Some famous bridges in History Built; Broken; Denied; Captured; Destroyed

Persian Bridges:-  513 BC;  480 BC

The Scythian campaign

(Modern geographical names will be used where convenient)

   In 513 BC the Persian empire under King Darius extended Eastward from the shore of the Aegean Sea.  At this date he decided to make a campaign against the Scythians living on the Western shore of the Black Sea.  To do this it was necessary to pass his army across the Bosphorus.  Ref. 1 states how a “raft” – a pontoon bridge – was built in 513 BC.  Details are lacking but it would have been about 2,600 feet long*¹.  Ref.2 (linked) adds modern speculation about the bridge.  Darius’ army must have included skilled technical troops. 

*1.  It was not until 1973 that another road bridge was built, of suspension type.  In 1988 and 2016 two more were added, the third including a railway.

   Having marched over this bridge and turned Northward the Persian army eventually came to the obstacle of the R. Danube.  A second pontoon bridge was built there (Refs. 1 & 3).  While Darius pressed on, he left the bridge guarded by Ionian Greeks who had been pressed into his service.  Ref.1 tells us that this nearly led to his undoing, because they contemplated breaking the bridge and stranding him in hostile territory.  They thought better of this but a voice in favour had been a certain Militiades, of whom more below.

The Greek Campaign of Darius

  A fringe along the Agean shore of the Persian empire was colonised by Greeks from the Western side of the sea.  These Ionian Greeks were subordinate to Persian overlords but in 499 BC they revolted.  This uprising was put down over several years but it had received aid from their fellow Greeks, especially from Athens.  Naturally, this was resented by Darius.  He planned to punish them for their interference by a military expedition.

   Darius’ planning was long-term, but he eventually turned to the Greek project.  In 490 BC this was amphibious and not on a large scale.  It was defeated at the battle of Marathon , where Militiades was one of the main leaders*² .  The Persians then withdrew.

*2.  In the museum at Olympia there is displayed a heavy bronze helmet with an inscription showing it was presented to the temple of Zeus as a thank-offering by Militiades for winning the battle of Marathon.

The Greek Campaign of Xerxes

   Ten years passed and Darius was succeeded by his son, Xerxes.  He spent 3 years until 480 BC preparing to invade Greece, this time with an intention to conquer.  Once again, a bridge was needed between Asia and Europe– or rather 2 bridges, because the huge army assembled for the attack was accompanied by a supply train which marched in parallel so that its provisions were readily available to the fighting element.  Ref. 1, written about 30 years later, describes the constructional details and Ref. 4 (linked) analyses these.  The sites were near the narrows of the Dardanelles and the pontoon bridges had to span over 7,000 feet of water.

   The first bridge, built before the army arrived, was swept away by a storm.  King Xerxes had the engineers responsible beheaded!  The second pair, presumably profiting from experience, survived.  The force took a week to cross, marching night and day.

   There followed the destruction of a Spartan rear-guard at Thermopylae, and then the naval battle of Salamis where the Persian fleet was defeated.  This ended hostilities for the year and the Persians over-wintered in Greece .  In 479 BC, although they took and burnt Athens, the Persian army was beaten at Plataea.  This ended Xerxes attempt to conquer Greece.

   Fig.1 on P.2 shows the locations of the Persian bridges.

Page 2 of 21

References

1.  History of the Greek and Persian War  Herodotus  Translated G. Rawlinson  New English Library edition, abridged  1966.
2. https://second.wiki/wiki/schiffbrc3bccke_c3bcber_den_bosporus
3. Warfare Col. O. Spaulding; Capt. H. Nickerson; Col. J. Wright  Harrap  1925.
4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xerxes%27_Pontoon_Bridges

Julius Caesar’s Rhine Bridges:- 55BC;  53 BC

His first bridge

   By 55 BC Julius Caesar had conquered Gaul.  Early that year there was a large invasion of the North-East of his new-won territory by Germans who had been forced by hostile tribes from their own ground over the R. Rhine.  After part of his army had been cut-up by these newcomers, treacherously as he thought, Caesar dealt very harshly with the incursion – he uses the word “massacre” (Ref. 5).

   In a situation somewhat parallel to that of Darius with the Greeks half-a-millenium earlier, Caesar decided to mount an expedition beyond his boundary to overawe the trans-Rhine Germans so as to deter them from interfering on his side.  He had a friendly tribe over the Rhine who offered him boats for transport.  He rejected the idea as likely to lead to defeat in detail and also not in keeping with the Roman might which he wished to impress on the Germans, so decided to build the first bridge which had ever spanned the river.

Page 3 of 21

   The site chosen was just below the confluence with the R. Moselle.  Ref.5 describes the timber piled bridge in detail and Ref. 6 (linked) illustrates it.  It was about 1,000 feet long and was built in 10 days by his army, well-accustomed to constructional work.

   The Romans crossed over, un-opposed, and proceeded to act in the way which Tacitus describes in his Annals written about a century-and-half later, allegedly quoting a Pictish chieftain, “They make a desert and call it peace!”  After 18 days the army returned to the left bank and dismantled the bridge.

