Two events in WW2 which, in themselves, were nothing more than “pinpricks” into the enemy’s hide became the cause of major changes in his strategy because they were considered to be a loss of “face” which demanded revenge. When these changes turned out to be major mistakes they altered the course of the war – in the favour of the Western Allies, Great Britain and the USA.
The first RAF raid on Berlin 25/26 August 1940
In August 1940 the Luftwaffe were targeting the RAF fighter bases in Southern England and it was becoming increasingly difficult to prevent damage which was degrading the aerial defence of that area. Failure to prevent the Luftwaffe from establishing superiority would make it possible for the Germans to launch the cross-Channel attack “Sealion” which was being organised to put their army ashore to fight a British army with very little heavy arms left after the Dunkirk evacuation.
By navigational mistake some German bombs were dropped in the night of 24/25 August at the centre of London. This was actually contrary to Hitler’s orders, since he still hoped that Great Britain would seek peace with him.
Churchill ordered * immediately a retaliatory raid on Berlin, never before attacked by the RAF, and this was carried out on the following night 25/26 August. Details are vague, but it seems that around 50 Hampdens were dispatched to Berlin which, being at their extreme range, meant that the planes probably carried only 1,000 lb of bombs each. It may be as few as 20 aircraft actually bombed the city (Shirer diary).
Damage was negligible (Middlebrook) but the moral effect was enormous (Shirer). Hitler was furious – he and Goering had assured the Berliners that no enemy aircraft could penetrate the double ring of flak. On 4 September Hitler gave a speech in which he promised a multiplication of the RAF bombs on England to raze their cities.
The Luftwaffe therefore shifted its targeting to London. On 6/7 September a night raid was mounted and, more significantly, the next day a large force of bombers did much damage in daylight. Raids on the city then continued by night and day.
The RAF bases, relieved of further damage, recovered their efficiency and the fighter defence of England proceeded to inflict losses on the Luftwaffe which the enemy found unacceptable. A climax on 15 September brought about 60 German aircraft losses, roughly equal bomber and fighter, with perhaps 150 crewmen being either killed or captured. The RAF loss was 29 fighters with 16 pilots killed.
The Luftwaffe was then seen by the Germans to have failed to gain aerial superiority and “Sealion” was postponed by Hitler on 17 September and never remounted.
The multiplication of the RAF “pinprick” by the furious reaction of Hitler to his loss of “face” saved the day for the RAF and almost certainly for Great Britain. In a way it was a direct duel between Churchill and Hitler and Hitler lost.
* See a discussion of this at the end of the note.
The USAF raid on Tokyo on 18 April 1942
President Roosevelt sought revenge for the unscrupulous attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 by a raid on Tokyo. The USN found it would be possible to fly the B25 twin-engined USAF bomber off a carrier’s deck to accomplish that task at a range where the launching ship could expect to escape a pre-emptive Japanese attack, given complete surprise (something not possible with normal single-engined carrier-borne aircraft).
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Accordingly, 16 B25s were launched from USS Hornet about 650 miles offshore on 18 April 1942, led by Lt. Col. Doolittle, a successful pre-war racing pilot. Each dropped 2,000 lb of bombs at various places in the Japanese capital and 3 other cities. The intention was to fly on and land in China, but bad weather and a failure to radio an advisory message to the Chinese prevented this from being carried out and all the planes were lost (bar one interned in neutral Russia). Seven crewmen lost their lives, including 3 shot by the Japanese after capture – but there was enormous loss of Chinese civilian lives when the Japanese sought viciously for the crews who had crash-landed or baled-out over the mainland.
Damage in Japan was minimal, except for delay to a light carrier conversion at Yokosuka.
However, the Japanese had suffered a colossal loss of “face” because bombs had landed on the city of the “divine” Emperor (although his palace had been specifically not targeted.
Japanese strategy post Pearl Harbor had been to establish a mid-Pacific patrol/defence line through Wake Island after this was captured on 22 December 1941, as it was thought that to go further would over-stretch their resources. The USN/USAF task force had penetrated this line (although then encountering a ring of small patrol vessels which had precipitated the B25 launch further out than planned, a cause of greater fuel consumption contributing to the failure to find Chinese airfields). Admiral Yamamoto had already been pressing to go further and capture Midway Island, 1,200 miles further on so as to threaten next the Hawaiian Islands. Two days after the Tokyo raid the Japanese General Staff decided to take that further step. A very large force was assembled for the purpose.
Penetration of Japanese cipher communications enabled the USN to place a defending force of 3 carriers near Midway, unknown to the enemy. On 4 June 1942, despite great loss of Midway-based and carrier-launched torpedo aircraft, the USN dive bombers sank all 4 large fleet carriers in the attacking fleet for the loss of 1 US carrier. Many of the highly-trained and experienced enemy carrier plane crews went down with their ships. From that day onward, as the USA built ever more ships, the decision in the Pacific in their favour was never in doubt although it would be costly.
Once again a mere “pinprick” had led through human vanity to, what was for the enemy, a disastrous change in his strategy. The mental duel between Roosevelt and Yamamoto was won by the American.
Conclusions
Cold-headed calculations would not have proposed the “pinpricks” on Berlin or Tokyo. The multiplication of their effect due to human vanity could not have been foreseen and in each case the enemy response provoked might have been fatal to the “pinpricker”! But, in each case the “kneejerk” response was itself unsound because it represented a gamble – that London could be “razed” or that the RAF could be defeated in the air while defending it and that either result was worth more than to continue the writing-down of the RAF bases; – and that the capture of Midway beyond a carefully-chosen defence perimeter would provoke a decisive and successful battle with the USN. What turned both tides was that, although only capable of launching “pinprick” attacks, the quality of the UK and US forces in defence was much higher than their enemies realised.
Therefore, a “pinprick” can only be recommended as a practical operation of war if the likely enemy magnified response is evaluated fully against the defensive force available.
* Churchill’s responsibility for the RAF attack on Berlin
Churchill did not claim in his account of WW2 to have ordered the Berlin attack 25/26 August 1940 and Gilbert’s biography is also silent on that. At first, since the result was favourable to winning the Battle of Britain, this silence is very surprising. However, it must be remembered that it provoked raids on London which cost a great many lives. Clearly, Churchill did not wish to be accused of sacrificing them, especially as the beneficial effect on the RAF defence could not have been foreseen at the time of launching the raid, so it could not have been pleaded that it was intended for the greater good of the country. Of course, the Luftwaffe would have turned against London later, in any case.
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Terraine also, noting that the raid was a retaliation which “deeply pleased” Churchill, does not say he ordered it and does say that the Air Staff were not pleased. That being so, it must mean superior orders were issued and issued as soon as the morning of 25 August so that the raid could take place that night . Middlebrook says the War Cabinet sanctioned it. Considering the timescale, that seems unlikely. Terraine being an anti-Churchill author obviously did not wish to credit him with – what turned out to be – an advantageous change in the German strategy!
Drew Middleton, a US correspondent present in London at the time, later wrote bluntly: “Bomber Command, on the Prime Minister’s order, retaliated with a raid on Berlin” (“The Sky Suspended”, p.135).
Conclusion
Churchill did order the retaliatory raid, possibly seeking War Cabinet approval afterwards (and he dominated that body) but preferred not to seek post-war credit for altering history because of the British casualty consequences.
Illustrations
References
Berlin Diary W. Shirer SphereWEdition 1972.
The Berlin Raids M. Middlebrook Cassell 2000.
The Right of the Line J. Terraine Wordsworth edition 1997.
The Sky Suspended D. Middleton Secker & Warburg 1960.