s opinion of his ability.

   Matters stood there when Stalin made his pointed query at Teheran

   DDE as a protégé of GCM naturally shared his view about making war i.e. he favoured the 1864 Grant method of “Straight at the enemy” and he too was a “Stranger to subtlety”. In late 1943 he had only a year’s experience of command.

Some comments on policy-making for OVERLORD

   It seems fair to say that policy-making at the top of the Anglo-American alliance did not do a good job in preparations for OVERLORD*.  This was to be the crucial offensive in defeating Germany but in planning it was not given sufficient resources to ensure a successful re-entry to Europe against a battle-hardened German army.

   The USN under EJK ordered in the USA the bulk of the landing vessels for amphibious assaults, including especially the 20 x Sherman-capacity Landing Ship, Tank (LST) which was essential in quantity for build-up of a beach-head.  The USN also allocated the vessels to the war theatres and EJK did not adhere in the distribution to the policy of “Germany First” (Ref. 24).  He made sure that Admiral Nimitz in the Central Pacific had plenty.

   The forecast of landing vessels available was what caused the CIGS’ exclamation quoted above on appointing Morgan to plan OVERLORD.  At Quebec the Combined Chiefs could have corrected the im-balance in landing resources but did not.  WSC saw the weakness of the COSSAC plan and asked for 25% more strength.  It is suggested above that a comparison with HUSKY may have caused this, but there were 6 senior military men there who could and should have drawn that invidious comparison.  FDR also did not query the plan.  Nothing was done in the rest of the year about enlarging it.

P.22 of 28

   Leaving the appointment of the man to command OVERLORD to 6 months before the target for D-Day of 1^st May 1944 which the Quebec meeting set was also a poor decision., for the reasons which Stalin pointed out.

   When appointed, DDE had sufficient experience from commanding 4 amphibious landings (TORCH, HUSKY, BAYTOWN [not opposed] and AVALANCHE) to suspect that COSSAC-OVERLORD was too weak.  AVALANCHE on the 9^th September at Salerno had been the first to meet a vicious German reaction against 3 assault divisions and the experience must have scarred DDE’s mind.  General Bernard L. Montgomery (BLM) was chosen by the CIGS to be DDE’s ground-force commander on 23^rd December 1943 and would precede DDE to London so DDE asked him to review the plan and authorised him to make changes for DDE’s approval after he returned from a visit to the States.

To obtain this enlargement OVERLORD was not able to obtain more shipping from the USN Pacific pool and retain the target for D-Day – it was too late for that.  It was necessary instead to delay D-day by a month (to 5^th June) to get that many extra landing vessels built in the UK and on the East coast of the USA;  and to postpone the complementary amphibious operation ANVIL* on the South of France (it took quite some time for these “home truths” to be settled).

   Both of these changes, necessary if D-Day was not to fail, were undesirable.  A month’s good campaigning weather was lost (it could not be forecast but May 1944 was very good weather; a bad forecast for June 5^th caused DDE to postpone D-Day by 24 hours; and the month had a bad storm** 2 weeks after D-Day which set back the enlargement of the beach-head) and another month was given to the Germans to strengthen their defences.  The delay to ANVIL (which would be re-coded as DRAGOON) meant, not only that any early assistance it could give to the Normandy battle was lost, but that it would be longer before the queue of new US divisions in the States could be shipped into Marseilles as intended (to ease L of C congestion).

*Operation names were supposed to be picked at random from a list of names which gave no clue to their intention but were serious).  OVERLORD breached that rule, as did ANVIL, the complementary operation.

**The storm wrecked the Mulberry built for the US sector.  “Good old American can do” then saved the build-up by beaching supply ships on the extensive hard sand and unloading them directly into trucks at low tide.  Between low tides they unloaded into amphibious trucks (DUKWs, a “war-winning” development; 21,000 were made).  “Rhino” powered rafts were also used to trans-ship cargo to shore.

   Altogether, it could be said that FDR made a bad decision at Quebec to accept GCM’s approval of the COSSAC plan instead of backing up WSC’s doubt about it and insisting on being shown the details.  The CIGS might then have reverted to his original opinion.  EJK’s non-compliance with “Germany First” policy might have been exposed and corrected.  Sufficient landing vessels could then have been allocated to accomplish the OVERLORD target of 1^st May 1944 that they were setting and to do the simultaneous ANVIL operation.  The war might have ended sooner and lives saved if these things had happened.