The second bridge

   The lesson to the German tribes had to be repeated two years later.  A second bridge was built, of the same type, a little upstream of the first site.  It took less time.  Once again, Caesar was unable to induce the Germans to oppose him in a pitched battle, as they withdrew into the thickly-forested interior.  In Ref. 5 he explains why he did not follow them because of a likely shortage of supplies from the country, but it was a sensible decision to judge by what happened in 9 AD.  Then a Roman army of 3 legions was ambushed in the Teutoberg Forest and annihilated (treachery again played a part).  In 53 BC, in returning over the Rhine, Caesar made a 200 feet gap from the right bank and built and garrisoned on the remainder a 4-storey tower.  This was his way of reminding the Germans not to send any reinforcements to rebellious Gauls.  During 52 BC, while Caesar was having to suppress the serious rebellion of Vercingetorix, the Gaulish chieftain had no aid from over the Rhine.  Conversely, Caesar hired some German cavalry to assist in defeating the rebellion.

                                                          Fig. 2 Julius Caesar

                             Believed to be the only sculpture made during his life.

References

1.  The Conquest of Gaul  J. Caesar  Translated by S. Handford  Penguin  1951.
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caesar%27s_Rhine_bridges

Stamford Bridge:-  1066

   The Persian and Caesarean bridges were “strategic”.  There is a legend of a case in which a bridge played a “tactical” role.  When the Etruscans attacked the minor settlement of Rome in the 6^th century BC, they were held at bay at the only bridge over the R. Tiber by Horatius and, initially, two companions.  This was to give time for their comrades to demolish the bridge behind them.

   It may be true.  The practical detail about demolishing the bridge suggests that it is.  In history there is a case like it which was sufficiently famous to be recorded in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle describing the battle of Stamford Bridge in 1066.

Page 4 of 21

   Contribution No. 14 covers the campaigns of King Harold Godwinson in 1066 as he strived to thwart the invasions in turn of the Norwegians in the North of England and then the Normans in the South.  In September he surprised the Northmen at Stamford Bridge, across the R. Derwent 9 miles East of York on the old Roman road from that city, which they had captured 5 days previously.  The battle which followed included a heroic lone stand which Ref. 7 (linked) describes:-

“The English advance was then delayed by the need to pass through the choke-point presented by the bridge itself. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle has it that a giant Norse axeman …. blocked the narrow crossing and single-handedly held up the entire English army. The story is that this axeman cut down up to 40 Englishmen and was defeated only when an English soldier floated under the bridge in a half-barrel and thrust his spear through the planks in the bridge, mortally wounding the axeman”.

  Clearly, the bridge decking must have been in poor condition to allow that fatal thrust.  In this case the Norwegians did not use the time gained to wreck the bridge.  The Saxons crossed it and then the Norwegians lost the battle and were practically annihilated.

Reference

•  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stamford_Bridge#cite_note-16

How King Henry V crossed the R. Somme:-  1415

   This is an example of a river crossing in which bridges were denied to the would-be crosser by enemy action.  Boats were not available and, if they had been, would not have been much use because the river had wide marshes on either side.  (Details mainly from Ref. 8).

   King Henry V of England considered that he had a title to the throne of France.  This and a specific associated claim for the recovery of Acquitaine were denied by King Charles VI of France.  Henry therefore decided to make war on him.

The capture of Harfleur

   A large-scale and well-prepared English amphibious expedition landed near the port of Harfleur on 14th August 1415 with the intention of capturing that place.  Sited as it was at the mouth of the R. Seine this was a strategic spot from which to control the river traffic to Rouen and Paris and also to provide a base for further incursions.  Although well-defended, it surrendered on the 22nd September.

The march to Calais

  After shipping home many sick people Henry then decided, against advice, to march by land directly to the port of Calais.  This had been possessed by the English since his great-grandfather, Edward III, had captured it in 1347.  By a coastal route it was about 150 miles away.  He took a force of 900 men-at-arms (swordsmen wearing plate armour) and 5,000 archers armed with 6 feet long-bows.  These weapons could fire a barrage up to 300 yards and with steel-tipped arrows could pierce the usual thickness of plate armour at 150 yards.  The barrage would be fired by the average archers and the more skilful would pick off the survivors of that with the armour-piercing barbs*¹ .

*1.  These different roles were described in the museum at Agincourt, visited in 1994.

   All men were mounted.  Baggage was carried on pack-horses.  Rations for 8 days were provided, which would see the force to Calais if the march was not interrupted.  However, as a very large French army had gathered at Rouen during the Harfleur siege, that was a risk which Henry ran and which close advisers, up to his brother Clarence (who was then sent home as “sick”!), had warned.

Page 5 of 21

The forced diversion inland

   The march began on 8^th October 1415.  The major physical obstacle was the R. Somme, about 87 miles up the coast.  Henry planned to use an old Roman tidal ford some miles inland, called Blanch Taque, over which Edward III had fought his way in 1346.  Near this on 13^th October a prisoner disclosed that, not only was the ford guarded by a French force as large as the English but the passage had ben barricaded with sharpened spikes.  The King had no option but to detour inland on the Somme left bank, hoping for an un-guarded crossing point.  For 4 days this hope was unfulfilled. as the bridges were in walled towns the English could not capture and the French moved parallel on the right bank to prevent any other crossing.  Then, knowing that the Somme made a great loop to the South some 20 miles further on, he made the bold decision to march across the chord and gain a day over the covering army on the arc.  See Fig. 3.  Provisions were running short by this time, although they had been supplemented by exactions from several towns by-passed by making threats to burn nearby villages if they were not forthcoming. 

   The English were near the walled town of Nesle by the evening of the 18^th.  Probably from scouts the longed-for news then came to the King that not one, but two, un-guarded crossings lay only a few miles further on!

                                                                                      Fig.3

Page 6 of 21

They had some minor interference from a few French. 

Meanwhile the rest of the army tore the villages to pieces to obtain materials to fill or bridge the damaged causeways.  The pack-horses of the baggage train then crossed at one ford while the fighting troops used the other.  By evening the whole force was on the right bank.

*2.  The causeway at Voyennes was built originally by the Romans ca 20 BC, being where the road which ran South-Westerly from the great 8-road node at Bagacum (now called Bavay) crossed the river (Ref.10)..  On a major highway it would have had a (presumably wooden) bridge, long gone and with no central organisation to replace it.  The French name “Voyennes” probably was derived from “Voie”, meaning “Highway”.,

  Why there was a second crossing at Bethencourt, only 1 ½ mile away is a puzzle.  Was it also of Roman origin as a precaution against Voyennes being swept away by floods?

*3.  The lines on the map are positions reached by the German attack of March 1918.  The phase line on the R. Somme was 23^rd March, the next a day later.  Visitors who would like to read more about the battle should consult Contributions 5 and 6.

The bridge of boats at Worcester:-  1651

   The tactical use of two improvised bridges of boats was an important factor in Oliver Cromwell’s victory over the Scots at the battle of Worcester on 3^rd September 1651.

   To understand how former allies became enemies a chronology is needed:-

• During the English Civil War of King Charles I against Parliament the latter sought the military aid of Scotland.  To obtain this, on 25^th September 1643 it contracted a “Solemn League and Covenant” with the Scottish Parliament.  This aimed at reforming the English Church to extirpate Episcopy and introduce Presbyterian form of worship as in Scotland;
• In January 1644 a Scottish army entered England.  A payment of £31.000 per month was promised to them (Ref. 11);
• 2^nd July 1644, in the battle of Marston Moor the Scottish army helped the Parliament forces to defeat the King’s army;
• 14^th June 1645 Parliament defeated the King in the battle of Naseby;
• 26^th November 1645, having done little for some time, the Scottish army besieged Newark together with Parliamentary forces;

Page 7 of 21

• 5^th May 1646, King Charles (a Scot, of course) surrendered to the Scottish army besieging Newark at their Southwell HQ and was made to order the Newark garrison to surrender on 8^th May;
• February 1647.  In return for £400,000 as half of the subsidy owed them, the Scottish army handed over the King to Parliament.  It then returned to Scotland;
• 26^th December 1647.  King Charles, still a prisoner of Parliament, secretly made an agreement with Scottish emissaries (“The Engagement”) to introduce Presbyterianism into England if the Scots helped him recover his throne;
• 18^th August 1648.  A Scottish army which invaded England on the King’s behalf was defeated at Preston;
• 30^th January 1649.  The King was executed;
• 1^st May 1650.  By the Treaty of Breda the exiled son of Charles I accepted the Scottish Covenant, i.e. Presbyterianism.  He landed in Scotland as Charles II on 23^rd June 1650;
• 3^rd September 1650.  Cromwell, having invaded Scotland with a Parliamentary army, defeated the Scots at Dunbar;
• 3^rd September 1651.  After invading England again the Scots, accompanied by Charles II (crowned at Scone as King of Scotland) were defeated at Worcester.

The battle

   Fig. 6 on P.8 shows the situation at around mid afternoon on the 3^rd September 1651.

   The Scottish/Royalist army had occupied Worcester on the 22^nd August and then Charles rested his troops for 5 days (Ref. 13, linked).  Cromwell, commanding the New Model Army of Parliament plus some militia, altogether about double Charles’ army, arrived in the vicinity by the 30^th.  He must then have conceived the idea of bridging the rivers near their confluence to permit operations South of the city, Powick stone bridge (see below) on the high road to Malvern being held by the Scots.  The Teme was narrow (but navigable to Powick) but the Severn there is about 100 feet across.

   Ref. 12 reports that 20 boats were collected, obviously on the R. Severn downstream of Worcester since the Scots held that city.  They would then have to be rowed or towed from the bank upstream to the confluence with the R. Teme.  With planks to form them as bridges Ref. 12 says that they were not completed until mid-afternoon on the 3^rd.September.  These bridges were constructed under the noses of the Scottish/Royalist forces on the North bank of the Teme, possibly not realising that they were being out-flanked because they were distracted by a cavalry troop crossing the Teme by a ford West of Powick bridge (Ref. 12).

.