OVERLORD 6th June 1944

---

 

   An election for President of the United States of America was scheduled for 7^th November 1944.  Although FDR said he was reluctant to run again, he was nominated as the Democratic candidate on 20th July.  FDR chose Senator Harry S. Truman as running mate for the Vice-Presidency.  Truman had run a Committee from March 1941 which endeavoured to ensure that the government had got good value-for-money from the enormous war programmes – its savings were estimated as well over $10 Bn (Ref. 29).

   It is speculation, but FDR may well have thought that Truman (in a post “A heartbeat from the Presidency”) might succeed him within his given term of office..  It is not known what his doctor was telling him in mid-1944, but, when Douglas MacArthur saw him for the first time in seven years on 26^th July (see below) he recalled his impression of the President’s health “…physically he was just a shell of the man I had known.  It was clearly evident that his days were numbered” (Ref. 30).

   FDR was elected for a 4^th term and Truman with him.

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Pacific Strategy meeting, 26 – 27^th July 1944

   In the Pacific theatre in mid-1944, the situation was that General MacArthur in the South had re-captured as much of New Guinea as he intended (leaving some Japanese-held places there and on Rabaul to “wither on the vine”); and Admiral Nimitz in the Centre was about to complete the capture of the three main islands of the Marianas.  Therefore, the question was, “Where next?”

   EJK, pursuing his major interest in the Pacific, as usual, got the agreement of the US Chiefs that the forces of Nimitz and MacArthur should combine to capture Formosa as a base from which to assault Japan in 1945.  Mindinao, the Southernmost island of the Philippines, would be recaptured for an air base but Luzon, the main island, would be by-passed.  Mac Arthur, who when ordered to leave those islands to be captured by the Japanese in 1942 had promised “I will return”, naturally opposed this plan.  FDR decided that he would settle the strategy after hearing both commanders.  He travelled to Pearl Harbor, which was Nimitz’s HQ and had MacArthur ordered to come there. The two commanders presented their cases to him over 26^th and 27^th July.  The Formosa plan would avoid the heavy losses to be expected in recovering Luzon.  MacArthur’s main argument was that the USA were honour-bound to liberate the islands, as they had US Commonwealth status.  He also pointed out that by-passing Luzon would leave 300,000 Japanese in the rear of a Formosa thrust, rather a lot to “wither on the vine”.

   No official record was made of this meeting, despite it being of major importance, but it appears that FDR made no statement there in favour of either.  However, a letter from FDR to McA on 9^th August accepted his plan (Ref. 28).

   The upshot was a combined forces attack on a central island of the Philippines, Leyte, an enormous naval battle where co-ordination broke down*, fortunately without fatal results and then the liberation of Luzon.  This cost the inhabitants of Manila, viciously defended by the Japanese, a huge number of casualties in a ruined city.  It may be that Filipinos wished afterwards that they had been bypassed and liberated when Japan was beaten.

*This is described in Contribution No. 4 of www.strategyinhistory.com.

 The Yalta Conference (ARGONAUT), 4^th to 10^th February 1945

   The war situation at the time of this conference between the Big Three was as follows.

• The Russian army had reached the R. Oder, 50 miles from Berlin;
• In the West the 1^st US Army was 25 miles from Cologne on the R. Rhine, with another 300 miles to go to Berlin.  The reinforced 1^st Canadian Army was about to initiate the un-zipping of the German front from North to South so as to close up to the Rhine;
• In the air the 8^th USAAF was about to re-launch its daylight attack on Germany, now to be escorted by fighters with long-range droppable fuel tanks;
• In the Atlantic in January 1945  57k tons of shipping had been sunk, only 8% of that lost in the worst month of November 1943, for the same number of U-boats sunk – 14;
• In the Pacific the battle to re-capture Manila had just begun.  This was over 1,800 miles from Tokyo;
• By the end of 1944 US submarines had reduced the Japanese merchant shipping to 40% of its pre-war capacity;
• B-29 raids had started from India and China in June 1944, the latter over grossly-inefficient mountainous L of C.  Operations from the Mariana Islands, 1,500 miles from Tokyo, began 23^rd January 1945.

P.25 of 28

   There were political discussions at Yalta, mainly concerned with the future of Poland – which, of course, had been “liberated” by the Russians – and promptly brought under their control.  There was nothing that FDR or WSC could do about that, so a war which had begun because of the German attack on Poland was going to end with them under the Russians.