Page 8 of 21

                                                          Fig. 6

                                                                                                                   Ref. 12

                                                                                                                        Fig. 7

References

1. The Island Race  W. Churchill  Cassell  1964.
2. Discovering Battlefields in Southern England  J. Kinross  Shire  1970.
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Worcester
4. https://britishlistedbuildings.co.uk/101349275-powick-old-bridge-worcester-bedwardine-ward#.YpIViCjMKUl

Page 9 of 21

Pontoon bridges at Oudenarde:-  1708

An example of the tactical use of organised portable pontoon bridges occurred in the battle of Oudenarde in 1708 during the war of the Spanish Succession.

   In this war the Duke of Marlborough commanding the Anglo-Dutch army in the Low Country inflicted such a defeat on the French army of King louis XIV at Ramillies in 1706 that most of Belgium fell under the control of the allies.  Unfortunately, the traditional enmity between Holland and the French-speaking part of Belgium was then exacerbated by Dutch supervision.  In1708 this resulted in Bruges and Ghent welcoming a return of the French.  Even the capital, Brussels, seemed likely to go the same way.

   Marlborough, joined once again by his joint Blenheim victor Prince Eugene (the principal general of Austria), who arrived in advance of his troops, had to try to restore the situation.  The worry of the situation, confronted by a rebuilt French army superior in numbers commanded by Vendôme, made the Englishman ill.  Nevertheless, the pair were resolved, if possible, to bring the French to battle.

   On the 9^th July 1708 Vendôme had sent cavalry to blockade the fortress of Oudenarde on the R. Scheldt, intending to follow this up with a regular siege.  Should it be captured there would then be French control of that river all the way from Ghent, just taken easily on the 6^th.  Marlborough, encamped covering Brussels from 8 miles West, marched at 2 AM on the 9^th South-West aiming at Lessines on the R. Dender which had to be crossed if he was to succour Oudenarde.  His right-hand-man, Cadogan, had been sent in advance with the wagon-borne pontoon train*¹.  They reached Lessines at midnight and immediately began to build the necessary bridges for the following army.  That arrived after a short mid -journey rest and an all-night march, at 11 AM on the 10^th.  The troops had marched 30 miles in 33 hours and arrived in good order..

*1.  A 1708 pontoon on its wagon was probably very similar to the British army design of 1867, shown here.

Page 10 of 21

who were marching behind at breakneck pace.  Meanwhile Cadogan pushed some of his force across the river.

   The cavalry of the right wing began to cross the downstream bridges at 12.30 PM.  The French had begun their own leisurely crossing of the Scheldt by pontoon bridges at Gavre during the morning, with no idea that the allies were so close – 2 days earlier they had been located 50 miles away!  When a messenger from his advanced guard told Vendôme that there were enemy troops across the river he exclaimed “The Devil must have carried them!.  Such marching is impossible!”

   There then took place an “encounter” battle, quite different from the usual pitched battles where the armies were arrayed in order before the action.  Everything was improvised as the forces arrived on each side.  The British and associated German infantry began to cross the pontoon bridges at 3 PM, having marched in all 50 miles in 60 hours. Troops were committed initially where the necessity was greatest.  Eugene was given command of the troops on the right, Marlborough took the centre.  He then instituted an encirclement of the French by having the Dutch troops, under the experienced general Overkirk, who made up the rear of his army and were crossing the Scheldt via the Oudenarde bridges, march North and then turn East.  Fig. 9 shows the situation at about 7 PM.  The Dutch deployment was delayed an hour by the breakdown of the 2 extra bridges in the fortress, for un-reported reasons.  It may be that they had been built too quickly and this was tactfully not mentioned.  The men had been travelling, building, dismantling and building again over 2 ½ days.

                                                          Fig.9.  The situation at about 7 PM

                                           The beginning of the encircling movement by the Dutch. 

                                          Vendôme has lost control of his army by fighting in the front line

The French left wing (arriving in the rear of the army) has been halted by his staff beyond the R. Norken, having received no orders.  They were advised, wrongly, that the Norken valley was marshy.

Ref. 15

   The encirclement of the French right wing was about completed at 8.30 PM when it was dusk.  In the failing light many French escaped, which would not have happened if the bridge breakdown had not delayed the encirclement

Page 11 of 21

   Marlborough ordered a halt to the fighting at 9 PM and for his men to lie on their arms until daybreak, although troops were still crossing the bridges.  About half of the French had been engaged with up to two-thirds of the allies.  9,000 French were POW.  Casualties totalled 6,000.

   Ref. 15 (the main source for details) quotes the allied loss at 3,000.  This was more than repaired by recruitment from deserters and captured mercenaries.  The psychological effect on the escaped French was such that they were referred to as the “…débris of the Grand Army” and they were found to be useless for further field service.

   When the French command was again assembled at about 10 PM the likelihood of another heavy defeat of the rest of their army if it remained on the field in the morning led them to order a retreat North-East to (treacherously retaken) Ghent.  The battle of Oudenarde was over.  Portable bridges had played a major role in the allied victory.

   An obvious question is:  “ What would have happened if the French left wing had come into action?”

The answer is that Marlborough would have deployed his Dutch troops to oppose it on the right instead of the encircling left-hand move.  No doubt he would then have employed some other tactic for the enemy’s discomfort!

References

15.  Marlborough: His Life and Times  Vol. III  W. Churchill  Harrap  1936.

This is the major source.

16. https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/12/uk-military-bridging-floating-equipment/

The bridges over the Berezina:  1812

   After Napoleon Bonaparte realised that he could not defeat Great Britain directly by invasion, he tried to ruin the country’s trade by a blockade (the “Continental System” of 1806).  Every country under his direct control or which could be influenced by fear of his military power had to cease trading with Great Britain.

   By 1812 Russia, which had accepted Napoleon’s dictat originally, was evading the blockade.  Napoleon invaded it to try to force it back in line. An army of over 400,000 was assembled in Poland, many subject and client nations being forced to contribute troops.  It entered Russia on 24^th June 1812.  Napoleon’s objective was Moscow.  Details of the Grand Army and the campaign are given in Ref.17.(linked).

   Fig. 10 on P.12 is a diagrammatic summary of the campaign (two important points are missing:-  the battlefield of Borodino 80 miles before Moscow, near the R. Moscow;  and Borisov (now Barysav) just South of Studianka.  Note also that the dates are 2 months behind actual, i.e. “Sept. 23” at Studianka = 23 November, because they were incorrectly converted from the Revolutionary calendar).

   The French Grand Army entered Moscow on the 14^th September.  By then it was down to 100,000 men as a result of disease, desertion and battle casualties.  Moscow was nearly deserted and was soon in flames, the fires probably started deliberately by the Russians to deny the occupiers billets and supplies.  The feeding of the men and horses of the Grand army was a specially weak point, there having been too much dependence on pillaging a country with a poor agriculture.

   To Napoleon’s chagrin, Tsar Alexander made no attempt to sue for peace.  Unable to stay in Moscow with inadequate provisions he was forced to retreat on the 19^th October

Page 12 of 21

   The Grand Army continued to lose men. Winter began, for which the French were not adequately clad (see the temperature chart on Fig. 10, remembering the dates 2 months behind).  Having deviated to the South from the wasted country of the advance, in hopes of plundering supplies, it reached Borisov on the R. Berezina with 50,000 men*¹ on the 23rd November 1812.

*1.  It had just been re-united with a detachment of 30,000 made at Polotsk on the advance (see Fig. 10).

                                                                                      Fig. 10

   A Russian detachment had forestalled the French to Borisov and burned the bridge.  The Berezina was only partially frozen so could not provide a means of crossing.  The Grand Army was therefore in grave danger of being attacked with no way of escape.  Emergency bridges were required desperately.  Ref. 18 gives the actual order by Berthier, Chief of Staff to Napoleon, at 4.30 AM on the 24^th November to General Éblé, in command of the Pontonniers of the army, to build bridges over the river.  A few days earlier Napoleon had ordered the 60 remaining pontoons (there had been 300 originally (Ref. 17)) and impedimenta to be burnt as slowing the army down un-necessarily!  Éblé had disobeyed this by saving the tools – and now they were vital (Ref. 18).

   While distracting the attention of the Russians in Borisov by feinting South of the town as though intending to bridge the river there, a site was selected for two bridges a few miles North of it, near Studianka. The Berezina is about 130 feet wide there.  Timber was obtained by demolishing property nearby.  The bridges had to be trestle-supported, since there was no equipment to drive piles.  Shortage of nails and cramps meant that the decking could not be fastened down.  Ref. 18 describes the construction which was started on the 25^th and completed by late on the 26^th. 

   The fighting troops crossed the river during the 27^th and 28^th, the leading corps holding off Russians advancing from Borisov.  Military police refused passage to any soldiers without weapons. 

   The pontonniers had to repair breakdowns several times.  After the soldiers had crossed, camp followers were allowed to use the bridges but there was no order and chaos resulted.  The painting by an anonymous artist shown as Fig, 11 on P. 13 seems to be related to that.

   On the 29^th the approach of the Russians from the East forced Éblé to set fire to the bridges, although there were many people left on the far side.  Most of these perished from hypothermia.

Page 13 of 21

                                                                                                     Fig. 11

   The losses continued to mount after the crossing, which was still 200 miles from the border.

   Napoleon abandoned his army on the 5^th December 1815 to return to Paris.  Numbers vary but his Grand Army staggered out of Russia on the 14^th December with only a small fraction of the host which began the campaign 5 ½ months previously

   It was the beginning of the end for Napoleon.

References

17. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_invasion_of_russia
18. The Bridges that Éblé built.
19.  https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2020/05/26/after-berezina-1812/

“Pegasus” *¹Bridge:-  6^th June 1944  (Most details from Ref. 20)

   The liberation of Western Europe from Nazi German occupation began at 00.20 on Tuesday 6^th June 1944 – D-Day for Operation Overlord. 

*1.  Named after the Airborne badge late in 1944.  The R. Orne bridge was named Horsa.

   This was the moment when the first Horsa glider of three carrying a coup-de-main party of 90 men crash -landed 90 yards from the target, the bascule bridge near Bénouville carrying the D514 Eastwards to Cabourg over the Canal de Caen á la Mer.  The 6^th Airborne Division was to follow half an hour later to begin to form an air-head up to 4 miles from the Orne as flank protection at the Eastern end of the Normandy beach-head.  The capture of this bridge intact (and the associated bridge over the R. Orne 900 yards further East) was necessary to enable reinforcements to be passed quickly into the air-head from the later arrival of the seaborne forces on the beach Sword Queen Red 4 miles to the North.