   FDR did make what was his last decision when he conceded various territorial demands from Stalin concerning Japan in order to secure a promise that Russian armies would invade Manchukuo  3 months after Germany was defeated.  Japan had very large forces there and the US wanted them prevented from returning to their homeland when, as intended, it was invaded by the Americans.

DDE decides not to go to Berlin

   When the British/Canadian 21^st Army Group, reinforced by the US 9^th Army, commanded by BLM, crossed the R. Rhine on 24^th March 1945, it was intended by DDE to advance to the R. Elbe (230 miles) and cross it on the way to Berlin (a further 75 miles).  The Russians were only 50 miles from that city but had not yet crossed the R. Oder in strength. 

   This Anglo-American operation was well on its way when DDE changed his mind.  Influenced by General Omar Bradley, commander of the US 12^th Army Group on the South of the 21^st, who predicted that to capture Berlin would cost 100,000 casualties (Ref. 32) and with intelligence reports of a possible German stand in an “Alpine Redoubt”, DDE telegraphed Stalin personally on 28^th March to say that, after encircling the Ruhr, his “…next task will be to divide the enemy’s remaining forces by joining hands with your forces.  For my forces the best axis on which to effect this junction would be Erfurt-Leipzig-Dresden; …It is along this axis I propose to place my main effort” (Ref. 26).  As this axis was well South of a drive on Berlin, this meant giving up all chance of capturing it, although there were now signs that the bulk of German troops were so in fear of Russian revenge for the crimes committed on their soil that they would not put up too much resistance to the Anglo-Americans.

   Stalin agreed with DDE’s new plan, saying that he “plans to allot secondary forces in the direction of Berlin” (Ref. 5).  He lied. 

   WSC disagreed with DDE about the possible capture of Berlin.  He tried to enlist FDR’s help in changing the plan.  In a telegram of 1^st April he wrote:- “I say quite frankly that Berlin remains of high strategic importance….The Russian armies will no doubt overrun all Austria and enter Vienna.  If they also take Berlin will not their impression that they have been the overwhelming contributor to our common victory be unduly imprinted in their minds, and may this not lead them into a mood which will raise grave and formidable difficulties in the future?”.

   It cannot be known what FDR, if in full health, might have decided.  He was now too feeble to give the question his attention.  GCM handled the subject and, as usual, supported DDE.

   FDR died on the 12^th April 1945, aged 63.

   The Russian attack on Berlin began on the 20^th April 1945.  Adolf Hitler committed suicide on the 30^th April.  The city was surrendered on 2^nd May.  It had cost the Russians 305,000 casualties (killed, wounded and missing) (Ref. 33).

   DDE saved many American and British lives by his decision of 28^th March 1945.  Very probably FDR would have agreed with his decision for that reason alone.  In the longest run it did not matter that the Western democracies did not take Berlin.  Finally, it was freed from Soviet control on the 9^th November 1989.

   Germany surrendered unconditionally on 7^th May 1945.

P.26 of 28

Epilogue

Truman’s decision to use FDR’s atomic bomb. 

                                                         Fig. 24 (Ref. 31)

   The project approved by FDR in January 1942 had resulted in a successful test of the first atomic bomb on 16^th July 1945.  Two bombs could be made available in August.  The question, requiring the approval of President Truman, was whether to save American lives by using them, knowing that the power of these weapons must cause frightful casualties to the Japanese.  Actually, B-29 area bombing with napalm incendiaries on the wood-and-paper Japanese houses built to prevent large loss of life from earth-quakes, had already caused a huge number of deaths in Tokyo and other Japanese cities.

 A warning was issued to Japan that failing to surrender would lead to “Prompt and utter destruction”.  This went unheeded.   

Truman gave the go-ahead to use the bombs.   

The result was the obliteration of the centre of Hiroshima on 6^th August 1945.

 Russia attacked Manchukuo on the 9^th August, just as Stalin had promised FDR at Yalta.   At the same date the second atomic bomb obliterated the centre of Nagasaki.

   Finally, under these colossal blows, Japan surrendered on 15^th August.

P.27 of 28

The End and the Beginning

   The Second World War, which by some reckoning began when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931, was ended on the 15^th August 1945..

   The “Cold War” between the Western democracies and the Communist Soviet Union was about to begin.  Winston Churchill later called the situation one of “Triumph and Tragedy”.

   Had FDR survived he just might have provided a better relationship with Stalin, but it was not to be.

The price paid in dollars.

Fig. 26

P.28 of 28

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