   The commander of both bridge assault parties was Major John Howard, in the leading glider.  He and his men were from the 2^nd Battalion of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry plus RE sappers, part of the 6^th Airborne,.  They and their glider pilots had trained for 3 months, the last few weeks at the bascule bridge over the Countess Weir canal near Exeter.

Page 14 of 21

   The perfect landings made near the Canal are shown on Fig. 12.  The point glider actually cut through the barbed wire entanglement around the bridge.  The descent had been near-enough silent.

                                                                               Fig. 12

The precision of the landing is shown well on Fig. 13 (below).  It was the near-miraculous feat, in the dark, of Staff Sergeant Wallwork of the Glider Pilots Regiment.

Page 15 of 21

The assault

   The Halifax aircraft which had towed the gliders had gone on to bomb Caen and this noisy air raid had distracted the Germans posted to defend the bridges.  They were taken completely by surprise.  The Canal guard NCO managed to wound mortally the leading platoon commander (Lt. Dennis Brotheridge), who became the first army casualty of the liberation*², but his men had secured the bridge in a few minutes.  Although wired for demolition the charge had not been placed as no alert had been issued to the German troops defending Normandy.

   The Orne river bridge was secured even more easily because, although only one Horsa landed near the bridge, the guards ran away as soon as the British appeared.

   The sea-borne reinforcement for the air-head by Commandos of the 1^st Special Service Brigade was planned to arrive at 12.00 and reached the bridge at about 13.00 (Ref.21).  In the mean-time the men at the Canal bridge, reinforced at 03.00 by paratroopers from the air-head, had beaten off a German tank-led counter-attack from Bénouville.  The tank was destroyed with a PIAT, the most powerful weapon they possessed.

*2.  There had been many thousand casualties in the allied air forces in the preparation for D-Day.

[Written on D-Day + 78 years]

Development of the Orne Bridgehead

   With the capture of the twin bridges the air-head of the 6^th Airborne became a bridgehead, not just defending the East end of the whole Normandy landings but also a base for attacking South to the East of Caen.  For this purpose when the 51^st Highland Division arrived it was concentrated in it.  Unfortunately, its attacks were unsuccessful.

   Extra bridges were begun by about 12 June.  To enable Operation Goodwood*³ to be launched from the Orne bridgehead by 3 armoured divisions on 18^th July, a total of 8 extra Bailey*⁴ bridges was built, in 4 pairs over the canal and river, named:-

Tay 1 and 2; London 1 and 2; York 1 and 2; Tower 1 and 2 (Ref. 23).

These bridges were carried on pontoons over the 250 feet wide canal (Pegasus, because of its abutments, was only 90 feet) and 180 feet river.

They were Class 40 capacity, i.e .could take a 40-tons vehicle (the Sherman Firefly tank weighed 35 tons).  Ref. 23 reports that London No. 2 (see Fig. 14) was built in 50 hours and York No 2 in 25 hours, presumably as a result of learning.

*3. See Contribution No. 9 at B5

*4.  The design and construction of Bailey bridges are detailed in Ref. 22.

                                                                        Fig. 14  London No. 2

    The airborne coup-de-main at night was a 100% success in Normandy.  Unfortunately, for the next capture of a vital bridge, it was ruled out as impossible as will be described next.

Page 16 of 21

References

20. Dawn of D-Day  D.Howarth  Collins  1959.
21. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegasus_Bridge#
22. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bailey_bridge.
23. After the Battle No. 1. Ed. W. Ramsey  After the Battle Prints  1973.

“The bridge too far”: Arnhem:-  17^th September 1944

   It seems that Lt. General Browning, as commander of the 1^st Airborne Corps, replied to Field Marshal Montgomery, after discussing with him the Operation Market-Garden plan for Urquhart’s 1^st Airborne Division to seize and hold for 2 days the bridge over the Lower Rhine at Arnhem,

 “We can hold it for four.  But I think that we might be going a bridge too far” (Ref.24 and also Ref. 25, linked).

   Unfortunately, the prediction was true.

   Another prediction, by Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands to Montgomery, that the intended relieving troops would find it hard to advance 60 miles at speed along the single raised highway over the low-lying ground to Arnhem was also true (Ref. 26, linked).

The decision not to use coup-de-main tactics

   Despite the success of the coup-de-main tactics in Normandy just over 3 months earlier they were not used at Arnhem.  This was because the air commanders feared that flak would cause too many casualties.  They were also concerned that the ground South of the bridge was too soft for glider landings. Urquhart wrote (Ref. 24) “An airborne operation remains the airmen’s responsibility until such time as the troops are put on the ground.  The airmen had the final say, and we knew it”.

   In the event the potential losses from such problems – dangers which the tough volunteers of the airborne troops were ready to face – were probably far less than resulted from landing over several days of an airborne division (about 10,200 men, including glider pilots.  Ref. 27, linked) 6 to 8 miles from the target and later a brigade (of Poles;  about 1700 men.  Ref. 27).  Only one reinforced battalion of 750 men reached the bridge on the 17^th (see Fig. 15 on P.17).  Despite their utmost efforts they could only hold the North end for 3 days and 4 nights.

Everything went wrong

   Apart from the special heroics of the men who reached the Arnhem bridge and those of the American paratroopers who crossed the R Waal at Nijmegen under fire to enable the bridge there to be captured on the way to relieve the British at Arnhem, the only thing to be said about Market-Garden is that everything went wrong.  Many reports and books have listed those things.

   Perhaps one point not emphasised in the writings is that, because the landings in Normandy were delayed by one month, the September weather gravely handicapped the operation.  This delay came about from shortage of landing craft because the Combined Chiefs of Staff had allowed the US Navy to plan a major amphibious operation in mid-Pacific only 46 days after the scheduled Normandy D-Day (1^st May).  They thereby negated their own agreed principle of “Germany First” *¹.

*1.  See also Contribution 7 at PP.22/23 and Contribution 9 at C1.

[The author can add something about the people at home listening anxiously to broadcasts from the

BBC war correspondent Stanley Maxted, late in the operation.  Signing off he said:-

“That’s all from Arnhem at tea-time”  (pause)  “only, there isn’t any tea!”.]

Page 17 of 21

                                                                                                                   Fig. 15

Details of the battle are given in Ref. 28 (linked)

Winston Churchill’s view of Market-Garden

   PM Churchill, a man always ready for action and frequently scornful of in-action, wrote to F/M Smuts on 9^th October 1944:-

“I have not been afflicted by any feeling of disappointment over this and am glad our commanders are capable of running this kind of risk” (Ref. 29).

References

24. Arnhem  R. Urquhart with W.Greatorex  White lion  1958.
25. http://www.battle-of-arnhem.com/the-statement-a-bridge-too-far-was-made-before-the-battle-of-arnhem/
26. http://www.battle-of-arnhem.com/montgomery-was-the-only-one-who-thought-market-garden-was-90-percent-successful/
27. https://marketgarden.com/2010/UK/statistics/statis1.html
28. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Arnhem
29. The Second World War Vol. VI  W. Churchill  Cassell  1954.

The bridge at Remagen:  7^th March 1945

   “Hot dog, Courtney!  This will bust him wide open!”.  Omar Bradley, commander of the US 12^th Army Group, exclaimed to the commander of his 1^st Army (Courtney Hodges) on the 7^th March 1945 when he telephoned in the evening with the totally unexpected news that his men had captured the Ludendorff railway bridge over the R. Rhine at Remagen, only slightly damaged (Ref. 30).

   The epic action is comprehensively described in Ref. 31 (linked) so does not need to be covered here*^{1 and 2}.

*1.  The Remagen bridge was planned to be built in 1912 to assist in getting troops into place to carry out the Schlieffen Plan.  Work actually did not start until 1916 and it was not completed in time for the massive East-to-West transfer of troops carried out to enable the 21^st March 1918 attack on the British (see Contributions Nos. 5 and 6).  It was available for US occupation troops to march across it in December 1918 (Refs 32 and 33 (both linked))!

Page 18 of 21

*2.  The Company commander, Lt. Timmerman, whose men stormed the bridge and who was the first officer across, was the grandson of a German émigré to the USA, the son of a soldier of the1918 US occupation army on the Rhine and his  German wife, born in Germany.

Planner’s objections to exploitation

   It is interesting that a senior planner of Eisenhower (the Supreme Commander)’s staff, who was with Bradley at the time he received the good news, was dismissive of it because “It just doesn’t fit into the Plan!” (Ref. 30).  The Plan was that the main effort to cross the Rhine would be by Montgomery’s 21^st Army Group (with the US 9^th Army alongside and under command) about 90 miles further North, with a start date of 23rd March.  This would debouch into flat terrain which the allied armour could exploit.  Montgomery’s understanding of Eisenhower’s intentions was that after the Rhine his thrust would proceed at full speed to cross the R. Elbe, and his preparation for the Rhine crossing took that further crossing into account.

Eisenhower’s decision to exploit

   However, Eisenhower was not going to lose a chance to develop from Remagen.  Bradley when he phoned, after hearing the staff man’s doubts, for confirmation of his action to push as many troops as possible over the Rhine, got it immediately.   

    

Fig.16    

                        The central span collapsed on 17^th March, killing engineers struggling to make it safe.

Eisenhower changes the Plan

Page 19 of 21

  

He added:- “…the axis on which my Tactical Headquarters move will be…MUNSTER…HANOVER – thence via the Autobahn to BERLIN I Hope” (Ref.34)..

   Montgomery knew he was ignoring an Eisenhower directive (SCAF247) issued on 25^th March that the Ruhr was to be surrounded and mopped-up before any further Eastward advance.  The German army by this date was nearly immobile for lack of fuel, so there was no serious danger in by-passing it.

   However, by this date Eisenhower had decided three things:-

1. Not to go for Berlin*³;
2. Give Bradley and the US forces the kudos of finishing-off the Germans in the West;
3. Guard against the Intelligence-perceived “Alpine Redoubt” (see Contribution 9 at C5).

He therefore shot back to Montgomery his FWD18272 on 28^th March:-

“…my present plans being coordinated with Stalin*⁴ are:-

As soon as you have joined hands with Bradley in the Kassel-Paderborn area Ninth United States Army will revert to Bradley’s command.

Bradley will be responsible for…the Ruhr…and..deliver his main thrust on…Leipzig…to join hands with the Russians” (see Fig. 18 sketch map, noting that this axis runs across hilly country).

He added, what can only be described as a snub, to Montgomery:-

“The mission of your army group will be to protect Bradley’s northern flank”.

                                                                        Fig. 18

*3.  This was more-or-less inevitable.  Montgomery’s forces on the 28^th March were still 220 miles from the R. Elbe which would have to be crossed, although probably against weak opposition, and then another 75 miles to Berlin.  The Russians would have to cross a heavily-defended R.Oder but would then be only 50 miles from the capital (they did not attack until 16^th April). 

   When asked by Eisenhower for an estimate of casualties to take Berlin, Bradley had said 100,000 (Ref. 30) (his only measure of city-fighting casualties would have been the capture of Aachen in October 1944 – 7.000).  The big unknown was how the Germans in general would fight to prevent Berlin being captured by the Western allies, knowing how they would suffer against the Russians but with SS fanatics, directly under Hitler’s eye, liable to hang anyone trying to surrender easily.   Stalin’s Soviet Union was likely to ignore casualties in order to raise the Red flag over the Reichstag.

*4.  Eisenhower, completely without informing anyone else, had cabled the US Military Mission in Moscow on the same day, for onward transmission to Stalin, that he was not going to go for Berlin (Ref. 35).  Stalin lied and replied that he was only allocating secondary forces to it on his side.  The capture cost the Russians 305,000 casualties (Ref. 36).

Page 20 of 21

The junction of the West and Eastern allies

   Eisenhower halted his central German thrust on the R. Elbe in order to prevent any accidents when meeting the Russians.  Hands were joined with them on the bridge at Torgau, 35 miles North-East of Leipzig on the 25^th April 1945.

The race to seal-off the Danish peninsula

   Although Eisenhower had plans to cut off the Schleswig-Holstein peninsula, this was to prevent German forces retreating into Denmark. Having taken back the 9th US army from Montgomery on the 3^rd April he now found it necessary to offer him the US XVIII Corps because the 21^st Army Group had their hands full with liberating Holland up to the inundations, capturing Bremen and obtaining the surrender of Hamburg.  It was Churchill on 19^th April, writing to the British Foreign Secretary in Washington, who raised the point that Montgomery’s troops should capture Lubeck, at the base of the peninsula, “…before our Russian friends   “ (Ref. 29), so as to prevent them occupying Denmark.  Whether this was passed to the US Chiefs is not known to this author, but Eisenhower did get the point and Montgomery got the XVIII corps.  From Elbe bridgeheads on 30^th April the 11^th Armoured division captured Lubeck on the 2^nd May*⁵ and 6^th Airborne division, attached to the US Corps, took Wismar a few miles further East along the coast the same day, a few hours ahead of the Russians (Ref. 37).

*5.  The Cromwell tanks of the division were fitted with speed governors on their Rolls-Royce Meteor engines to prevent undue track wear.  For the dash to Lubeck these governors were un-coupled!  [Private information from an 11^th veteran.]

Surrender of all German forces in front of 21^st Army Group

   After Eisenhower changed his mind for post-Rhine operations because of the fortuitous capture of the Remagen bridge, it gave Bradley’s US 12^th Army Group the glory of the major role in destroying the German army in the West, wiping out the memory of the Ardennes surprise of December 1944.

   However, it fell to Montgomery to achieve for the British and Canadian 21^st Army Group (with attached Polish troops) a military event of a sort which did not come 4-Star General Bradley’s way.  On the 4^th May 1945 all the German forces (including naval) in North-West Germany, Holland and Denmark surrendered un-conditionally to Field Marshal Montgomery personally.

References

30. A Soldier’s Story  O. Bradley  Eyre & Spottiswoode  1951.
31. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Remagen#Bridge_construction_and_design
32. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Ludendorff_Bridge
33. https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/HD/Brief%20Histories/Barnes%20Occupation.pdf?ver=2019-05-24-133416-423&timestamp=1558719232689
34. Monty Vol. 3: The Field Marshal 1944-1978  N. Hamilton  Sceptre edition  1987.
35. Crusade in Europe  D. Eisenhower..Heinemann  1948.
36. The road to Berlin  J. Erickson  Phoenix 1996.
37. Normandy to the Baltic  B. Montgomery  Hutchinson  1947.

Page 21 of 21

Russian bridges destroyed in Ukraine

   Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022 as a further escalation of an undeclared war which began in February 2014.  Previous events had been the seizure of the Crimea by Russian troops without national badges and Russian support for separatists in the Eastern part of Ukraine.

   On 13^th May 2022 Ukraine reported details of how their forces had smashed an attempt to cross the Siverskyi Donets river in the Eastern region of the country (Ref. 38).

   Having been detected by a reconnaissance team, artillery was directed on the two floating bridges with the result seen on Fig. 19.

                                                                                                                   Fig. 19